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ABSTRACT 
TRANSCENDING SUBJECTS: HEGEL AFTER AUGUSTINE,  
AN ESSAY ON POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
 
 
Geoffrey J. D. Holsclaw, B.A., M.Div. 
 
Marquette University, 2013 
 
 
From where do political reformers and radicals come who are willing and 
prepared to challenge the status quo?  Where are people formed who are capable of 
initiating change within a political system?  Some worry belief in transcendence closes 
off authentic political engagement and processes of transformation.  Others think that a 
transcendent orientation is the only means to protect and promote a more free and just 
society. Some see a positive commitment to transcendence as inimical to democratic 
practices, while others see such a commitment as indispensible for such a project.  These 
general issues concern transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity as they bear on the 
question of political transformation.  
Explaining the differences between these fundamental orientations prompts an 
investigation of the philosophical and theological systems of Hegel and Augustine.  
Examining Hegel and Augustine around the issues of transcendence and freedom offers a 
way to understand these more localized disagreements between political philosophers and 
theologians, and even between theologians. 
This dissertation examines Hegel, because after the recent demise of Kantian 
liberalism in the forms of Rawls and Habermas, many are returning to Hegel as the 
original critic of Kantian philosophy specifically, and of Enlightenment secularism 
generally.  This return to Hegel has produced a larger amount of research that dislodges 
the easily caricaturized Hegel of dialectical monism and political conservativism, 
creating the possibility of a more positive deployment of Hegel within philosophy and 
politics. Concerning Augustine, in one sense his theology is perennial for theology, 
whether accepted or rejected.  But in addition to this, just as with Hegel many are 
beginning to question the received Augustine, mining his texts within his own cultural 
and theological milieu rather than merely as the beginning of supposedly unfavorable 
theological developments.  The time is ripe for an engagement between these two 
stalwarts of theology and philosophy in order to illuminate the similarities and 
differences and make clear their contemporary relevancy. 
This dissertations will argue that Hegel best represents a philosophy of ‘self-
transcending immanence’ that promotes freedom by standing in opposition to 
transcendence, and that Augustine best respresents a theology of ‘self-immanenting 
transcendence’ as the only possible hope for the true freedom.
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
There is another world and it is this world. 
- Franz Wright 
 
Theology seems to have lost its place, unsure to which world it belongs.  Does 
theology, God, or the gods live within this world or do they journey toward another?  
And if to another world, what is its nature and its relation to this world?  One could posit 
another world superimposed upon this one, interacting unperceivably, relating 
irreducibly. But a second could posit another world as merely a reflection, reification, or 
projection of this world.  This other world is a false, but perhaps necessarily, production 
propelled up from below.  The first truly affirms another world; the second critically 
accepts it. For those truly affirming another world, it is this world that is thereby 
changed, cognitively if not materially, in reference to the other.  For those critically 
affirming another world, it is the other world that is changed, either into a persistent 
illusion or an illusive projection.  And between these two orientations is a world of 
difference, philosophically and theologically. 
 
Transcendence, Immanence, Subjectivity, Freedom 
 
 Speaking of this world and another world, a world beyond, speaks of 
transcendence and immanence. What is transcendent to what? From what perspective is 
something immanent to something else?  Transcendence is always transcendence of a 
world.  But which world, and whose? In the classical perspective transcendence refers to 
something like a transcendent world above (invisible, immutable, eternal) making 
intelligible the immanent world below (visible, changeable, temporal) of which we are a 
  
 
2 
part, subjects caught within and between these two worlds (spirited bodies or embodied 
spirits). Transcendence “is that which is beyond the visible and temporal world of 
humans, but as such, it is reached by humans in the movement beyond themselves.”1 The 
transcendence of the immanent world is a movement beyond, a movement that subjects in 
some way accomplish.  This transcendence, therefore, is doubled: first as that which is 
beyond the world, and second, as the act by which subjects reach this transcendence as a 
form of self-transcendence. 
In the modern turn toward the subject, however, the doubling of transcendence 
(transcendence of the world and transcendence of subjectivity) turns to a doubling of 
immanence. After the turn toward the subject, begun by Descartes and completed in 
Kant, this world below is not grounded in a transcendent world above, but is grounded in 
the subject itself.  With Descartes the metaphysics of transcendence is replaced with the 
metaphysics of subjectivity such that the world beyond the subject is the non-subjective 
world of immanent objects.  This rebounds into the shrinking of immanence from 
encompassing the entire world of material objects to encompassing the world of thought 
representing these objects to a subject. In modernity, “immanence is no longer the world 
within our reach…but is our own subjectivity” representing the world of objects.2  This 
creates a doubling of immanence: first as the world in opposition to otherworldly 
transcendence, and second as the immanence of thought to the subject.  In this regard, 
modern subjectivity frames the problem of transcendence as the world of immanent 
                                                
1 Arne Grøn, “Subjectivity and Transcendence: Problems and Perspectives,” in 
Subjectivity and Transcendence, ed. by Arne Gron, Iben Damgaard and Soren Overgaard 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. K), 11. 
2 Grøn, “Subjectivity and Transcendence,” 12. 
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objects the subject is seeking to grasp, rather than as a transcendence beyond the world of 
such objects. 
Obviously, the issues of transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity are always 
intimately woven together and concern a fundamental “matter of orientation in 
philosophy.”3  Oriented around the subject, to speak of the transcendence of the world is 
to ask if and how there is a world other than subjectivity and how subjectivity must deal 
with or takes account of this worldly transcendence.  This could be called the question of 
epistemological transcendence.  But oriented around the world itself, to speak of the 
transcendence of the world is to ask about the being of the world and its beyond, if there 
is a beyond.  This could be called the question of ontological transcendence.4  Each 
orientation entails shifting the primary definition of immanence and includes an account 
of the self-transcendence of the subject.  Epistemological transcendence construes 
immanence as that which is thinkable for subjectivity.  Ontological transcendence 
construes immanence as the totality of beings, or being itself, which may or may not be 
thinkable for consciousness.  Of course neither orientation cancels out the other, and the 
question of subjectivity is integral to both.  In either case, transcendence implies some 
sort of human self-transcendence as the movement beyond the immanence of thought.5 
 The complex weaving together of these elements reveal the basis for the title of 
this work: transcending subjects.  On the one hand, ‘transcending’ can be an adjective 
describing “subjects”. This places the emphasis on the subject and its act of transcending, 
                                                
3 Grøn, “Subjectivity and Transcendence,”12. 
4 The distinction between ‘ontological transcendence’ and ‘epistemology transcendence’ 
comes from Merold Westphal, Transcendence and Self-Transcendence: On God and the 
Soul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Westphal also adds ‘ethical 
transcendence’. 
5 Grøn, “Subjectivity and Transcendence,” 30. 
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referring specifically to the self-transcending process by which subjectivity moves 
beyond its own immanent world of thought.6  On the other hand, ‘transcending’ could 
also be a present participle acting upon ‘subjects’ as its object.  This would place the 
emphasis not on the subject that transcends, but on the active transcending of 
subjectivity, i.e. the subject is being transcended by and to something else.  These two 
ways of reading the title, that subjects actively transcend and that subjects are 
transcended, is the central problem of this study. 
An introduction such as this cannot endlessly qualify transcendence, subjectivity, 
and immanence in advance of the planned discussion of Hegel and Augustine.  Therefore 
we will modify William Desmond’s classification regarding transcendence as a baseline 
for our investigation.7  What Desmond calls first transcendence (T1) regards the 
transcendence of external objects in the world, related but not reducible to conscious 
thought.  Second transcendence (T2) is the self-transcendence of subjectivity as it relates 
to, yet exceeds and is not reducible to, first transcendence.  This is the self-transcending 
power of thought about external objects and its freedom within this world of objects.  
Third transcendence (T3) refers to a beyond in relation to both nature/being (T1) and 
subjectivity (T2).  This third type of transcendence is typical of religious or metaphysical 
thought and recently has received an endless onto-theological critique.  Because this 
investigation is not concerned directly with a philosophy or theology of nature, we will 
combine the first two into a single category in what will be called ‘self-transcending 
                                                
6 Of course, posing the problem this way seems to make an absolute distinction between 
thought and reality, something problematized by Hegel. In due course we will see how 
Hegel formulates his own understanding of subjectivity’s own self-transcendence. 
7 William Desmond, Hegel’s God: Counterfeit Double? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 
2-7. 
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immanence’. Self-transcending immanence affirms the non-reducible interrelation 
between the transcendence of objects and the self-transcendence of subjects. The second 
category affirms an actual transcendence in the ontological sense, and I will just use the 
word ‘transcendence’ to signify this ontological meaning. 
Hegel will guide our understanding of this self-transcending immanence and his 
critical affirmation of another world.  As we will see, Hegel critically affirms 
transcendence as the necessary passage of thought’s self-determining freedom within this 
world.  For Hegel, to truly affirm another world is to hinder freedom in this world.  In 
this sense, actual transcendence competes with the freedom of self-transcendence.  On the 
other hand, Augustine’s orientation towards transcendence offers an alternative vision 
and practice of freedom.  Augustine sees God’s transcendence not merely as an opposed 
‘other’ (whether epistemic or ontological), but gives an account of God’s ‘self-
immanenting transcendence’ in which God comes into this world in order to re-establish 
freedom.8  This study will read “Hegel after Augustine,” as the subtitle suggests, arguing 
that Augustine offers a fundamental orientation regarding transcendence, immanence, 
and subjectivity. 
 
A Radical Political Subjectivity? 
 
This study, however, will farther restrict itself by not merely focusing on these 
philosophical and theological problems, but will ask about political possibilities. Within 
their broader orientations between transcendence and immanence, Hegel and Augustine 
                                                
8 Of course, the cogency and plausibility of these distinctions between Hegel’s ‘self-
transcending immanence’ and Augustine’s ‘self-immanenting transcendence’ can only 
seen at the end of our investigation.  As of yet they only have heuristic value in positing 
different fundamental orientations in philosophy and theology.   
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represent two forms of understanding freedom and social change.  The general questions 
of transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity will therefore run through the specific 
questions of radical political subjectivity and its capacity for both engaging in social 
criticism and offering substantial change.  It is for this reason the second subtitle claims 
this to be “an essay on political theology.” 
 To understand the issues surrounding the possibility of a radical political 
subjectivity within Hegel and Augustine let us first observe a recent interaction between 
Romand Coles and Stanley Hauerwas.  Coles seeks to express the possibilities of a 
radical democracy understood as a receptive generosity.  Hauerwas points to a radical 
ecclesiology expressing itself as repentant orthodoxy.  Their dialogue, captured in 
Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: Conversations between a Radical 
Democrat and a Christian, will serve to clarify the terms of this inquiry regarding a 
political subjectivity capable of social criticism and change.9 
 
Romand Coles: Radical Democracy as Receptive Generosity  
 
Away from the corporate mega-state, which contains a rhetoric of democracy 
even while eroding its possibility, Romand Coles seeks a radical democracy, a democracy 
never fully in possession of itself, a democracy that is fugitive in nature.10  Unlike the 
attempts to gain a share of State power, radical democracy attempts to share power 
                                                
9 Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical 
Ordinary: Conversations between a Radical Democrat and a Christian (Eugene, Oregon: 
Cascade Books, 2007). 
10 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 307.  Coles is 
drawing from Sheldon Wolin’ s Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in 
Western Political Thought, Expanded Edition (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004), 
ch. 17 where Wolin sets forth this idea. 
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through a persistent tending to others as a process of mutual benefit.11  The characteristics 
of such a radical democracy consist in tension-dwelling practices between 1) the past and 
future, 2) receptive listening and prophetic voicing, 3) immediate goals and deep 
transformation, and 4) cultivating local habits and the habit of de-habituation.12  Radical 
democracy is enabled by a receptive generosity and reciprocal mutuality where each 
person is open to the other, never fully in possession of oneself.  This generosity and 
mutuality is cultivated by liturgies—body practices—that form in participants the 
capacities of patience, care, dialogue, courage, and fortitude.13  Radical democracy, 
therefore, is not a system of governance guided by a constitution, but a continual process 
guided by the individuals constituting it. 
 In his desire for radical democracy, Coles admits to being haunted by John 
Howard Yoder, whose ecclesial politics, or radical ecclesiology, embodies many traits of 
radical democracy (tension dwelling, generous receptivity, reciprocal mutuality, body 
practices, and non-coercive relations).14  But even in this haunting, Coles has two crucial 
concerns in regard to Hauerwas’ appropriation and extension of Yoder.  First (in the form 
of a question), could not the centrality of Christ for Yoder (and Hauerwas) lead 
unexpectedly to anti-democratic practices of exclusion?  In other words, does not the 
emphasis Hauerwas places on orthodoxy lead to the inability of practicing generous 
receptivity?  And second, concerning the ‘liturgical turn’ in theology and Christian 
                                                
11 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 141. 
12 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 278. 
13 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 323.   
14 Romand Coles, Beyond Gated Politics, Ordinary (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005), 137-138.   
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ethics,15 might an understanding of Christian ethics as Christian practice embodied and 
performed in the liturgy lead to an ethical and political orientation of gathering as a 
closed community rather than cultivating a community openly scattered throughout the 
world?16  Yet even in the midst of these worrisome questions, Coles, ever true to 
practicing generous receptivity, acknowledges that these “undemocratic institutions 
linked to orthodoxy” might actually constitute the very conditions of a radical 
democracy.17  Or said differently, Coles worries that radical democracy might indeed 
require a transcendent orientation for its very possibility of being, even while worrying 
that this transcendence also precipitates the forms of exclusion that radical democracy 
seeks to avoid.   
 
Stanley Hauerwas: Radical Ecclesiology as Repentant Orthodoxy 
 
 In relation to Coles’ concern about the ‘liturgical turn’, Hauerwas wonders how 
and where people are formed who are concerned with radical democracy.  Certainly they 
do not simply drop from the sky.  Hauerwas notes that Coles’ account of radical 
democracy is significantly developed in conversation with Ella Baker and Cornel West, 
both of whom were liturgically formed in an ecclesial tradition to be persons capable of 
generous receptivity and prophetic voicing.  Without these strong religious traditions, 
Hauerwas wonders if these types of people are even conceivable?18   
                                                
15 See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, eds. Blackwell Companion to 
Christian Ethics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004). 
16 Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical, p. 211. 
17 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 323.   
18 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 111. 
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Second, in relation to Coles’ haunting by John Howard Yoder, Hauerwas suggests 
that Yoder would like Coles to be haunted by Jesus instead.  In fact, Hauerwas confesses 
that he also is haunted by Jesus.  In addition to this, Hauerwas intentionally places his 
body in positions to be haunted by Jesus. “That I go to church,” says Hauerwas, “does not 
mean I think that Jesus is only to be found there.  It just means that he has promised to 
show up there in a manner that can help us discern how he shows up in other places.”19  
Hauerwas emphasizes the ‘liturgical turn’ not to form a closed community, bordered off 
and secured from others, but as the principle means by which the otherness of Jesus can 
haunt the ecclesial community gathered in his name.  The ecclesial community does this 
so that it might be scattered in the world to live as Jesus lived.  It is not a question of 
church against the world, but an emphasis on the church for the world. 
 Lastly, Hauerwas claims that a commitment to orthodoxy protects the radical 
democratic ideal practiced by (or for Hauerwas, inspired by) Jesus. Orthodoxy “names 
the developments across time that the Church has found necessary for keeping the story 
of Jesus straight” such that “rather than being the denial of radical democracy, orthodoxy 
is the exemplification of the training necessary for the formation of a people who are not 
only capable of working for justice, but who are themselves just.”20  This relation of 
orthodoxy and the liturgical training of a people highlight Hauerwas’ understanding that 
only in these practices can radical ecclesial and radical democratic processes flourish.  Or 
rather, only within these practices can a radical subjectivity flourish, and without them it 
will stagnate. 
                                                
19 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 105.   
20 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 30.   
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Indeed, in the midst of claims that Hauerwas’ ecclesial focus fosters an 
exclusivism based in an imaginary center (be it orthodoxy, liturgy, or Jesus), Hauerwas 
seeks to turn this criticism around.  He asks, and is never answered by Coles, “what do 
radical democrats do if they do not confess sin?”21  For in the practice of confessing and 
repenting of sin, the church takes into account its own failure to be what it ought to be.  It 
does this not as an excuse for evil nor as an eternal postponement of holiness.  Rather the 
Church knows from the beginning that it is not in possession of itself, that it has not been 
sufficiently haunted by Jesus, by the Spirit of Jesus, the Holy Ghost.  The confession of 
sin affirms the necessity of a critical distance (from society at large and even from 
oneself) and this confession is itself a practice of constructive change in turning from evil 
to good. 
But if radial democrats do not confess sin, how can they ensure that their practices 
of democracy do not become self-possessing?  And how do they know there is movement 
toward what is good?  Does radical democracy even have a category such as sin through 
which it can make sense of the need for and failures of a generous receptivity?  Or in the 
terms Coles uses, if radical democracy requires cultivating the radical habit of de-
habituation (i.e. breaking with the oppressive habits of the status quo), this practice of de-
habituation must assume both the reality of and access to a horizon transcending such 
oppressive habits.  For Hauerwas, this transcendence is protected rather than prohibited 
by orthodoxy, and accessed through confession of sin.  
In this brief summary we see both Coles and Hauerwas emphasizing the need for 
establishing a critical distance from the status quo in order to initiate constructive change.  
                                                
21 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 326. 
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And both agree that some formative subjectivity is required for such critique and change.  
However, they disagree about how best to accomplish these goals.  But instead of diving 
into their respective works and filling out how they have engaged these issues, we will 
seek to investigate the deep division between the two, the division separating much 
contemporary political theory, be it theological or not.  Between Coles and Hauerwas is a 
basic difference in orientation regarding transcendence.  While both are devoted to the 
establishment of justice and freedom, Coles sees a positive commitment to transcendence 
as inimical to a radical democratic practice, and Hauerwas sees such a commitment as 
indispensible for such a project.  Explaining the differences between these fundamental 
orientations leads us to the philosophical and theological systems of Hegel and 
Augustine.  Examining Hegel and Augustine around the issues of transcendence and 
freedom offers a way to understand these more localized disagreements between political 
philosophers and theologians, and even between theologians. 
 
Why Hegel and Augustine? An Apologetic Purpose 
 
 Why, it might be asked, should we turn to Hegel and Augustine? What possible 
recourse can be found from these two for a radical political subjectivity?  While each 
seemingly begins with an odyssey of the subject, do not both end as fascist 
curmudgeons?  It should be noted, however, that concerning Hegel, after the recent 
demise of Kantian liberalism in the forms of Rawls and Habermas, many are returning to 
Hegel as the original critic of Kantian philosophy specifically and of Enlightenment 
secularism generally.  This return to Hegel has produced a larger amount of research that 
dislodges the easily caricaturized Hegel of dialectical monism and political 
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conservativism, creating the possibility of a more positive deployment of Hegel within 
philosophy and politics. Concerning Augustine, in one sense his theology is perennial for 
theology, whether accepted or rejected.  But in addition to this, just as with Hegel many 
are beginning to question the received Augustine, mining his text within his own cultural 
and theological milieu rather than merely as the beginning of supposedly unfavorable 
theological developments.  The time is ripe for an engagement between these two 
stalwarts of theology and philosophy in order to illuminate the similarities and 
differences and make clear their contemporary relevancy. 
 While descriptive commentary is useful, this is not the sole purpose in engaging 
Hegel and Augustine.  Indeed, Hegel is deployed here as one of, if not the most, 
sophisticated attempts at articulating ‘self-transcending immanence’ as a philosophical 
system in opposition to transcendence.  He does this for the purpose of securing a 
positive account of freedom (subjective and social) beyond the negative accounts offered 
by Hobbes and his followers.  Because of this, Hegel makes the ideal test case for 
examining those promoting freedom through a philosophy of ‘self-transcending 
immanence’ intended to exclude transcendence.  On the other hand, Augustine offers a 
theological orientation that emphasizes God’s ‘self-immanenting transcendence’ as the 
only possible hope for true freedom.  In essence, Hegel claims that transcendence 
destroys freedom and Augustine claims that transcendence is the only means to freedom.  
At its core, this study seeks to show that Augustine gives a better explanation of and 
therefore funds a better practice for freedom.  And by practice of freedom I mean the 
ability to criticize and constructively change the dominant social system in which a 
subject finds itself. Through Augustine, then, it will be argued that the possibility of 
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social criticism and substantive change better reside in God’s self-immanenting 
transcendence than in our own self-transcending immanence. 
 I do not want to give the impression, however, that I simply reject everything in 
Hegel and accept all of Augustine.  In general I can affirm aspects of Hegel’s social and 
political philosophy, but not his fundamental orientation regarding a self-transcending 
immanence.  Because of this I can accept aspects of his understanding of the process of 
subjective recognition as social intersubjectivity and the self-transcendence of 
consciousness.  Conversely, I generally affirm Augustine’s fundamental orientation 
regarding God’s self-immanenting transcendence, but not necessarily all aspects of his 
theology.  Examples would be aspects of the Donatist controversy and parts of his views 
on reprobation. 
 Also, it is not the case that philosophy and theology are being pitted against each 
other.  It is not the case that Hegel is rejected because he is a philosopher and Augustine 
accepted because he is a theologian.  Indeed, Hegel is very interested in theological issues 
and Augustine in philosophical matters.  Both Hegel and Augustine relate philosophy and 
theology in such ways as to have made themselves prominent figures in both theology 
and philosophy.  The issues between them are not theology and philosophy, but rather the 
fundamental orientation between transcendence and immanence, here focused on 
subjectivity and the possibilities of political criticism and change. 
 
Objections 
  
But there is a problem. Actually two.  First, by comparing Hegel as a philosopher 
of immanence to Augustine as a theologian of transcendence it seems that I am violating 
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the very center of Hegelian thought, that there really is no opposition between 
transcendence and immanence, the infinite and the finite.  To position Hegel as a 
philosopher of immanence may seem to swim against the current of his own thought, 
placing Hegel within a binary opposition he would deny.  The second objection concerns 
the positive comparison between Hegelian and Augustinian subjectivity. 
Concerning the first objection, one of the essential purposes of Part One will be to 
show that Hegel does not accomplish his goal of uniting the infinite and the finite as a 
process of accounting for all ‘otherness’.  It will be argued that rather than proving his 
point by strict scientific deduction, he instead assumes his conclusions.  Hegel gives a 
plausible philosophical system of immanence, but one which is ultimately chosen rather 
than proven.  Of course Augustine does not escape this fate either.  But for Augustine, it 
is not the case that we choose the system but that the system (God) converts us.  That 
neither Hegel nor Augustine ultimately prove their case makes this study more of an 
aesthetic apologetic based in the plausibility and suitability of Augustine’s position over 
Hegel’s. 
But it must also be said, in regard to this first objection, that Hegel himself is 
given to polemic and binary thought.  He definitely thinks that Kant, and all other appeals 
to transcendence are wrong.  Hegel believes that reflective philosophies of Kantian origin 
are inferior to and opposed to his own speculative philosophy.  And he definitely thought 
that reference to an actual transcendence was positively inimical to the self-determining 
freedom of modern thought.  And in none of these binary oppositions does he think he is 
violating his own philosophy.  Too often, an over-hasty denial of binary oppositions is a 
refusal to examine the deep presuppositions and orientations within philosophical and 
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theological systems.  This denial either leads to gross misunderstanding or superficial 
agreement among and within philosophy and theology.  This investigation in no way 
desires to minimize the complexity and subtlety of these issues and therefore will proceed 
through detailed inquires into both Hegel and Augustine.  But it will nonetheless 
persistently return to the question of these fundamental orientations between 
transcendence and immanence, focused through the possibility of each to produce and 
sustain a radical political subjectivity capable of criticism and change. 
 The second objection will be discussed in full at the beginning of chapter 5, but 
needs to be mentioned here.  These fundamental orientations between Hegel and 
Augustine will be tested through their respective accounts of subjectivity and politics.  
Initially this seems to be the most natural place from which to carry out such a 
comparison between Hegel and Augustine given the perceived influence Augustine exerts 
on western philosophy and theology and subjective turn.  But some have begun to 
question the all too easy assimilation of Augustine’s understanding of the subject to 
modern, especially Cartesian, accounts of subjectivity.22  It is enough here to note that I 
am in complete sympathy with the criticisms concerning the relative equivalence of 
Augustinian and modern subjectivity, and that it is exactly this lack of congruence that 
gives Augustine the resources by which a radical political subjectivity is produced. 
                                                
22 The received view is expounded by those likes Charles Talyor, Sources of the Self: The 
Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Stephen Menn, 
Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Phillip Cary, 
Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003).  Representative of those questioning this view are 
Michael Hanby, Augustine and Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2003); John C. 
Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma: Reconsidering the Self in Augustine’s Thought.” 
Augustinian Studies 38/1 (2007), 119-132; Thomas Harmon’s “Reconsidering Charles 
Taylor’s Augustine” in Pro Ecclesia 20/2 (2011): 185-209. 
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Outline 
 
 This study proceeds in two parts, the first concerning Hegel and the second on 
Augustine.  Each part contains three chapters. Chapter one looks at recent interpretations 
of Hegel’s political philosophy given by Robert Pippin and Slavoj Žižek.  This will offer 
entrance into the field of Hegelian studies and its recent post-Kantian emphasis on self-
determining freedom.  It will be shown that these two contemporary interpretations end in 
drastically different positions, with Pippin focused on evolutionary social practices and 
Žižek on revolutionary subjective acts.  The question arising from this chapter concerns 
whether such a dichotomy necessarily follows from Hegel or only from his interpreters.  
To answer this question one must be thoroughly acquainted with Hegel’s philosophical 
project.  Chapter two, therefore, introduces Hegel’s philosophical and social project of  
“being at home with oneself in one’s other” (E §24 A2) in two steps.  First, his Logic is 
examined as the linchpin of Hegel’s philosophy.  Entrance will be made by looking at 
Hegel’s derivation of the concept of the true infinite from the concept of being.  This 
derivation of the true infinite (which unites the finite and infinite) is utilized by Hegel to 
ward off the need to reference an unthinkable transcendence (an ‘other’) beyond 
consciousness.  In the second portion of this chapter we will turn to his Phenomenology 
and examine both the course and development of consciousness into self-consciousness 
and how Hegel utilizes his conception of the true infinite within this development.  This 
chapter is essential for (1) properly understanding Hegel’s philosophy, for (2) 
understanding the claim that his philosophy is committed to self-transcending 
immanence, and for (3) its argument that Hegel ultimately fails in providing a 
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presuppositionlesss beginning for his philosophy.  Chapter three, concluding part one, 
will examine the political consequences of Hegel’s philosophy of freedom.  This chapter 
will determine that the dichotomy between Pippin and Žižek reproduces an inherent 
instability within Hegel’s system leading toward his failure in securing a radical political 
subjectivity capable of both social criticism and substantive change.   
Part two will move from Hegel’s attempt at “being at home with oneself in one’s 
other” to Augustine’s pilgrimage of the soul in its return to the God who is both 
absolutely other and intimately the same as humanity.  Similar to chapter one, chapter 
four will examine contemporary interpretations of Augustine’s political theology, 
represented by John Milbank and Eric Gregory, each positioning Augustine’s ontological 
commitments alongside the concerns of modern liberalism.  While not denying these 
ontological commitments, but centering on the process of subjective formation, chapter 
five examines Augustine’s Confessions and its depiction of the bondage and conversion 
of the will.  This chapter will begin to outline how Augustine integrates the subjective 
and social aspects of the conversion of the will.  This chapter will show how this 
integration is only possible because of the self-immanenting transcendence of God in the 
Incarnation.  Chapter six turns from the prodigal rebellion of the will to the pilgrim 
journey of the city of God.  It looks at how God’s self-immanenting transcendence 
founds and establishes a truly just society, changing from a city dominated by the desire 
for domination to a city opening in love toward God and neighbor.  The conclusion will 
gather together the threads of these various arguments to show that concern for a radical 
political subject, capable not only of offering criticism but also engaging in change, must 
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abandon all Hegelian forms of self-transcending immanence in favor of a more 
Augustinian self-immanenting transcendence. 
 
Subjectivity, Matter, and Time 
 
 One last issue must be raised so that it can be placed to the side until the 
conclusion.  This investigation centers on the issues of a radical political subjectivity.  As 
we will see in chapter two, because Hegel is so focused on question of thought (via a 
social self-consciousness) the issue of time and matter are effectively bracketed out of 
our exposition.  This is not the case for Augustine as he links questions of subjectivity 
(and its conversion) to ontological issues that questions of matter are much more difficult 
to avoid.  Likewise, because Augustine is more concerned with the transformation of 
subjectivity, and society, this entails raising issues of temporality (which Augustine is 
keenly aware of in the tenth book of the Confessions).  But in order to keep this project to 
a manageable size, these issues (of matter and time) are for the most part left unexplored 
until the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 1: HEGEL IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
Thinking immediately involves freedom.1 
 
Introduction 
 
 As noted in the introduction, after the demise of a Kantian/Rawlsian political 
philosophy of secular rights and duties, many are returning to Hegel as offering a model 
of post-secular political philosophy able to both include substantive social practices and 
even robust religious life.2  This contemporary return to Hegel exhibits two seemingly 
opposed expressions: one in the form of social self-legislating historical practices 
resulting in inter-subjective recognition; the other in the form of radical subjectivity 
persisting within the dialectic failure of the social reconciliation.  The former focuses on 
the evolution of social normativity while the latter on the revolution of radical 
subjectivity.  After the overcoming of metaphysics (post-Heideggerian for contemporary 
interpreters, post-Kantian for German Idealists like Hegel), readings of Hegel fall within 
these two broad frameworks.  The ‘normative Hegel’ is expressed through the work of 
Robert Pippin.  And the ‘radical Hegel’ offered by Slavoj Žižek.  Interpreting the work of 
these two will take up the bulk of this chapter as a way of orienting ourselves within the 
landscape of contemporary Hegelian studies.  In addition to this we will begin to see the 
problems within Hegel’s system of ‘self-transcending immanence’. 
                                                
1 E §23 R. 
2 Beyond Robert Pippin and Slavoj Žižek mentioned below, see Beyond Liberalism and 
Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ed. Robert B. Williams 
(Albany: SUNY, 2001); Thomas A. Lewis, Freedom and Tradition in Hegel: 
Reconsidering Anthropology, Ethics, and Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005) and Religion, Modernity, and Politics in Hegel (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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This return to Hegel, however, can only be properly understood as an overturning 
of the metaphysical interpretation of Hegel.  For many, Charles Taylor’s Hegel 
effectively reintroduced Hegel to American philosophy in 1975, and did so by reading 
Hegel metaphysically.  Taylor sees Hegel responding to and uniting the two diverse 
Enlightenment strands of radical moral autonomy and Romantic expressive unity.3  To do 
this Hegel must overcome the oppositions between the “knowing subject and his world, 
between nature and freedom, between individual and society, and between finite and 
infinite spirit.”4  Hegel did not to want refer to some general pantheism that places 
humanity as an insignificant part within the cosmic substance. Instead, Hegel modified 
Spinoza and Schelling, so that human subjectivity would not be lost in the cosmic 
substance. 
 But overcoming these opposition requires more than the unity of substance and 
subject, and therefore Hegel turns to Geist.  Taylor explicates Geist through Hegel’s 
account of the human subject.5  In Taylor’s account, the human subject for Hegel is both 
a living being (animal) and a thinking/expressive being (rational), and as such is 
necessarily embodied in a double sense.  As an animal, the human body has a form of life 
and therefore also a natural limit.  But as a thinking and expressive being, humanity 
always creates tangible modes of expressing its thoughts, constituting the second form of 
embodiment.  But following Kant, consciousness is always both continuous and 
discontinuous with this embodied way of life, separating thought from desire, reason 
from nature, intention from inclination.  This consciousness divides humanity from itself 
                                                
3 Charles Taylor, Hegel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 3-50. 
4 Taylor, Hegel, 79. 
5 Taylor, Hegel, 82-86. 
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resulting in the unfortunate, even if expected, articulation in Cartesian dualism.  Within 
this embodied alienation “man is thus inescapably at odds with himself.”6  Or in a more 
Hegelian idiom, “the subject is both identical with and opposed to his embodiment” 
because thinking cannot exist without embodiment even while it struggles against this 
embodiment.7   
 But rather than the non-coincidence of life and expression for the human subject, 
cosmic Geist unites the embodiment of life and expression because the universe is 
already the embodiment of Geist.  For Geist to fully express itself in the universe as free 
and rational a consciousness must exist in the universe as an external embodiment (or 
expression) of self-determining rational freedom of Geist.  This embodied expression of 
Geist is finite spirit, or human subjectivity. Human individuals are not merely fragments 
of the universe, parts of the cosmic whole, but are “vehicles of cosmic spirit.”8  While 
everything in the universe is an expression of Geist expressing itself, humanity is the 
culminating vehicle of this expression, especially when humanity comes to know itself as 
rationally free. 
 For Hegel, on Taylor’s reading, the differences between nature and freedom, 
individual and society, finite and infinite each express moments of the original unity of 
Geist now externally embodied, but returning toward unity as self-conscious freedom.  
This is the basis for Hegel’s claim to being an idealist, that the “Idea becomes its other, 
and then returns into self-consciousness in Geist.”9  As Geist passes through its other, 
which is embodied existence as the universe, we see that “absolute idealism means that 
                                                
6 Taylor, Hegel, 84. 
7 Taylor, Hegel, 85. 
8 Taylor, Hegel, 44, also 90-92. 
9 Taylor, Hegel, 109. 
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nothing exists which is not a manifestation of the Idea, that is, of rational necessity,” and 
that “absolute idealism is related to the Platonic notion of the ontological priority of 
rational order, which underlies external existence, and which external existence strives to 
realize,” foremost of which is human subjectivity as self-legislating freedom.10  Taylor’s 
interpretation of cosmic Geist working through human self-consciousness as the 
expression of Geist’s own essence constitutes the metaphysical reading of Hegel.  And 
that those like Pippin and Žižek seek to overturn this interpretation in their return to 
Hegel.    
 In the first section of this chapter we will examine how Robert Pippin understands 
Hegel.  The second section will examine the work of Slavoj Žižek and his drastically 
different rendering of Hegel.  In their reaction against the metaphysical reading of Hegel 
proposed by Taylor and others, Pippin and Žižek exemplify two currents in political 
appropriation of Hegel.  The former is concerned with autonomy established through 
social practices, and the latter thinks of autonomy as established against social practices.  
These opposed interpretation will serve to introduce Hegel’s main concerns while also 
beginning to show the inherent instability caused by the Hegelian system of self-
transcending immance.  This instability will cause us to drive into Hegel system in the 
next chapter. 
 
1. Evolutionary Social Practices: Autonomy through sociality 
 
Against a metaphysically monist, or idealistically spiritualist reading of Hegel, 
and the materialist reduction into a historical method, Klaus Hartmann began articulating 
                                                
10 Taylor, Hegel, 110.  
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a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel as one working out the categorial structure of 
thought or reason.11  This began preparing the way for interpreters like Robert Pippin.  
For Hartmann, Hegel’s Logic is reconstructive of human thought.  Unlike Taylor for 
whom human subjectivity is the vehicle for Geist, for Hartmann “the vehicle of 
reconstruction will be concepts or categories” and the procedure of this reconstruction is 
dialectical.12  Hegel’s philosophy only attempts an integrative, systematic reconstruction 
of thought without presupposition.  Within Hegel’s framework, thought encounters its 
other in the world or as being.  As this other enters into thought and makes a difference to 
thought in the mode of negation.  The otherness of being is established in thought as 
‘being thought’ and therefore as the negation of being itself.  The thought of something 
‘being though’ is its ‘determinate negation’.  This conflict of being and negation, which 
brings being into thought, is the dialectic procedure by which content is placed within the 
immanence of thought.  Because of this process “Hegel’s philosophy appears to us as 
categorial theory, i.e. as non-metaphysical philosophy, or as a philosophy devoid of 
existence claims and innocent of a reductionism opting for certain existences to the 
detriment of others.”13   
The perspective of Hegel as providing a pure category theory, claims Hartmann, 
strips the needs for picturing, or representing (Vorstellung) how knowledge of things 
comes about, i.e. bridging the subject-object divide. The cost of breaking down this 
bridge is the price of circularity: reason can only be satisfied when “it can accept things 
                                                
11 Klaus Hartmann, “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View,” in G.W.F. Hegel: Critical 
Assessments, vol. 3, ed. Robert Stern (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 224. 
12 Taylor, Hegel, 244. 
13 Taylor, Hegel, 248. 
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on its own terms, within the immanence of thought.”14  Because of this circularity one 
cannot ask the question of the cause of the universe because such a question is a category 
mistake for Hegel.  Likewise, the questions of realphilosophie overstep the bound of the 
Hegel’s Logic, mistaking itself as a normative rather than reconstructive system.  
Hartmann is against a ‘maximal’ reading of Hegel which extends the dialectic of 
categories to actual existence and the processes of contingency.  This is the metaphysical 
reading that Hartmann sees as indefensible philosophically (even though he concedes it is 
an exegetically defensible reading of Hegel).  Hartmann instead opts for a ‘minimal’, or 
non-metaphysical, interpretation that sees Hegel’s achievement as mapping the interior 
categories of thought.15   
 This problem with Hartmann’s interpretation is that order to save Hegel from a 
seemingly pre-critical metaphysics of cosmic Geist Hegel is reduced to a Kantian variant.   
Hartman separates thought from being and makes being only internal, or immanent, to 
thought.  This move fails to avoid Kant’s ontological skepticism, a problem motivating 
Hegel’s entire system (i.e. Hegel desired to abolish the noumenal/phenomenal divide). 
Hartmann’s Hegel argues for the necessity of the categories, but not why we should both 
understand the world in those categories and how we have come to this understanding as 
both normative for and yet true of the world.  And most importantly, the separation of the 
Logic from the realphilosophie reintroduces Kantian ethical formalism, a situation Hegel 
                                                
14 Taylor, Hegel, 253. 
15 Taylor, Hegel, 256-7. 
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also sought to avoid (i.e. Hegel desired to abolish the opposition between nature and 
freedom).16   
Robert Pippin has taken up the challenge of offering a more consistent reading of 
Hegel as a non-metaphysical thinker.  Making a strong argument for understanding Hegel 
as a post-Kantian philosopher, Pippen seeks a third way between the right Hegelians who 
postulate a “philosophically problematic theological metaphysics” and the left Hegelian 
who run to the margins of Hegel’s texts looking for useful conclusions and formulations 
amid a thoroughly historical methodology (but Pippin is admits he is also offering a left 
Hegelian interpretation of agency as socio-historical achievement).17  Pippen presents 
Hegel as a non-metaphysical thinker, yet still speculative in his idealism, extending 
Kant’s critical epistemology.  This ‘absolute idealism’ does not revert back to a 
precritical cosmic mind, i.e. the human subjectivity writ large for Talyor, but rather is 
Hegel’s solution to the perceived failure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, or said 
differently, Hegel’s Begriff is merely a variation on Kant’s “transcendental unity of 
apperception.”18  With a rejection of Kant’s strict divide between concept and intuition, 
opting for their perpetual interweaving, Pippin argues for a Hegel who is always in need 
of a Phenomenology as the historically formed content which is schematized in his Logic.  
The focus below will be on Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s practical philosophy as an 
extension of Kant’s critical project.  For Pippin, Hegel reinterprets Kantian freedom as 
                                                
16 Simon Lumsden, “The Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel,” Philosophical Compass 
3/1 (2008): p. 55. 
17 Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 5. Regarding his comment on Left 
Hegelianism, see Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as 
Ethical Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 58. 
18 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 6-10. 
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social self-legislation, historically achieved through practices and institutions, resulting in 
mutual recognition as inter-subjective institutional relatedness.  Each of these movements 
articulates Pippin’s version of the self-transcending immanence of Hegelian philosophy.  
Pippin’s goal is to show that Hegel can be interpreted non-metaphysically without merely 
reducing him to Kant.  Instead, within a post-Kantian trajectory, Hegel offers new 
answers to these Kantian problems.  Kant’s problems and Hegel’s answers will be 
explored around Pippin own themes of freedom as ‘self-legislation’. 
 
Kantian Self-Legislation 
 
 The problem of freedom within modernity often comes down to attempts to 
reconcile the individual and society.  To understand Hegel’s contribution to this problem 
we must first understand how Kant adopts the problem of self-legislation from Rousseau.  
Rousseau sought to reconcile the original independence of natural humanity with the 
dependence of humanity in society, or more colorfully, to reconcile the fact that “man is 
born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”19  The natural savage, who at one time lived 
within himself, now lives outside himself, in society, mistaking this exteriority for 
freedom.20  But Rousseau does not opt for a mere return to a natural setting, but poses the 
problem of how to achieve independence through societal dependence.  This is not the 
search for a relatively unconstrained freedom of non-interference as we seek to secure 
                                                
19 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “Of the Social Contract”, in Social Contract and other later 
political writing, ed. and trans. by Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 1.1.1.  Pippin summarizes this inheritance from Rousseau to Kant to Hegel 
in “Hegel, Ethical Reasons, Kantian Rejoinders,” Philosophical Topics, 19:2 (1991): 99-
103. 
20 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses and Essay on the Origin of 
Languages, ed. and trans. by Victor Gourevitch, (new York: Harper and Row, 1986), 
199. 
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our needs or desires (from Hobbes to Nozick).  Rather, it is a reconciliation of our 
particular wills and the general good of society, expressed as the general will.  Only in 
this ‘general will’ can one achieve freedom as independence without denying the fact of 
social dependency.  Indeed, the ideal society would be structured to mediate economic 
and psychological dependence in order to flourish personal independence.  Only in this 
society would it make sense that one could be “forced to be freed.”21  
 Kant take from Rousseau the desire for freedom as more than non-interference, 
but rather than basing it on a vague conception of the “general will,” Kant produces an 
argument from reason expressed as the categorical imperative.  The basis of moral action 
is to “act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it 
should become a universal law.”22  This universal law, or norm as Pippin prefers, is not 
imposed externally, but rather is self-legislated by reason.  Respecting others as an end, 
rather than a means, is to posit humanity itself as an ultimate value or norm to be 
followed.  This norm is not something other than the capacity to set and evaluate norms 
according to reason, such that the categorical imperative is a self-legislated law, not 
externally imposed by nature or force, but internally posited by reason.23  This positing 
by reason, for Kant, is a process of individual reflective endorsement where each applies 
the standards of reason to one’s own actions.   For Kant, this reflective endorsement is 
meant to solves Rousseau’s problem of the general will because self-legislating reason is 
                                                
21 Rousseau, “Of the Social Contract”, 1.7.8. Regarding this account of Rousseau and his 
influence on Hegel, also see Frederick Neuhouser’s Foundations of Hegel’s Social 
Theory: Actualizing Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 55-81. 
22 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 3rd ed, trans. by James W. 
Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 30. 
23 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 75 and 87.  See also Paul Franco’s Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 11-20. 
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not something more than individual reason as will.   The cost, however, of Kantian self-
legislation as individual reason’s own reflective endorsement is that morality is separated 
from politics causing a separation between individual and society.  It is here, with the 
success of Kantian self-legislation but the failure of social reconciliation, that Pippin sees 
Hegel moves the argument forward.     
 
Spirit as Socio-Historical Achievement 
 
Remembering that the “Kantian notion of self-legislation is the center of 
everything” for Hegel,24 we can now examine Pippin’s understanding of Hegel’s neo-
Kantian political theory, beginning with his understanding of Geist.  Often rendered by 
the “almost meaningless and now standard translation” of ‘spirit,’ regularly 
misunderstood as a cosmic mind or soul, Pippin understands Geist as the “state of norm-
governed individual and collective mindedness…and institutionally embodied 
recognitive relations.”25  Pippin’s understanding of Geist draws from a “distinct and 
controversial interpretation” of Hegel’s Encylopedia and its linking of nature and Geist as 
anti-dualistic, as self-relating, and as the achievement of freedom.26   
For Pippin, Geist is neither material nor immaterial because it is not a thing at all 
Rather Geist is Hegel’s way of expressing a non-dualistic relation between nature and 
mind.  Geist is not divine mind manifesting itself in nature, but rather the truth of nature 
in which nature vanishes [verschwunden] (PSS 1:24-25), yet not other than nature.27  The 
truth and vanishing of nature in Geist indicates the inappropriateness of purely natural 
                                                
24 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 111. 
25 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 39.  
26 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 48. 
27 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 45-46. 
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causality as an explanation for the complexity of certain natural organisms who “come to 
be occupied with themselves and eventually to understand themselves no longer 
appropriately explicable within the boundaries of nature.”28  The divide between nature 
and Geist is therefore not an ontological one, but an explanatory or a normative one, such 
that humanity has established for itself that while being part of nature it is inappropriate 
to reduce human achievements and aspirations to merely natural phenomena.29 
Because of it non-reducible to natural, Geist must be understood as self-relating.  
For Hegel, sentient creatures do not merely embody their natures, but employ a mediated 
and self-directed stance toward their natures.  The reflected, self-conscious stance of 
humanity is really the source of the nature-Geist distinction as humanity seeks to render 
intelligible its natural embodiment and it reflective achievements.30  Geist is self-relating 
because it knows itself as Geist in its distinction from, and yet dependence on, nature.  In 
this way Geist comes to know itself when it makes the normative distinction between 
itself and nature, becoming self-relational in the process.  But it must be remembered that 
this overcoming or vanishing of nature, is not based in an alternative ontological entity 
acting upon nature.  Rather, while not reducible to nature, the achieved distinction of self-
relating Geist best considered as “not non-natural.”31 
All of this is a way of saying Geist is best understood as an achieved freedom 
from, but in, nature.  This independence from nature is a capacity historically achieved, 
                                                
28 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 46. 
29 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 61. 
30 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 51.  In this Pippin agrees with Taylor’s 
interpretation of human nature for Hegel, but not Taylor’s application of this to Geist. 
31 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 52. 
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not naturally given or cosmically received.  According to Pippin, Hegel sees the human 
mindedness of Geist as 
something like achievements, modes of self- and other-relation and so ways of 
making sense of, taking a stance with regard to, nature and one’s own nature that 
can be reached, or not, and these are of course achievements actually reached by 
nothing other than creatures otherwise describable as bits of matter in space and 
time.32 
 
Geist, therefore, is freedom from nature, while remaining within it, such that self-
actualization is not some cosmic mind or Geist expressing itself through nature and 
history. Geist is rather “a kind of socio-historical achievement (the achievement of 
certain practices and institutions) which some natural beings are capable of” such that 
there is a “continuity between natural and spiritual dimensions.”33  Geist is the capacity 
for freedom of thought and action that is a practical and historical achievement, an 
achievement not requiring an ontological distinction between nature and spirit.34  As 
Pippin says, 
Spirit, understood this way (that is, by taking full account of the anti-dualism 
claim and the insistence that development is a self-determining development) is 
thus not the emergence of a non-natural substance, but reflects only the growing 
capacity of still naturally situated beings in achieving more and more successfully 
a form of normative and genuinely autonomous like-mindedness.35 
 
This achievement as self-relating freedom connects to the Kantian concerns of self-
legislation, but now socially constituted as a historically achieved norm, rather than an 
individually, reflectively endorsed norm.  That Geist is a product of itself, relating to 
itself, mirrors Kant’s concern that one gives oneself one’s own law.   
                                                
32 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 54. 
33 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 42. 
34 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 61. 
35 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 112. 
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Geist, as the socially normative sphere of “not non-natural” human existence 
represents Pippin’s articulation of self-transcending immanence.  Geist is immanent to 
natural processes but self-transcends them through its own normative self-relation.  
Human sociality as historical achievement is exactly the form of Hegelian self-
transcending immanence for Pippin.  But as we will see, Hegel’s concept of Geist is 
meant to extend beyond merely a socio-historical achievement into an account of mutual 
recognition ending in autonomy as social self-legislation. 
 
Mutual Recognition as Condition for Freedom 
 
 The last major step in Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel’s practical philosophy 
centers on an understanding of mutual recognition, the fact of which establishes and 
ensures actual freedom.  The language of achievement used by Pippin throughout marks 
Hegel’s account of human nature as neither essentialist nor teleological.  Because of this 
individuals are neither liberal autonomous agents nor communitarian instances of society, 
however those are to be construed, because this would be to lapse into essentialist or 
teleological renderings of humanity.  Neither the individual nor society can become the 
sole basis for deducing the other, but rather the individual and society are both considered 
as rational achievements.  Pippin claims that positing such a gradualist account of 
achieved social norms must eventually be able to account for its own understanding of 
itself.36  How is this accomplished? 
 Hegel’s account of the struggle for recognition attempts to fill this process of 
achieved social norms.   Against the widely accepted Marxist interpretation that chapter 
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four of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit offers a struggle for recognition as the 
formation of subjectivity, Pippin argues this section, and the entire work, offers an 
account of the conditions of freedom.  For Pippin, the question of freedom, not the 
question of subjectivity, guides Hegel’s discussion such that the struggle is not a 
individual, psychological struggle for recognition, but rather a struggle for the adequate 
conditions for asserting and realizing freedom.  When the positions of Lord and 
Bondsman emerge after a struggle to the death, the Lord, who would forsake life to assert 
freedom, and the Bondsman not willing to forsake life, the problem that emerges for 
Hegel is not the psychological dispositions or motivations of each. Rather the problem is 
the objective failure of each to have achieved the goal of freedom because the Lord is 
now seeking recognition from one who is unworthy to grant it, and the Bondsman 
recognizes the Lord but is not recognized in return.  In Pippin’s paraphrase of the 
situation,  
The dilemma is that the objective social situation is such that neither can find any 
way of dealing with each other in normative terms; no exchange of justificatory 
reasons is possible in such a context, and so the very determination of what was done 
remains provisional and indeterminate…[because] each is striving to be free under 
conditions that will not allow the realization of freedom.37 
 
Hegel traces this breakdown of mutual recognition through the social organization of 
labor, and then through general figures of consciousness attempting to justify or 
legitimate this inequality: the figures of Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy 
Consciousness. These failed attempts at securing freedom reveal the need not only for a 
socio-pragmatic and historical account of freedom, but also an institutional account of 
mutual recognition.  Pippin outlines this institutional account consisting of (1) a free 
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subject being recognized as such by (2) another such subject in (3) a concrete practice of 
mutual recognition (4) achieved as successful norms of mutual justification.38  This 
mutual recognition as participating in mutual justification means to treat others and 
oneself as reason-givers and reason-responders within a normative social framework.39   
 Pippin notes that for Hegel this recognition is always institutional, but not 
institutional in the strict sense in which Hegel delineates as within the family, civil 
society, and the state.  For Pippin, in an admittedly deflationary move,40 institutional 
recognition is the claim that we are always already giving and receiving practical reasons 
within a context, from a social-institutional position, where the rules governing social 
interaction are already established. But this is not a positivistic claim about institutional 
structures.  Rather this is a claim for the discursive nature of giving and receiving reasons 
for one’s actions: i.e., one always argues from the position of being a parent in regard to 
children, a property owner in regard to one’s possessions, as a business person in regard 
to fulfilling a contract, and as a citizen in regard to taxation.  Hegel’s point is that these 
are already viable institutional positions from which one gives and receives reasons, not 
requiring a higher discourse for justification.   
Because all institutions are revisable, breaking down and changing, Pippin claims 
that Hegel should not be read as a cultural positivist.41  These fundamental changes occur 
in institutions not because an agent has done something different, but rather because what 
can be justified as reasonable by that agent becomes different.  For Pippin, “requesting, 
providing, accepting, or rejecting practical reasons…are all better viewed as elements in a 
                                                
38 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 209. 
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40 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 272. 
41 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 266. 
  
 
34 
rule-governed social practice” where justifications for actions are offered to others.42  
When a crises arrives within these practices there can be no recourse to a meta-discourse 
to resolve the issues (i.e. Kant’s categorical imperative) because one can never exit these 
discursive institutions.  In the process of justifying one’s actions one must always accept 
an opponent’s claim as a move within their own space of reasons, only then countering 
by offering and attempting to convince them of your alternative understanding of the 
issues.  Pippin points to the development of equal right for women as an instance of this 
institutional revision and transformation.43  For Pippen, Hegel’s view on practical reason 
is that  
Human subjects are, and are wholly and essentially, always already under way 
historically and socially, and even in their attempts to reason about what anyone, 
any time ought to do, they do so from an institutional position.44 
 
Or we could say, these institutional positions are the evolving normative frameworks in 
which Geist produces itself, relating to itself as self-legislating freedom.  In this 
interpretation, Hegel is not relying on a monistic substance or cosmic mind to ground 
institutional necessity, but understands Geist as social self-actualization, achieved 
through shared justificatory practices of giving and receiving reasons for one’s actions, 
and recognizing oneself in those actions and justifications, as well as through the actions 
of others. 
 
Evaluation 
 
                                                
42 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 270. 
43 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 276. 
44 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 265. 
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In summary, then, Pippin suggests a Hegel having much in common with strains 
of American pragmatism and its understanding of social normativity and rationality.45  
Pippin’s Hegel has much to say to the problems of contemporary practical philosophy in 
regard to how we understand the development of historical and social practices, and how 
we communally justify our actions to each other, and therefore achieve recognition, 
without adopting an atomistic individualism.46  In these ways Pippen navigates between a 
Kantian liberal atomism of individuals self-actualization before the moral law and a 
communitarianism that speaks eloquently of social dependence yet offers no real 
explanation for how this might function.  For Pippin, Hegel is an advocate of 
evolutionary social practice promoting a rational freedom such that authentic autonomy is 
achieved through sociality.  These evolutionary social practices are the life of Geist, the 
self-transcending achievement beyond, yet within, the immanence of nature.   
Pippin’s reading of Hegel, however, is self-consciously a reconstruction of the 
emergence of justificatory social practices of recognition as an achievement.  His account 
never attempts to explain how a present justificatory practice is actually challenged, and 
most importantly by whom.47  But it should be asked, given Pippin’s account, where does 
an Antigone come from who challenges Creon?  Where does a Socrates come from who 
becomes a gadfly within Athens?  Where does a Jesus come from who would challenge 
both the Jewish and Roman practices?  Where is this subjectivity constituted, in order to 
                                                
45 Jeffrey Stout’s Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), also makes a similar claim about the achieved social normativity of giving and 
receiving reasons, and Robert B. Brandom’s Making it Explicit: Reasoning, 
Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994), on 
which Stout substantially relies. 
46 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 236-7. 
47 See Pippin’s concluding comments that Marx was right about Hegel, that philosophy 
only comprehends the world. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 272. 
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challenge, the social practices that have evolved in each shape of Geist?  Pippin’s Hegel 
offers no resources for such a subjectivity because for him the question of ‘beyond’ is 
already outside the orbit of Hegel’s philosophy.  As we will see at the end of chapter 
three, Pippin, like Hegel, feels no compulsion to offer an account of a radical subjectivity 
ready and able to break from social norms precisely because there is no need to break 
from them.  There is no need to break from them because, for Pippin and his Hegel, the 
modern project and its institutions best reflects the normative achievements of humanity. 
 
2. Revolutionary Radical Act: Autonomy Against Sociality. 
 
 Slavoj Žižek does not agree with this positive assessment of modern institutions 
nor this normative account of Hegel.  Žižek agrees that Hegel disallows reference to an 
ontological beyond.  But for Žižek this is exactly to mobilize a radical subjectivity 
beyond social normativity.  He accomplishes this by offering a Hegel radically open to 
the slippages within reality (ontological and social).  Žižek’s Hegel, driven by a dialectics 
of failure rather than one of progressive reconciliation, offers a political subjectivity 
capable of escaping the dominant social order, able to break with the normative status 
quo.  This radical subjectivity engages in revolutionary acts against the normative social 
order.  
 
Kantian Completion 
 
 Žižek constantly seeks to correct the cartoon version of Hegelian dialectics 
commonly understood as “the self-mediation of the Notion which externalizes itself, 
posits its content in its independence and actuality, and then internalizes it, [and] 
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recognizes itself in it.”48  In agreement with Pippin, Žižek understands Hegel not as a 
dialectical panlogicist for whom all reality is merely the drama of cosmic mind. 
 Žižek argues that Hegel does not regress from the Kantian critical insight, falling 
back into a pre-critical metaphysics, but instead pushes the Kantian critique into the 
spaces Kant feared to go.  Hegel concluded beyond Kant 
that every tension between Notion and reality, every relationship of the Notion to 
what appears as its irreducible Other encountered in the sensible, extra-notional 
experience, already is an intra-notional tension, i.e., already implies a minimal 
notional determination of this “otherness.49 
 
What Kant lacks in his critique is the very critique of the Ding-an-sich.  Kant sees das 
Ding as the limit of phenomena, the thing that transcends notional thought.  Žižek claims 
that Hegel inverts this limitation such that it is not the Kantian Thing in its inaccessible 
transcendence that limits our representational grasp.  Rather it is the chaotic movement of 
the manifold of sensations that must be limited in order for phenomena to appear in the 
first place.  This act of limiting creates both the possibility of phenomena and the 
projection, or illusion, of the Ding-an-sich residing behind or beyond phenomenal 
appearances.  It is for this reason that “limitation precedes transcendence,” explaining 
why ultimately it is phenomena that are central to Hegel, not noumena.50   
Rather than Hegel returning to a metaphysics of the Absolute, Žižek sees Hegel as 
reproaching Kant for keeping one foot within classical metaphysics and its beyond by 
clinging to das Ding, even if devoid of content.  Instead of filling in this noumena void 
                                                
48 Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: on Schelling and Related Matters, (London; 
New York: Verso, 1996), 6.  
49 Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 20 (italics in original).  Žižek notes Pippin’s 
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with Absolute Knowledge, as usually claimed, Hegel instead extends Kant’s 
epistemological void into an ontological one.51  The problem with Kant thinking his 
Critique of Pure Reason “as the critical ‘prolegomena’ to a future metaphysics” is that 
Kant does not realize that it “already is the only possible metaphysics.”52  Hegel 
completes this critical turn not with a return to classical metaphysics, nor merely a 
notional non-metaphysical logic, but with an additional turn of the critical screw by 
claiming that the epistemological limitation for us is also the ontological limitation of the 
world itself.  This claim, however, is difficult to grasp for those no initiated in German 
Idealism. 
 For Žižek, Hegel completes Kant by supplementing Kant’s formulation that the 
conditions of possibility for our knowledge are the same as the conditions of possibility 
of the object of our knowledge with its reverse:  
the limitations of our knowledge (its failure to grasp the Whole of Being, the way 
our knowledge gets inexorably entangled in contradictions and inconsistencies) is 
simultaneously the limitation of the very object of our knowledge, that is, the gaps 
and voids in our knowledge of reality are simultaneously the gaps and voids in the 
“real” ontological edifice itself.53 
 
In this way, rather than placing the antinomies of reason within our epistemological 
finitude, postulating a self-consistent thing-in-itself beyond our grasp, Hegel bites the 
ontological bullet and posits reality itself as inconsistent. Hegel’s achievement then is 
that  
far from regressing from Kant’s criticism to pre-critical metaphysics expressing 
the rational structure of the cosmos, Hegel fully accepts (and draws the 
consequences from) the result of the Kantian cosmological antinomies—there is 
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no “cosmos,” the very notion of cosmos as the ontologically fully constituted 
positive totality is inconsistent.54 
 
As commentator Adrian Johnston notes, Žižek italicizes “is” rather than “no” when he 
says “there is no cosmos” drawing our attention to the fact that for Žižek being itself is 
this inconsistency, not merely our knowledge of it, because “being ‘is’ this very acosmos, 
this unstable absence of a cohesive, unifying One-All.”55  And for Žižek’s Hegel, because 
there is no beyond, no consistent Ding-an-sich in its unknowableness, the play between 
appearance and essence, and understanding and reason must change, leading to a changed 
understanding of both substance and subject. 
 The problem with Kant is that he does not push his critical philosophy far enough 
because he continues to presuppose that das Ding “exists as something positively given 
beyond the field of representation,” where as Hegel pushes this critique by claiming that 
“there is nothing beyond phenomenality, beyond the field of representation.”56  In other 
words, when traditional philosophy makes a distinction between something’s mere 
appearance and its true essence, Hegel always opts for the appearance.   
 Žižek makes this point regarding appearance and essence with reference to 
Hegel’s distinction between positing reflection, external reflection, and determinate 
reflection.57  Taking hermeneutics as an example, ‘positing reflection’ is a naïve reading 
of a text, claiming immediate intelligibility because the text itself is perspicuous.  It is 
‘positing reflection’ because it directly posits it object.  But under pressure of diverse and 
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Subjectivity (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 130. 
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conflicting interpretations, ‘positing reflection’ gives way to ‘external reflection’ that 
posits the essence of the text, its true meaning, as existing behind the text in an 
unattainable realm transcending our knowledge.  ‘External reflection’, then, is the 
admission and accumulation of distorted pieces of the text’s true meaning, reflected 
through our finite capacities.  This is the Kantian position that the appearance of the text 
hides its true essence, which stands behind or beyond the mere appearance.  The move 
from ‘external’ to ‘determinate reflection’ is to become aware that the positing of an 
eternal essence is internal to appearance itself as appearance.  According to Žižek, the 
necessity of postulating an essence behind the text is that which allows the text itself to 
appear.  Or as Žižek says, “what appears, to ‘external reflection, as an impediment is in 
fact a positive condition of our access to Truth” because “‘essence’ itself is nothing but 
the self-rupture, the self-fissure of the appearance…The fissure between appearance and 
essence is internal to the appearance itself.”58  This is all another way of indicating 
Hegel’s ontological extension of the Kantian critique of epistemology.  
 This difference between ‘external’ and ‘determinate reflection’ is mirrored in the 
difference between understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft).  For Hegel, 
understanding (Verstand) functions in the realm of the Kantian critique, of ‘external 
reflection’, positing a beyond in which objects reside, eluding our discursive grasp.  The 
movement to reason (Vernunft) is not to add something new to the understanding; it is not 
raising the understanding to a higher level within the Absolute.  Rather, reason merely 
subtracts ‘the beyond’ from the understanding.  Between understanding and reason is not 
a choice between the two, but the choice to deactivate reference to any ‘beyond’ because 
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“Understanding, deprived of the illusion that there is something beyond it, is Reason.”59  
In the end, one is always at the level of understanding, it just depends on whether there is 
reference to a beyond or not.  The Hegelian logic of reason (the notion) is not another 
logic which accomplishes what the understanding failed to do (knowing things-in-
themselves), but is rather the repetition of the logic of understanding without reference to 
a beyond, realizing itself as pure self-relation.60  This mirrors the claim that one is always 
on the level of appearance, whether or not one posits that the essence stands behind 
appearance or one posits that appearance creates the illusion of essence.  This complex 
issues will be further explored in the next chapter when we examine Hegel’s Science of 
Logic. 
A further consequence of this relationship between understanding and reason is 
that the typical explanation of Hegelian dialectic as moving from an initial harmony of 
immediate self-identity into a disharmony of difference, then resulting in a new harmony 
of a higher and more complex order, is shown to be false.  Instead, as with the difference 
between appearance and essence, and understanding and reason, this new harmony is in 
fact just the consummation of the loss of the original harmony, rather than a new 
substantial unity.61  Hegelian dialectics does not overcome disharmony or difference, but 
accepts difference ontologically rather than merely epistemologically.  Therefore, “far 
from being a story of progressive overcoming, dialectics is for Hegel a systematic 
notation of the failure of all such attempts—‘absolute knowledge’ denotes a subjective 
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position which finally accepts ‘contradiction’ as an internal condition of every identity.”62 
On this view, rather than instituting the totalizing system par excellence, Hegel is 
advocating for the very displacement of every totalizing system.63 
 
Self-Divided Substance, and Subject 
 
 The interplay between appearance and essence and between understanding and 
reason, each moving through or beyond reference to a ‘beyond,’ takes us to the heart of 
the Žižekian project by helping us understand what Hegel means in the Phenomenology 
when he says that the Absolute, or Truth, be conceived “not only as Substance, but also 
as Subject.”64  For Žižek this should be taken as meaning exactly the opposite of what 
many suppose it to mean.  The subject is not elevated to the status of some absolute 
substance or cosmic mind, swallowing all substantial content according to is all 
devouring dialectical process. Rather this phrase refers to the debasing of substance to the 
status of the divided or fractured subject.  Žižek points out that the Phenomenology is the 
story of the repeated failures of the subject to truly account for the world and itself. For 
Žižek, when Hegel says that the Absolute is “not only Substance, but also Subject,” this 
does not mean that subjectivity is constitutive of reality, but rather that  
there simply is no such ‘absolute subject’, since the Hegelian subject is nothing 
but the very movement of unilateral self-deception…‘Substance as Subject’ 
means precisely that this movement of self-deception, by means of which a 
particular aspect posits itself as the universal principle, is not external to 
Substance but constitutive of it.65 
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64 Here I am following Žižek’s translation.  Miller translates “nicht als Substanz, sondern 
ebensosehr als Subjekt” as “not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” (PS ¶17/PG 
23). 
65 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 76. 
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The subject, then, is not elevated to the dignified status of substance, but rather substance 
is lowered to the fragmented level of the subject, always trying yet failing to make sense 
of the world.  The main point for Žižek is that it is the subject that, incessantly searching 
behind appearances for an enduring essence, fails to understand it (the subject) is the one 
positing the essence behind the appearances.  Hegel’s idealism begins when this illusion 
is given up.  For Žižek, “‘unmasking this illusion’ does not mean that ‘there is nothing to 
see behind the phenomena, [for] there is nothing but this nothing itself, ‘nothing’ which is 
the subject.”66  What Žižek is proposing here is not a simple denial of reality within an 
anti-realist perspective, which is nothing but the subjective idealism of Kant, but rather 
the positive functioning and existence of ‘nothing.’  The point around which sensible, 
phenomenal reality is organized and made meaningful is nothing, a nothing that is the 
subject who suspends all meaning.67  Meaning is ‘suspended’ by the subject in its twofold 
sense: that from which something hangs or is held up, or the barring or prohibiting of an 
action.   
 That subjectivity is the nothing around which meaning/appearance gathers means 
that subjectivity is always pathologically biased, limited, and distorting because while 
there can be no reality apart from the constituting subject (pace Kant), every subject is 
situated within reality while at the same time cut off from itself.68  As Žižek says, “There 
is no ‘absolute Subject’—subject ‘as such’ is relative, caught in self-division, and it is as 
such that the Subject is inherent to the Substance.”69 This structurally biased and split 
                                                
66 Žižek, Sublime Object, 195 (italics in original). 
67 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder, 59. 
68 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 78-79. 
69 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 89. 
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subject, as substance, keeps Hegel from being merely a ‘subjective idealist’ like Kant 
because the subject, instead of functioning as a Ding-an-sich, is itself both a mere 
appearance while also projecting an essential substance.   
 
Subjective Destitution and Sociality  
 
 On a superficial reading it might seem that, while expressing their positions in 
drastically different conceptual schemes, Pippin and Žižek are really in broad agreement.  
Both seek to reconnect the Hegelian project to the Kantian critique against the superficial 
historicist appropriation of the dialectic.  Both articulate how the subject must assume 
responsibility for the world one inhabits: Pippin speaking of Geist as the normative realm 
of self-legislating reason; Žižek speaking of the lack of an ‘absolute subject’ guaranteeing 
the consistency of reality.  But both lead toward the realization that every subjective 
position is biased, and therefore constructed.  Both see the realm of Geist as a normative 
distinction within thought and language placing human freedom as an achievement 
beyond nature, yet still within it, and therefore as non-supernatural.  Or as Žižek says, 
spirit is “the domain of signification, of the symbolic; as such, it can emerge only in a 
creature which is neither constrained to its bodily finitude nor directly infinite…but in 
between, a finite entity in which the Infinite resounds in the guise of…Another World.”70  
But these semblances hide a profound difference between the two, revealed in their 
understanding of the political significance of Hegel. 
 Unlike Pippin who builds from the normative idea of social self-legislation, as a 
historical achievement constituted through various practices of mutual recognition, 
                                                
70 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder, 60-61. 
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Žižek’s Hegel does not build up toward a social theory.  Instead, Žižek’s exposition seeks 
only to repeat the same constitutive failures within differing conceptual frameworks 
(appearance/essence, understanding/reason, substance/subject).  For Žižek, Hegel in 
method and in practice never moves forward in his analysis unless progress is measured 
by uncovering deeper conceptual failures.  This Žižekian perspective reveals the 
difference between Pippin’s evolutionary perspective of a socially normative practice of 
mutual-recognition, and Žižek’s revolutionary perspective that the dialectic exposes the 
ideological frame in which such social practices exist and the radical means by which to 
exit, in order to transform, those structures. 
One way of understanding this is to situate Žižek alongside other political 
theorists through his deployment of the concepts of perversion and hysteria. Much of 
postmodern political theory looks to the excessive or transgressive aspects of life 
violently repressed by the reigning socio-political order.  Inverting Hobbes, who sought 
to circumscribe the riotous passions of the multitude according to the law of the 
sovereign, these theorists seek to re-inscribe all forms of life within the political order. In 
this way, an ever broadening and inclusive political field emerges through endless re-
negotiations and re-articulations of the political field.  Žižek’s main targets are of a 
continental variety, such as Judith Butler and Antonio Negri.  But as will become clear, 
Žižek is also indirectly speaking to certain forms of Anglo-American pragmatists like 
Pippin.  For Žižek, the problem with this view is two-fold.  First, giving free reign to all 
transgressive identities and lifestyles through transgressive political action exactly 
mirrors the processes of global capitalism.  The market revels in breaking every rule and 
crossing every line, all in the effort of creating new markets for selling new products to 
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new consumer-subjects who themselves are trained to transgress.  Žižek complains that 
those promoting a ‘politics of multitude’ as an ever broadening of the political field 
exactly mimic the machinations of global capitalism. The “subject of late capitalist 
market relations is perverse” in its attempt to transgress all limits, yet in its very 
perversion maintains itself as a version of capitalism.71  Second, perversion remains 
within the Kantian matrix of external reflection by positing that the existing law is always 
partial and fragmented, and each transgression seeks to reveal this limit with reference to 
an unacknowledged beyond.  
Why is this? Perversion, which Žižek uses in a technical sense drawing from 
Lacan, stays within the political order, albeit in the seemingly exterior form of 
transgression.  Acts of perversion claim to know the symbolic law (whether the political 
laws of the land or the subjective laws of civility, sociality, sexuality, and rationality), 
and claim to know exactly how to resist them via overt transgressions.  These 
transgressive acts, therefore, always ultimately point to the law. Knowing the law, and 
then, always with an eye toward the law, transgressing the law’s limit, shows the mutual 
implication of the existing political order and its own transgression.  The law and its 
transgression make an articulate totality where the latter never moves beyond the frame 
of the former.  To transgress in this way is actually a reasonable form of resistance 
within the political order because it seeks to move within the political field as a 
broadening, re-ordering, and re-articulation of current and future ‘forms of life.’  It does 
this in the form of transgression because if one were truly to move beyond, rather than 
merely transgress within, the socio-political order it would mean the loss all contact with 
                                                
71 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 248. 
  
 
47 
reality, unhinging all systems of meaning and significance, and thus foreclosing the 
possibility of reasonable political action.  Transgressive acts, perverting the law, and 
therefore showing the law’s own perversion, are different ways of describing what Pippin 
might call instances of the provisional and revisable nature of our practices and 
institutions seeking mutual recognition, the recognition of the reasonableness of one’s 
actions.  The law, its transgression, and the law’s subsequent revision are, for Pippin, a 
desirable, evolving situation.   
Žižek contends, however, that this transgressive strategy ultimately fails because 
it is still trapped within (because it mirrors) an economic system that feeds on 
transgressive forms of life even as it promotes these transgressions.  This transgressive 
strategy is doomed to perpetuate the status quo in the form of evolutionary modifications, 
rather than offer any truly revolutionary break. Or said differently, this strategy posits an 
essence of freedom standing behind the partial and broken appearances of law.  This 
transgressive social strategy, therefore, fails the fundamentally Hegelian lesson that 
positing an essence (of subjectivity, of law, of freedom) beyond its appearance is the 
ideological move par excellence, a failure many continental and pragmatic theorist have 
missed in their social theories. 
For Žižek, the prevailing socio-political order cannot be transgressed in the form 
of perversion, but rather must be traversed in the form of hysteria.72 The hysteric is 
incapable of finding ones coordinates within the symbolic network, a breakdown that 
simultaneously puts the symbolic order in doubt and therefore puts one’s own subjective 
position in doubt, causing what may seem to be irrational outbursts.  The hysteric is in 
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doubt about the symbolic law, not knowing what the law wants from her, and therefore 
powerless in following the law.73  Rather than transgressing the political order in vain 
attempts at incremental rehabilitation, Žižek proposes traversing the political order in the 
mode of hysteria, or as he elsewhere calls it, through a radical “subjective destitution.”74  
Rather than seeking subjective affirmation from (indicating source/origin) the political 
order (even in the guise of transgression because in transgression one can minimally 
affirm one’s own essence beyond the social appearances), for Žižek, one ought to enact a 
hysterical subjective destitution from (indicating separation/removal) the socio-symbolic 
order.  The figure of this subjective destitution in which “the subject accepts the void of 
his nonexistence” is symbolic death.75  Only in what we might call a ‘psychic suicide’ 
where one is biologically alive, yet dead to the symbolic coordinates of social, political, 
and economic life, is one placed in “the suicidal outside of the symbolic order,”76 able to 
act with a revolutionary freedom.  This is the case because the hysteric understands that 
she is just as divided as the social substance (the law) is.  The hysteric is the political 
consequence of the philosophical idea that the absolute is “not only Substance, but also 
Subject.” 
Many political theorist, however, are unwilling to entertain this type of symbolic 
death because it seems simultaneously too excessive as a stepping outside the bounds of 
rationality, reasonability according to certain accounts of political ‘realism’ and too 
                                                
73 Žižek, Sublime Object, 112-114, and The Ticklish Subject, pp. 247-257. 
74 See The Ticklish Subject, 366; Sublime Object, 230; The Indivisible Remainder, 163-
65. 
75 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 281. 
76 Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and 
Related Dates 
 (NY: Verso, 2002), 99. 
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moderate in its apparently disinterested stance toward the current state of affairs.  These 
theorists would claim that such a radical break makes it impossible to reform the political 
order because one is so utterly beyond it, so utterly detached: too ideologically minded to 
be any politically good.  But this is exactly Žižek’s intention when he speaks of 
subjective destitution as death, for only when one considers oneself dead to the existing 
order will one be able to actually act freely with regard to it.77  Only then will one moves 
from piecemeal forms of transgressive resistance against the existing order toward 
creating the possibility of another order altogether.  This subjective destitution is a radical 
transformation through a revolutionary traversal of the existing order, rather than a 
gradual evolution through transgressional reappropriations within it. 
As a hysterical action of subjective destitution, this move beyond the symbolic 
law is characterized by a radical gesture of ‘striking at oneself’, the gesture which 
ultimately constitutes subjectivity as such.78  This ‘striking at oneself’ is the means by 
which one becomes ‘uncoupled’ from the symbolic order, dying to ones own social 
substance.  As noted above, perversion assumes some minimal subjectivity that ‘knows’ 
the limits of the law, and therefore posits itself as beyond the law.  This is the ideological 
position that assumes an essence behind appearances, and therefore has failed to learn the 
Hegel’s dialectical lesson that substance is divided, just as the subject is divided.  The 
hysteric denies even this minimal subjective support within the social substance, and 
therefore is the true figure for political action. 
Contra Pippin and Taylor, Žižek’s Hegel only becomes Hegel when he abandons 
the Romantic project of the expressive unity of the social substance, achieved through 
                                                
77 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, pp. 260-264. 
78 Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, pp. 148-150. 
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shared social practices, and instead beings understanding reconciliation not as a healing 
of the split between radical subjectivity and social objectivity, but a reconciliation with 
the split as a persistent aspect of the social field.79  This reconciliation is the political 
implementation of what was already argued philosophically, that dialectical 
reconciliation is not a higher harmony, but a reconciliation to the persistence of 
fundamental disharmony.  The fact that “‘Substance is [also to be conceived of as] 
Subject’ means that this explosion of the organic Unity is what always happens in the 
course of the dialectical process,”80 and the new unity is not a new harmony at a higher, 
more explicit level, but rather the unity of persistent division, both within the subject and 
the social substance.  Only the hysterical subjective position can persist within this place, 
for “a truly free choice is a choice in which I do not merely choose between two or more 
options WITHIN a pre-given set of coordinates, but I choose to change this set of 
coordinates itself” and therefore act as Christ did.81 
 Žižek’s many references to Christ underscores the religious aspects of Hegel 
totally absent from Pippin’s interpretation, and most non-metaphysical interpretations of 
Hegel.82  Žižek understands Hegel as putting forth Christianity as the manifest religion 
because Christianity articulates this negative space beyond the symbolic law and its 
transgressive supplement, a new place from which political action pours forth.83  For 
Žižek, “both Christianity and Hegel transpose the gap which separates us from the 
Absolute into the Absolute itself” such that substance and subject are always already 
                                                
79 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 95. 
80 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 96 (bracket in original). 
81 Slavoj Žižek, Belief (New York: Routledge, 2001), 121. 
82 A recent exception is Thomas A. Lewis, Religion, Modernity, and Politics in Hegel 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
83 Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, 145.   
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divided.84  Throughout The Puppet and the Dwarf Žižek seeks to unite fall and 
redemption, Adam and Christ, Judaism and Christianity, law and love according to the 
dialectic whereby the former is fulfilled by the latter, not in a new harmonious positivity, 
but rather through transposing the initial gap of the former into the latter itself. 
Ultimately, the gap separating God and humanity is internal to God, exemplified by the 
death of Christ.  Rather than the death of God leading to our freedom from God, as for 
Nietzsche, Žižek claims that the death of God, and our participation in that death, allows 
us to suspend the symbolic law, just as Christ did. This is the forgotten core of 
Christianity, not that God is dead and we have killed him, but that God (the substance) is 
dead and all of us (subjects) have died with God. 
 
Evaluation 
 
Žižek’s reading of Hegel is self-consciously politically oriented toward the 
successful breaking out of the regimes of global capitalism by offering a robust 
ontological account of the necessary failure of both the social structure and the subject, a 
failure which opens the very possibility of an authentic political act against and beyond 
the dominant order.  While Pippin’s Hegel offers few resources for this type of radical act 
putting previous justificatory practices into question, it seems that Žižek offers little 
reason why someone would enact a psychic suicide in order to enter the outside of the 
symbolic order.85  Why not rather engage in perverse acts where one can have the 
                                                
84 Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf, 88. 
85 Bruno Bosteels critiques Žižek for equivocating between Lacan and Badiou on the 
nature of subjectivity and the act, an equivocation between the Lacanian subject which 
assumes the impossibility of subjectivity and the Badiouian subject faithful to an event.  
These two ‘subjects’ are, for Bosteels, irreconcilable.  See his “Badiou without Žižek,” 
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symbolic cake and transgressively eat it too? Žižek, it should be noted, does offer 
numerous examples of people willing to make such an act (Antigone, Oedipus, Jesus, 
King Lear), but the use of such examples only return us to the problem of a prior social 
normativity.  If Žižek’s best arguments for prompting a radical act in others is to refer to 
a counter tradition of those resisting the status quo, then these example begin to function 
as a normative tradition for Žižek.  But the use of such a counter tradition seems to imply 
its own law and its symbolic order, all of which Žižek seems opposed to in placing the 
subject beyond symbolic support. 
 
Conclusion 
 
After the metaphysical Hegel proposed by Taylor comes these two drastically 
opposed and yet typical interpretations.  Broadly speaking, Pippin’s Hegel offers a 
retrospective account of the emergence of normative practices as the pre-condition of 
freedom.  He leaves aside, however, the emergence of the individual subjects capable of 
resisting such engrained practices. Žižek’s Hegel is explicitly oriented toward offering an 
account of the subject within and beyond the ideological interpellation of society’s 
dominant social practices.  But the place from which this subject acts, the place of its own 
subjective destitution, is always a prior (counter-) normativity that Žižek must 
simultaneously presuppose and yet disavow.  Pippin offers a Hegel emphasizing the self-
transcending immanence of normative practices (yet assuming a prior subject formation), 
and Žižek offers a Hegel emphasizing the self-transcending immanence of the radical act 
(yet assuming a prior normative formation via religion). In either case, the normative 
                                                                                                                                            
Polygraph: An International Journal of Culture and Politics 17 (2005): 221-244, esp. 
235-238. 
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Hegel of evolutionary social practices and the radical Hegel of revolutionary subjective 
acts are interpretations of Hegel opposed to each other in fundamental ways.  This 
fundamental opposition prompts the question of which is more adequate to the texts of 
Hegel and which is more adequate to the questions of contemporary political theory.  Can 
Hegel hold together both normative social practices while also offering the possibility of 
a radical subjectivity capable of resisting such practices if the need were to arise?  Being 
able to answer this question first requires a deep understanding of Hegel’s philosophical 
systems.  Only then will one be able to adequately assess his political implications.  
Chapter two will offer an entry into Hegel’s system through an examination of his 
Science of Logic and then a reading of his Phenomenology.  Chapter three will then 
assess Hegel’s political philosophy with an eye toward resolving this fundamental 
opposition between Pippin and Žižek in regard to Hegel philosophy of self-transcending 
immanence. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONSCIOUSNESS AND FREEDOM: LOGIC AND  
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 
 
When we think freely, voyaging on the open sea, with nothing under us  
and nothing over us, in solitude, alone by ourselves— 
then we are purely at home with ourselves.1 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focused primarily on the normative and the radical Hegel, 
displaying the divergent interpretations regarding sociality and subjectivity, especially in 
regard to politics.  These divergent interpretations sought to unify Hegel’s system and his 
realphilosophie rather than excluding the former in order to focus on the latter.  To 
evaluate these interpretations it is necessary to explore Hegel’s system in greater detail. 
Essential to Hegel’s philosophical system is the dual role of negation as the motor 
of conceptual development and the true infinite as the completion of the Kantian 
revolution.  Hegel’s understanding of negation and the true infinite allow him to deal 
with otherness as internal to the processes of consciousness (eventually expanded to 
intersubjective self-consciousness) rather than as an alien limitation to consciousness 
itself.  Overcoming the limitations of otherness is required, for Hegel, in order to ensure 
consciousness as self-determining freedom.  This chapter will focus on Hegel’s 
development of the self-determining freedom of consciousness, leaving the practical and 
political implication of this freedom for the chapter three.   
 The first section of this chapter will establish the self-transcending immanence of 
Hegel’s speculative philosophy.  His system is self-transcending because thought is 
always process of ‘going beyond itself’.  But his system is ultimately grounded in 
                                                
1 E §31 A. 
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immanence because Hegel finally admits of no transcendence beyond this self-
transcending movement of thought.  This will be established through a reading of the 
opening chapters Hegel’s Science of Logic where he deals with the dialectic of being-
nothing and the finite-infinite.  It will be argued that Hegel includes ‘otherness’ within 
consciousness through an initial exclusion of transcendence.  This exclusion operates by 
prefiguring every ‘beyond’ as merely ‘nothing’, a ‘nothing’ that is then re-including as 
‘negation’, the dynamic of thought itself. ‘Nothing’ is always deemed the indeterminacy 
of thought. 
 Hegel justifies this movement from ‘nothing’ to ‘negation’ in his Logic through 
reference to his Phenomenology of Spirit, claiming that in the earlier work he overcomes 
the distinction between subject and object, showing that no-thing is outside or other than 
pure knowing.  Because of this claim the second section of this chapter will examine the 
Phenomenology according to three instances in which consciousness encounters 
otherness: the encounter with the ‘supersensible beyond’ by consciousness in chapter III; 
the encounter with the Unchangable (God) by the Unhappy Consciousness in chapter IV 
(an encounter only finally resolved at the end of chapter VI); and the encounter with the 
God-man by religious consciousness in chapter VII.2  The parallel purpose in examining 
these encounters is to understand Hegel’s developing notion of consciousness as the 
emergence of self-consciousness as Geist, culminating in the absolute knowing of chapter 
VIII.  Throughout the exposition of the Phenomenology I will continue to make reference 
                                                
2 Certainly every form of consciousness encountered in the Phenomenology is an 
encounter with and movement through the otherness (or object) appropriate to that form.  
These three instances are chosen as exemplary cases of encountering otherness in its 
seemingly transcendent form. 
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to Hegel’s deployment of negation and the movement of the true infinite in order to show 
the coherence of his thought throughout.   
The third and final section will argue that Hegel does not prove his case 
concerning the unity of subject and object because instead of truly encountering all forms 
of otherness, pre-eminently the otherness of a transcendent God, Hegel always pre-
configures this otherness as the indeterminate nothing of thought. By pre-configuring the 
otherness of God the Phenomenology merely assumes what it attempts to prove, trading 
on arguments that only properly belong within the Logic.  In light of this circularity I will 
argue that the best place from which to make the argument concerning the unjustified 
exclusion of transcendent otherness is neither within Hegel’s treatment of religion, nor 
the earlier encounter of the Unhappy Consciousness, but the earlier encounter with the 
‘supersensible beyond.’  The goal, then, of this chapter is to show both that Hegel’s 
philosophy is aptly described as self-transcending immanence, even while showing that 
Hegel only assumes but does not justify such a philosophical perspective. 
 Of course this summary cannot replace actual arguments and is hardly intelligible 
without them. This is the difficult journey before us, a journey into the freedom of 
thought, a “voyaging on the open sea, with nothing under us and nothing over us…purely 
at home with ourselves” (E §31 A).  Throughout we will follow Hegel as he attempts to 
fathom the depths of this infinite sea of thought, asking whether he has actually measured 
the depths of the infinite or only established the length of consciousness. Throughout I try 
to present the most favorable interpretation of Hegel’s positions in order to both truly 
understand his project and to allay fears that I am criticizing a caricature.  It is for these 
reasons this chapter is the longest and densest. 
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1. Nothing Is Infinite: Science of Logic 
 
The Thought of the Logic 
 
The purpose of Hegel’s Science of Logic is to clarify the categories of thought and 
through them “to raise mind to freedom and truth” (SL 37/WL 5:27).  This is not logic in 
the standard sense of rules governing logical argumentation, giving proper order to 
thoughts.  Rather the Logic outlines what thought itself is.  For Hegel, “logic is to be 
understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought.”  To ensure its 
ontological and theological impact, he adds that the Logic “is the exposition of God as he 
is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind” (SL 50/WL 5:44).  
To make sense of this Hegel distinguishes the science of logic as he conceives it from 
other sciences.  In other scientific investigations the subject matter of the science 
(biology, physics, economics) is distinguished from the scientific method of 
investigation.  But this is not the case when investigating thought because thought is both 
the matter and method, or the content and the form.  Hegel emphasizes it is not the case 
that thought is merely a rational form given to a received content (as for empiricists and 
even Kant).  It is not the case that the matter or content 
of knowing is present on its own account as a ready-made world apart from 
thought, that thinking on its own is empty and comes as an external form to the 
said material, fills itself with it and only thus acquires a content and so becomes 
real knowing. (SL 44/WL 5:36-37) 
 
Rather, content and form are already united in thought. Consequently, what logic is 
cannot be stated beforehand for this would again make logic into content external to 
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thought.  Knowledge of what logic is emerges “as the final outcome and consummation 
of the whole exposition” (SL 43/WL 5:35).3 
But if the way into logic is already within logic, how and where is one to make a 
beginning?  And is the beginning really a beginning if the truth of the system can only be 
known at the end?  If the goal of the Logic is to raise the mind to freedom and truth as the 
system of pure reason, while at the same time not taking for granted a presumed content, 
then for Hegel its beginning “may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by 
anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science” (SL 
70/WL 5:69).  As he says in the Encyclopaedia Logic,  
All…presuppositions or assumptions must equally be given up when we enter 
into the Science, whether they are taken from representation or from 
thinking…Science should be preceded by universal doubt, i.e. by total 
presuppositionlessness (Voraussetzungslosigkeit).  Strictly speaking this 
requirement is fulfilled by the freedom that abstracts from everything, and grasps 
its own pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking—in the resolve of the will to 
think purely. (EL §78) 
 
This resolve to think purely, the resolve to “consider thought as such” (SL 70/WL 5:68) 
is the immediate beginning of logic. As Houlgate notes, the resolve to think thought “sets 
aside all assumptions about what it is, [and] is left with nothing to think but the simple 
thought that it is.”4  To this resolve to only think thought it must be added that the 
beginning be immediate.  If the beginning were mediated it would no longer be a 
beginning for then it would be mediating between something else, something a 
presupposed.  This immediate beginning must likewise be both without determination 
relative to something else or have any determinations within itself.  For Hegel this 
                                                
3 Hegel is reinforcing what he says in the introduction to the Phenomenology, that “the 
way to Science is itself already Science” (PS ¶88/PG 80). 
4 Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue 
University Press, 2006), 31. 
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immediate and indeterminate with which logic begins is pure being (SL 70/WL 5:69), the 
beginning of a presuppositionless science of logic.5 
  
The Presupposition of the Logic 
 
Before following this beginning of pure being we need to pause a moment to 
understand the claims of this presuppositionless science.  To do this we must look at the 
link between the Logic and the Phenomenology, setting the groundwork for the 
relationship between both explored in sections one and two of this chapter.  Early critics 
criticized Hegel for failing in his supposed presuppositionlessness.  Schelling claimed 
Hegel actually presupposed (1) the subject who thinks even while suppressing this 
subjective position, and Hegel (2) presupposes the absolute that is being thought.6  In 
Hegel’s mind, however, these criticisms are knocking on an open door because both 
objections had already been granted by Hegel in his Phenomenology.  Hegel had shown 
in that early work that one could not start with the subject of ordinary consciousness 
without inevitably ending up with the Absolute beyond the dichotomy of subject and 
object.  The thinking subject and the overcoming of this subject and its object(s) within 
the Absolute arrive together.  In the Logic Hegel points to the Phenomenology as having 
exhibited consciousness  
in its movement onwards from the first immediate opposition of itself and the 
object to absolute knowing.  The path of this movement goes through every form 
of the relation of consciousness to the object and has the Notion of science for its 
result…Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of 
                                                
5 See Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, 29-71, for a detailed account of the 
presuppositionless aspect of Hegel’s Logic. 
6 For a summary and rebuttal of Schelling’s critiques, see Alan White, Absolute 
Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 
1983), 15-31. 
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consciousness.  It contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its 
own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought. (SL 
48-9/WL 5:42-3)  
  
It is in this sense that Hegel claims that the Logic presupposes the Phenomenology 
because the Phenomenology “contains and demonstrates the necessity, and so truth, of the 
standpoint occupied by pure knowing” (SL 68-9/WL 5:67).  On Hegel’s account, the 
claim to being presuppositionless rests on presupposing the conclusions of the 
Phenomenology.  This of course raises the status of the Phenomenology as the 
presupposition of a presuppositionless science.7  But this will only become the focus in 
the second section of this chapter. 
 
Being-Nothing and Becoming 
 
 Having established the interlocking presuppositions between the Logic and the 
Phenomenology, we will now examine the opening argument of the Logic concerning the 
                                                
7 In a sense, the Phenomenology is an extended investigation in how not to start 
philosophical science by beginning with the presupposition that a subject (or 
consciousness) relates to an object.  Beginning with this conception of consciousness is 
the optimal starting place for Hegel because it is from this perspective that Hegel’s 
opponents (Kant and Schelling principally) assume that consciousness always requires an 
external object which inevitably means that philosophical science can never be 
presuppositionless (i.e. self-determining), but must always presuppose an object in 
opposition to a subject.  If this perspective, which claims the impossibility of a 
presuppositionless science, is overcome according to a reductio ad absurdum resulting in 
the Absolute beyond the dichotomy of subject and object, then the process of this 
overcoming would become the presupposition of a presuppositionless science.  Therefore 
in Hegel’s mind and against critics like Schelling, presupposing the Absolute (which is 
exactly not presupposing the dichotomy of subject and object) and suppressing individual 
consciousness (but not thought as such) is exactly what a presuppositionless science 
requires.  Of course this is only the case if the Phenomenology is correct in its 
conclusions.  For an extended argument in this direction, see William Maker’s 
“Beginning,” in Essays on Hegel’s Logic ed. George di Giovanni (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 1990), 27-44, and his Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1994), 83-98. 
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dialectic of being-nothing and its transition into becoming.  As noted above, the 
beginning of a science of logic must be that which is most immediate and indeterminate, 
which Hegel claims to be pure being.  “Being, pure being, without any further 
determination” (Sein, reines Sein, - ohne alle weitere Bestimmung).  When considering 
the first category Hegel does not even use a copula. No predication of existence is given 
for this would add a determination to indeterminate being. The first negative definition of 
pure being, “without any further determination,” is given a farther negative expansion in 
the following statements:  
In its indeterminate immediacy (unbestimmten Unmittelbarkeit) it is equal only to 
itself.  It is also not unequal relative to another; it has no diversity within itself nor 
any with a reference outward. 
 
 Pure being has neither internal composition nor external relation.  As such, for pure 
being “there is nothing to be intuited” because “it is only this pure [empty] intuiting 
itself” (es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst).  And because pure being is best 
thought as nothing, the nothingness of thought, Hegel concludes by saying, “Being, the 
indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.” (Das 
Sein, das unbestimmte Unmittelbare ist in der Tat Nichts und nicht mehr noch weniger 
als Nichts) (SL 82/WL 5:82-3).  Pure being, the most basic thought from which Hegel 
seeks to derive his science of logic, in its complete and utter indetermination, has been 
found to pass into its opposite and has become neither more nor less than nothing.8 
 Of this nothing Hegel continues in the next section: “Nothing, [the] pure nothing 
(Nichts, das reine Nichts): it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence 
of all determination and content—undifferentiatedness in itself.”  While re-worded 
                                                
8 It is from here that Slavoj Žižek takes the title of his massive tome, Less Than Nothing: 
Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2012). 
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slightly, the same basic phrases apply to nothing as they did to being.  Nothing lacks all 
determination and is equal to itself without any internal differentiations. But amid the 
empty intuiting of nothing there is a distinction found between the empty intuiting of 
something (etwas) and pure nothingness.  Because of this, “To intuit or think nothing has, 
therefore, a meaning: both are distinguished and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or 
thinking” (so ist [existiert] Nichts in unserem Anschauen oder Denken) (SL 82/WL 
5:83).9  The thought of nothing, it seems, has surprisingly found a basis of existence, an 
existence within thought. Through its absence of determination nothing is determined to 
be the same as pure being because nothing has existence within thought. 
 Being, then, slides into nothing and nothing into being.  This is the being-nothing 
dialectic leading to the identity of being and nothing as each passes over into the other.  
Or rather, “the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being—does not pass over but 
has passed over—into nothing, and nothing into being” (SL 83/WL 5:83).10 In the 
manner of writing the first two paragraphs Hegel indicates what logically must occur, that 
being “has passed over” into nothing and nothing into being.  This “has passed over” is 
already accomplished at the end of the paragraphs on being and nothing.  By the time 
Hegel is half-finished describing being he is already articulating aspects of nothing, and 
once nothing is articulated it is found to have passed back into being.11  In addition to the 
truth of the identity of being and nothing Hegel also claims that they are “not 
undistinguished from each other,” but “on the contrary, they are not the same” for they 
“are absolutely distinct.”  Immediately after claiming this absolute distinction, however, 
                                                
9 Parentheses in original. 
10 Emphasis added. 
11 Dale M. Schlitt, Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim: A Critical Reflection (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 
58.  
  
 
63 
Hegel adds that they are “unseparable and inseparable and that each immediately 
vanishes in its opposite.  Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate 
vanishing of the one in the other: becoming” (SL 83/WL 83). 
One way of understanding this is considering the identity and difference of the 
morning and evening star.  While each has a difference sense both have the same 
reference, Venus.  Likewise, being and nothing each have the their own sense (being is 
that which applies to everything and nothing is that which applies to no-thing), even 
thought they both have the same reference as the emptiness of thought.12  This analogy 
emphasizes the identity of being and nothing.   
To give full weight, however, to Hegel’s claim that being and nothing are 
“absolutely distinct” the opposite of this analogy is preferable.  As Hegel’s exposition of 
being and nothing indicates, it is exactly the logical (or linguistic) sense of each term that 
is identical in that each is “indeterminately immediate,” but it is the ontological reference 
that is different, i.e. being is being and nothing is nothing.  Instead of their senses 
(connotations) being different and their reference (denotation) the same it seems the only 
way to affirm the absolute distinction between being and nothing is to conclude that 
while their sense (connotation) is the same it is their references (denotations) that are 
different.  If this is the case, then, as Michael Rosen says, it seems Hegel is claiming that 
being and nothing are “non-identical indiscernibles” and the concept of becoming is the 
mutual vanishing between them.13  But if “non-identical indiscernibles” accurately 
describes the non-relation of being and nothing, from where comes the difference 
                                                
12 Justus Hartnack, An Introduction to Hegel’s Logic (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1998), 12. 
13 Michael Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 150-152. 
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between them that gives rise to the category of becoming?14  If being-nothing are “non-
identical indiscernibles” how is enough difference found between them to warrant 
                                                
14 Critics point out that the dialectic of being-nothing only arrives at becoming because 
illicit presuppositions are smuggled into the process, or that becoming is merely assumed 
in advance.  Beyond the objections to a presuppositionless beginning mentioned above 
(that Hegel assumes the absolute), critics claim that the very language used to express 
pure being predisposes the development toward becoming by presupposing later 
developments within the Logic, namely the categories of reflection developed in the 
second part on Essence.  Terms such as “indeterminate immediacy” and “equal to itself” 
are negations of reflective categories such that pure being is determined through the 
negation of these categories. In addition, it is claimed that Hegel presupposes the 
everyday use of language in which thought originally lives leaving Hegel’s dialectic in 
need of retrieving its more primordial hermeneutic. In these ways it is claimed Hegel 
illegitimately makes use of what comes later in (or outside of) the Logic rather than 
letting the categories develop immanently (see Dieter Henrich, “Anfang und Mthode der 
Logik,” in Hegel im Kontext [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971], 85-90; Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Hege’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies trans. by P. Christopher 
Smith [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976], 93, 99). 
 One response is to ignore these objections all together by claiming that Hegel 
never seriously intended a presuppositionless science but always presupposed the totality 
of his system.  Beyond presupposing the Phenomenology, Klaus Kartmann suggests 
Hegel’s Logic must be understood as a retrospective justification of the whole, or a 
reconstruction of the richness of thought back through its antecedents.  Robert Pippin 
suggests that here as elsewhere Hegel is merely assuming a position which he already 
thinks is untenable in order to move beyond it, i.e. that the idea of “indeterminate 
immediacy” is always a failure (See Klaus Hartmann, “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical 
View,” in G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments, vol. 3, ed. Robert Stern [London and New 
York: Routledge, 1993],154; Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfaction of 
Self-Consciousness [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 182-186). 
 A less dismissive response claims these criticisms move too quickly in that Hegel 
is not defining pure being, but is rather describing it with the available language.  It is not 
the case that Hegel defines being as in-determinate (the negation of determinacy) or im-
mediacy (the negation of mediation) for this would be to say too much by giving 
determinations to indeterminate being.  Rather “indeterminate immediacy” and 
expressions like it turn ordinary language (which is naturally reflective) against itself so 
as to properly indicate the thought of pure being. Hegel uses “ordinary determinate words 
with rich and varied meanings to bring to mind (and “thematize”) an utterly 
indeterminate thought” (Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, 84 [emphasis in 
original].  See also 82).  In order to indicate pure being Hegel seeks to purify ordinary 
language of its presuppositions rather than building his argument upon them.  These 
“self-canceling expressions” (Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, 79), indicative of 
a “hermeneutic self-alienation” (Clark Butler, Hegel’s Logic: Between Dialectic and 
History [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996], 27), are the means by which 
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another category? In other words, the problem is not the transition between the 
“indeterminate immediacies” of being and nothing, but how this transition transitions into 
something else, into becoming, moving from the indeterminate to the determinate. 
 
The Failure of Being: From Verstand to Vernunft 
 
To keep the mutual vanishing of being and nothing from reducing into a mere 
tautology admitting no productive movement then some minimal difference must be 
found through which the oppositions can be resolved.15  Hegel seems only to state that 
some minimal difference exists rather than prove that it does.  As Gadamer says, 
“Though it is convincing that one cannot think Becoming without thinking Being and 
Nothing simultaneously, the converse, that when one thinks Being and Nothing one must 
                                                                                                                                            
Hegel practices the “absolute culture and disciple of consciousness” required to dwell and 
labor in the realm of shadows, which is the system of logic (SL 58/WL 5:55). 
15 One way of understanding this problem is to remember that Hegel mentions three 
moments of thought: 1) the understanding (verständige) fixes determinations, 2) 
dialectical or negative reason (die dialektische oder negativ-vernünftige) opposes these 
fixed and one-sided determination with others, 3) and speculative or positive reason (die 
spekulative oder positiv-vernünftige) unites opposed determinations (E §79-82 and SL 
28/WL 5:16).  If we apply these movements to the opening dialect in a relatively 
straightforward manner we see the understanding isolating pure being, abstracting and 
purifying its determinations, a process rendering pure being completely without 
determination. In seeking clarity and precision of thought the understanding inadvertently 
renders pure being unintelligible and therefore in fact nothing.  In turning its attention to 
nothing the understanding finds that something is being thought and therefore nothing is.  
The understanding cannot isolate either concept without immediately passing into its 
opposition.  This passing into oppositions is the natural consequence of understanding’s 
commitment to fixed determinations, giving rise to dialectical reason as the mutual 
vanishing of being and nothing into each other.  Speculative reason resolves the 
opposition with the concept of becoming, which settles into a stable result from its 
unstable unrest (SL 106/WL 5:113).  The problem is that this still does not get at the non-
relational identity of being-nothing if speculative reason is not already presupposed. See 
John Burbidge On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of a Commentary (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1981), 42-45. 
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think Becoming is not at all convincing.”16  Therefore, if Hegel is not to fall to the 
criticism that he either assumes becoming from the beginning or is relying on some 
subjective opinion (which he denies to be the case [SL 92/WL 5:95]), then there must be 
a reason that enables Hegel to justify the difference which gives movement at the 
beginning of the Logic.  To see how he does this we must look more closely at the 
operations of Verstand and Vernunft at the beginning of the Logic. 
 The work of the understanding (Verstand) in relation to reason (Vernunft) is to 
separate and fix the abstract determination of any concrete object or idea, preparing it for 
the later unifying process of reason (SL 610-11/ WL 6:286-87).17  This is the ideal 
relation between Verstand and Vernunft where separating and fixing determinations 
slides seamlessly into a fluid unity of concepts.18  What this means for the beginning of 
the Logic is that the understanding begins the logical process by isolating pure being 
through a movement of abstraction, separating it from all other relationships. 
But the question we must ask is “from what” is the understanding isolating and 
abstracting?  Certainly it is not phenomenological consciousness for this would be to 
repeat the Phenomenology.  The understanding is not isolating and abstracting from 
“determinate being” for this would be to presuppose a later category.  If we are to take 
Hegel seriously that the Logic presupposes the conclusions of the Phenomenology then it 
                                                
16 Gadamer, Hege’s Dialectic, 87. 
17 Also see the three-fold designation the separates Vernunft into the two moments of 
dialectical and speculative in addition to Verstand (E §79-82 and SL 28/WL 5:16). 
18 Of course Hegel often takes a negative perspective of Verstand as the failure of 
Kantian philosophy which only fixes determinations, sets up rigid dichotomies, and 
erects limits (Beschränkens) to thought, refusing to move beyond this perspective and 
thinking itself the apex of philosophy.  Especially in his early essays Hegel would oppose 
Verstand and Vernunft (FK 62, 64-65/GW 296, 299-300; DS 90-91/Diff 21-23; SL 
45/WL 39) even while also indicating their significant relationship (compare PS ¶32/PG 
37 and DS 94/Diff 27; E §79-82 and SL 28/WL 5:16). 
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follows that the understanding is isolating and abstracting from “the standpoint occupied 
by pure knowledge” (SL 68-9/WL 5:67).  As David Gray Carlson explains: “The 
beginning [of pure being] is simply the immediate version of absolute knowing” as 
constructed by the understanding.19  The understanding isolates and abstracts from within 
and out from absolute knowing.  If this is the case then the difference noted in the 
vanishing of being and nothing is not the difference between being and nothing.  Rather 
the difference is between pure knowing (as known by Vernunft) and the pure immediacy 
of being (as articulated by Verstand).  The concept of becoming does not come on the 
scene through the dialectic between being and nothing.  Rather, becoming is better 
thought as marking the difference between the immediacy of pure being (as spelled out 
by the understanding) and its difference from pure knowing (as known by reason).  “Pure 
being was supposed to be absolute knowing—the Understanding’s propositional 
summary of it.  But it ended up being nothing at all—a failure,” a failure speculatively 
resolved in the positive movement of becoming.20 
 In light of this failure of the understanding to provide a true beginning, what 
precedes becoming is not the mutual vanishing of being and nothing, but the fact of 
vanishing itself, that thought is vanishing from itself.  “What precedes ‘becoming’ is 
thinking which fails to form a thought of its own being,” finding itself to be nothing at 
all.21  This failure of thought (by the understanding) in comparison to pure knowing (by 
reason) generates the perspective from which the difference between being and nothing is 
                                                
19 David Gray Carlson, “The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning of Hegel’s Logic,” in 
Hegel’s Theory of the Subject, ed. David Gray Carlson (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 
2005), 211. 
20 Carlson, “The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning of Hegel’s Logic,” 207. 
21 Carlson, “The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning of Hegel’s Logic,” 217. 
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discerned. Becoming is the true first thought of the Logic, not because becoming was 
presupposed, but because being-nothing failed to be a thought.  
We must, however, press more deeply into this failure of thought.  As Angelica 
Nuzzo suggests, while the Logic certainly begins with being, it actually begins from 
nothing.22  When Hegel asks, “With what must science begin?” his answer is being.  But 
Nuzzo suggests that how Hegel actually begins is different.  When Hegel begins with 
being we are told nothing about it.  We are not even given an actual propositions but 
mere phrases (Sein, reines Sein…Nichts, das reine Nichts).  And as we have seen, it is not 
the case that nothing vanishes into being and being into nothing, but an “already having 
vanished” into each other.  This pure vanishing is nothingness, “the most radical 
challenge to the logic of the understanding,”23 proving to be the downfall of Verstand in 
its failure to think.24  Here Hegel is staging the last stand of the critical (Kantian) 
philosophy that makes function as its own absolute.  The promise and failure of Kantian 
philosophy is exposed in these short paragraphs where Verstand is shown to immediately 
falter when separated from Vernunft.  The encounter with nothingness as the mutual 
vanishing of being-nothing reveals the immediate deadlock of Verstand when elevated to 
a systematic position, revealing the needs for its assimilation within are larger vision of 
                                                
22 Angelica Nuzzo, “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason: How Does Hegel’s Logic 
Begin,” in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, ed. Nectarios G. Limnatis (London: 
Continuum, 2010), 23. 
23 Nuzzo, “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason,” 20. 
24 Therefore, those like Gadamer who claim the being-nothing dialectic is a failed thought 
are right in their observation but wrong in their conclusion that this failure invalidates 
Hegel’s logic.  See Gadamer, Hege’s Dialectic, 88. Sympathetic interpreters like Pippin 
also claim the thought of pure being to be a failure, but that it was intended to be.  See 
Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism, 184. 
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Vernunft.  The failure of Verstand to think results from its encounter with nothingness, 
the nothingness of thought. 
In view of this conclusion, while the Logic formally begins with being, true 
thought only begins at becoming, and all this comes from nothing(ness).  Of course, if the 
Logic begins from nothing then it seems to have fulfilled the conditions of a 
presuppositionless science.  This science is freely self-determining exactly because 
nothing is determining it. When isolated from Vernunft, Verstand realizes that nothing 
(nothingness) is out of reach (negatively).25  But, when Verstand is integrated with 
Vernunft, it is equally true that nothing (no-thing) is out of reach (positively) because 
now thought thinks both all that is and the nothing that is not. The nothingness of thought 
as the failure of thought is now is now barred from being beyond thought (a Kantian 
beyond), and is re-included as the non-thought of thought issuing in the concept of being 
which transitions into determinate being (Dasein).26  As we will see, this initial 
internalization of nothing in the form of non-thought becomes the productive power of 
negation within thought.  This science, then is neither indeterminate as abstract nor 
determined by external content, but is fully self-determining. 
 
Finite-Infinite and the True Infinite 
 
The immediacy of pure being gives way to the new concept of determinate being 
(Dasein).  Determinate being, through many twists and turns, finally culminates in the 
                                                
25 Nuzzo, “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason,” 21. 
26 To say that “nothing (nothingness) is out of reach” for the understanding rebounds 
from the non-thought of nothing to the first thought of becoming as unstable unrest. But 
to say “no-thing is out of reach” is to enter the stable result of becoming—determinate 
being—the next immediacy understanding takes under consideration. 
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contradictions of finitude, leading to our desired goal of the true infinite.  These 
contradictions of determinate being stem from the relationship between something and its 
other.  With the concept of determinate being comes the problem of distinguishing one 
determinate being from another.  Hegel show that’s the concept of something (Etwas) 
logically entails something else as part of its own internal structure.  The color blue is 
only truly known through its opposition to other colors, just as sea is distinguished 
through its opposition to land.  In this way “negation is now immanent” in each 
determinate something as its relationship to its other (SL 125/WL 5:135).27  This 
immanent negation is the limit (Grenz) between both something and its other such that to 
pass beyond this limit is to change into something else (SL 126/WL 5:135). Being within 
its limit is the only way determinate being can be itself without changing into its other.  
But this limit is also its limitation (add German) in relation to its other (add reference).  In 
other words, having a limit is also to be limited, and this being-limited is the 
internalization and embrace of something’s (Etwas) own non-being (i.e. the being of its 
other is something’s non-being).  Embracing this contradiction (being through non-being) 
is the condition of finitude. 
The contradiction of finitude is that the limit of something is both its being and 
non-being such that finite things both are and yet are coming to an end.  As Hegel says:  
Finite things are, but their relation to themselves is that they are negatively self-
related and in this very self-relation send themselves away beyond themselves, 
beyond their being.  They are, but the truth of this being is their end.  The finite 
not only alters, like something in general, but it ceases to be; and its ceasing to be 
is not merely a possibility, so that it could be without ceasing to be, but the being 
as such of finite things is to have the germ of decease as their being-within-self: 
the hour of their birth is the hour of their death. (SL 129/WL 5:139) 
 
                                                
27 Emphasis in original. 
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Finite being, which is the logical consequence of determinate being, reveals itself to be a 
permanent ceasing-to-be because things (determinate beings) are always changing into 
something else; constantly being birthed and yet always tending toward their own death. 
In this way negation reigns on the level of the finite as the ceaseless process of 
‘becoming.’   
 But the reign of negation within the finite sows the seeds from which the infinite 
will grow.  This reversal happens because the perpetual ceasing-to-be of finite being is 
not a passing into nothingness, for this would place thought back into the position of non-
thought with which the dialectic began (SL 131/WL 5:141). Finite being does not cease 
to be as a return to nothing, but constantly passes over into another finite something.  
Taylor summarizes it in this way: 
A finite thing goes under of necessity.  But in going under it does not simply 
disappear.  The negation from which it suffers is itself a determinate one, and 
hence in breaking up it is replaced by another determinate thing—e.g., wood 
which is burnt become smoke and ash.28 
 
In its ceasing-to-be, finite being itself has not ceased to be even if a particular finite thing 
has.  This process goes on perpetually as a transition between determinate beings.  Finite 
being, in going beyond itself (in ceasing to be), unites with itself (as continual process of 
ceasing to be) and thus is found to be infinite (SL 136-7/WL 5: 148-9).  
 The arrival of the infinite is given much fanfare by Hegel.  He proclaims that “at 
the name of the infinite the heart and the mind light up for in the infinite the spirit is not 
merely abstractly present to itself, but rises to its own self, to the light of its thinking, of 
its universality, of its freedom” (SL 137-8/WL 5:150). The freedom of thought, so 
earnestly sought from the beginning, is now glimpsed in the thought of the infinite.  This 
                                                
28 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 242.   
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celebration, however, is prematurely ruined by the understanding (Verstand) and its 
‘spurious infinite’.  We must pass through this spurious infinite in order to achieve the 
true conception of the infinite.  For as with the being-nothing, there is a dialectic between 
finite-infinite that must be properly grasped. 
The spurious infinite is “the infinite of the understanding” (das Unendliche des 
Verstandes) which strictly opposes the finite and infinite.  The understanding sets up a 
determinate opposition so that “there are two worlds, one infinite and one finite, and in 
their relationship the infinite is only the limit of the finite and is thus only a determinate 
infinite, an infinite which is itself finite” (SL 139-40/WL 5:152).29  The understanding 
thinks the infinite as the ‘beyond’ or ‘negation’ of the finite, acting as the limit of the 
finite.  The infinite is in-finite, the negation of the finite, and is therefore connected with 
the finite as its opposite.  As a negative determination in relation to finitude, the infinite 
only exists through this negation as a structural opposition.  Because of this structural 
opposition the infinite has the finite as its limit.  But as Hegel has shown, everything with 
a limit is in fact finite.  Therefore to make the infinite the non-finite is exactly to reduce 
the infinite to finitude. 
The spurious infinite, as the negation of the finite, merely extends the dilemma of 
something and its other and their infinite alteration. As with the pure alteration from one 
finite thing to another in the ceaseless process of ceasing-to-be that gave rise to concept 
of the infinite in the first place, now the concept of the infinite itself is caught in a 
continuous alternation between one infinite and its finite limit.  This first infinite, reduced 
                                                
29 As I will show later, this mirrors the problem the understanding runs into in the 
Phenomenology when it tried to account for sensible appearance by invoking a 
supersensible world. 
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to finitude, turns around and generates its own infinite, which is again reduced to 
finitude, ad infinitum.30  In this situation of structural opposition between the finite and 
infinite, all that is left is “the alternating determination of the finite and the infinite” (SL 
141/WL 5:155), an alteration that Hegel calls an “infinite progress” where the finite and 
infinite mutually affirm and negate each other in their attempts at independence (SL 
142/WL 5:155-56).  Hegel summarizes the problem created by the understanding and its 
fixed determinations (opposing the finite and infinite) as the problem of an “abstract 
transcending of a limit, a transcending which remains incomplete because it is not itself 
transcended” (indem über dies Hinausgehen nicht selbst hinausgegangen wird) (SL 
142/WL 5:155).  What Hegel means by this is that the categories and perspective of 
finitude (i.e. determination through a limit), which is essentially the perspective of the 
understanding, cannot grasp the truth of the infinite because it instead reduces the infinite 
to the finite. The finite perspective of the understanding (Verstand) needs to be 
transcended again (this suggest a certainly parallel between the being-nothing and finite-
infinite dialectic to which we will return below).   
To transcend this perspective one must move from what is implicitly present in 
the ‘infinite progress’ to what is implicitly present in the ‘infinite alteration.’  As Hegel 
says, “In this alternating determination of the finite and the infinite from one to the other 
and back again, their truth is already implicitly present, and all that is required is to take 
up what is before us” (SL 143/WL 5:156).  What he means is that from the perspective of 
the understanding the finite and the infinite each come into being through the other.  
From the side of the finite, the finite is negated and the beyond of the finite is seen as the 
                                                
30 Houlgate gives an excellent summary of the relation of the two series of infinite 
alterations in The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, 409-412. 
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infinite.  But this negation is again negated (or transcended [Hinausgehen] as Hegel 
typically says here) and the finite is returned to itself through its other.  The finite is 
therefore united to itself through the infinite (the other of the finite). Likewise, the 
infinite is negated by the finite as the limit of the infinite (that through which the infinite 
is known).  With the positing of the finite comes a limit that must be transcended such 
that the infinite returns to itself through the finite (the other of the infinite).  Each is the 
self-sublation of the other, or rather “both the finite and the infinite are this movement in 
which each returns to itself through its negation” (SL 147/WL 162). What the 
understanding overlooks is  
the negation of both which is actually present in the infinite progress, as also the 
fact that they occur therein only as moments of a whole (Ganzen) and that they 
come on the scene only by means of their opposite, but essentially also by means 
of the sublation (Aufhebens) of their opposites. (SL 147/WL 5:162) 
 
This becoming itself through its other is the true meaning of ‘negation of negation.’  With 
the union of these moments (the finite becoming itself through the infinite and the infinite 
through the finite), both thought and the thought of being are truly self-relating as the true 
infinite, and therefore it is the highest instance (so far) of self-determining thought now 
seen as self-transcending (a transcending of the need to transcended a limit).  In this it is 
“a matter of complete indifference which is taken as the beginning” because each is a 
derivation of the other (SL 148/WL 5:163).  Only the finite perspective of the 
understanding (Verstand) seeks to claim the priority of one over the other.31 
The significance of the true infinite lays in it being the truth of becoming.  Hegel 
makes this clear when he emphatically notes that the determination of the true infinite 
                                                
31 Note the problem of religious readers who claim that Hegel has preserved 
transcendence within the finite because he does not claim to reduced the infinite to the 
finite. 
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cannot properly be called the “unity of the finite and infinite” because this would imply a 
static and inert relationship.  Rather the true infinite  
is essentially only as becoming, but a becoming now further determined in its 
moments.  Becoming, in the first instance, has abstract being and nothing for its 
determinations; as alteration, its moments posses determinate being, something 
and other; now as the infinite, they are the finite and infinite, which are 
themselves in the process of becoming. (SL 148/WL 5:164) 
 
Only by conceiving the true infinite as becoming does its true nature manifest itself.  The 
true infinite resolves the contradiction of finite being, which is the result of the 
conceptual development beginning with determinate being (Dasein), such the true infinite 
“as the consummated return into self, the relationship of itself to itself, is being (ist Sein)” 
(SL 148/WL 5:164).  Inversely, the true infinite reveals the true nature of the finite as 
actually lacking being.  Indeed, the finite, known through the moments of the finite-
(spurious)infinite dialectic, is merely ideal.  Only the true infinite actually is, a 
proposition Hegel claims every true philosophy and religion affirms (SL 154-5/WL 
5:172; E §95R).  This then is the true infinite, the basis of Hegel’s idealism and the 
benchmark of true philosophy, around which his entire system rotates.  This true infinite 
springs from ‘negation’ within thought (negating the opposition between finite and 
infinite) as the overcoming of the ‘nothing’ beyond thought. 
 
Why Nothing Is Infinite 
 
To fully appreciate Hegel’s derivation of the true infinite (and its significance for 
other parts of his system) we must connect the first movement of being-nothing and 
becoming with the later movement of finite-infinite and true infinite.  After all, with the 
arrival of the true infinite Hegel suggest the circle is the proper the image for the true 
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infinite because in the circle “the line which has reached itself, which is closed and 
wholly present, without beginning or end” (SL 148/WL 5:164).  The circular nature of 
this his thought suggests it is appropriate to retrace earlier moments.  To connect the 
beginning with the end (the true infinite) it is first necessary to set out the structural 
analogues between being/nothing and finite/infinite.  After this the implications will be 
discussed concerning the nature of self-determining, or self-transcending thought.   
We must first notice that just as the finite and the infinite are moments within the 
true infinite so too are being and nothing moments of becoming.  In the earlier discussion 
on being-nothing Hegel remarked on the deficiency of claiming the direct “unity of being 
and nothing” because this expression is a one-sided truth that cancels out the absolute 
distinction between them (SL 90-3/WL 5:92-6). Hegel likewise adds a remark about the 
deficiency of emphasizing the unity of the finite and the infinite because a commitment to 
their unity must be immediately corrected by an opposing commitment that they “are 
absolutely different and opposed to each other” (SL 151/WL 5:167).  But he then points 
out that this new position must also be corrected again by claiming again that the finite 
and infinite are “inseparable” (untrennbar).  Because of this need to pile on 
qualifications, the infinite process mutates into the alternating determination of the unity 
(Einheit) and separateness (Trennung) of the finite and infinite, which is, nevertheless, 
inseparable (untrennbar) (SL 151/WL 5:168).  In the end, for Hegel, the emphasis lands 
on the inseparability of the finite-infinite, after proper qualification. 
It is exactly at this point, however, that the same question presents itself 
concerning the difference between being and nothing, but now in the reverse form.  For 
being-nothing it was asked how their difference was maintained within their mutual 
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vanishing.  Specifically, from where was the difference marked?  But here the question 
concerns the affirmation of the inseparability of finite-infinite. In other words, why the 
necessity of inseparability?  To answer this question we must take our previous analysis 
of how the Logic actually begins and extend it to the dialectic of the finite-infinite. 
The previous analysis concluded that while the Logic formally begins with pure 
being, true thought only begins at becoming, and all this comes from nothing.  
Concerning the dialectic of the true infinite, finite being now stands in the place of pure 
being and the spurious infinite for nothing.  Hegel supports this himself by identifying the 
spurious infinite as “the nothing of the finite” (das Nichts des Endlichen) (SL 139/WL 
5:151), which is here explicitly under the rule of the understanding (Verstand).  As with 
the being-nothing alteration, the finite-infinite alternation ultimately collapses into an 
inseparable unity-in-separation, all governed by the understanding (Verstand) in its 
encounter with nothing (the nothing of the ‘beyond’ being rather of ‘pure’ being). 
As with becoming, the true infinite comes also from nothing in the form of the 
spurious infinite, the nothing of the finite.  The nothing that is beyond every finite as its 
limit is equal to the nothing before becoming, each governed by Verstand in its isolation 
from Vernunft.  The failed thought of the spurious infinite (the ceasing-to-be which itself 
must cease to be, or the perpetual transcending of a limit which must itself be 
transcended) is just the explicit articulation of the initial failure of Verstand to think pure 
being as a beginning.   
Is it any wonder, then, that after each of these failures Hegel adds remarks about 
the impossibility of a beginning?  After his discussion of being-nothing Hegel comments 
on the impossibility that the world had a beginning. To ask about the beginning of the 
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world is to deny the unity of being and nothing, giving nothing its own independence 
from which being would then come. But this cannot be the case because “in nothing—or 
nothing—is no beginning (im Nichts oder das Nichts ist nicht Anfang) (SL 104/WL 
5:110).  As noted above, one cannot start with or in nothing, only from nothing as non-
thought.  Likewise, after the dialectic of the finite-infinite Hegel considers the question, 
“Can the infinite become finite?”  He answers that the meaning of this question 
presupposes the separability of the infinite from the finite such that the infinite could then 
go into or become finite.  But this is a denial of their inseparability.  As Hegel states, 
either the infinite has eternally gone forth in finitude (which is Hegel’s position and is his 
denial of creatio ex nihilo), or the infinite has remained by itself “without having its other 
present within it” (SL 154/WL 5:171), a reversion back to the spurious infinite.  The 
thought of nothing and the thought of the spurious infinite are both non-thoughts.  Or 
rather, both encounter nothingness under the guidance of the understanding, and therefore 
fail.   
 As before, the failure of the spurious infinite reveals the failure of Verstand in 
isolation from Vernunft.  Just as the difference between being-nothing was not the 
difference between them but the difference between the beginning of Verstand and the 
pure knowing of Vernunft, so too the inseparability of finite-infinite is not truly between 
the finite and the infinite but between Verstand and Vernunft.  Finite-infinite is deemed 
inseparable because Verstand has found that it is inseparable from Vernunft if it is to 
function properly, a lesson taught to Verstand through its two encounters with 
nothingness.  In this way the nothing of understanding (Verstand) becomes the infinite of 
reason (Vernunft).  
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 While Hegel does not explicitly make this claim, he has shown all along why 
‘nothing is infinite.’  Taken in the negative sense in regard to the spurious infinite, it is 
‘nothing’ cancels the spurious infinity and its beyond, i.e. there is no-thing beyond the 
finite now known as the true infinite.  As a proposition this would claim, ‘The spurious 
infinite is nothing.’ On the other hand, taken positively concerning the true infinite, 
‘nothing’ is the non-thought necessitating the true infinite, i.e. it is from nothing that true 
infinity comes.  In both cases the nothingness of thought produces the self-enclosed 
infinity of being.  That ‘nothing is infinity’ is another way of saying that Hegel takes into 
account both the immanent and the self-transcending nature of thought.  Thought is 
immanent to itself because Hegel has attempted to show that there is ‘nothing’ before 
thought (within the being-nothing dialectic) and ‘nothing’ after thought (within the finite-
infinite dialectic), and ‘negation’ is ‘nothing’ as it functions within thought.  Thought is 
self-transcending because it is that which goes beyond all limits, preeminently seen in the 
transcending of the mutual limitations between the finite and the infinite leading to the 
true infinite. 
 
Self-Transcending Immanence 
 
 This, then, is the logic of thought thinking itself that references nothing other than 
itself.  ‘Nothing’ and its resultant infinity is the ‘key’ to unlocking the Logic, and Hegel’s 
system.  Dieter Henrich claims one must have this key in order to understand the Logic, 
but laments that one never finds an exposition of this key within the Logic itself.32  The 
above analysis shows that we need not glean this key as a global inference from Hegel’s 
                                                
32 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lecture on German Idealism (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 316-319. 
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system, but rather we find the key of nothing through the operations of pure knowing 
integrating Verstand with Vernunft, traced through the movements of being-nothing and 
finite-infinite. The self-transcendence of thought includes the logical category of 
‘nothing’ by excluding nothingness as a non-thought, thereby internalizing ‘nothing’ as 
dialectical development through negation.  In these opening chapters of the Logic, Hegel 
has shown the self-transcendence of thought within the very immanence of thought.  
Thought is self-transcending as the transcending of itself (as Verstand) by itself (as 
Vernunft).  And yet it is an immanent because these movements have always been 
discerned from the perspective of Vernunft as pure knowing, the perspective by which 
thought discerns the difference between being and nothing, and the inseparability of the 
finite and infinite.  These movements are the self-transcending immanence of thought 
thinking itself.   
In a very Hegelian sense, to take up this key is to ‘have already’ opened the door 
and entered in.  This is the reason for the eerie sense of always having been inside 
Hegel’s philosophy, especially when reading the Phenomenology or the Logic.  One 
never meets Hegel at the door, but rather finds oneself already quite at home in his 
system, not sure how you got in or perhaps how to get out.  Or even better, when we take 
up this key we find ourselves already deep at sea on the waters of free thought.  For when 
Hegel says that “when we think freely, voyaging on the open sea, with nothing under us 
and nothing over us, in solitude, alone by ourselves—then we are purely at home with 
ourselves,” (E §31) we must understand him quite literally, that there is ‘nothing’ under 
thought (below or before being) and ‘nothing’ above thought (beyond being). 
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This first section has argued that while the Logic formally begins with pure being, 
true thought only begins at becoming, and all this comes from nothing.  The Logic 
includes ‘nothing’ by first excluding it as the non-thought of being.  The Logic then 
internalizes this ‘non-thought’ as the productive process of negation.  The failure of 
‘nothing’ is taken up as ‘becoming’, which is developed as determinate being through its 
internal negations. This development culminates in the contradictions of finitude and 
finally issues in the thought of the true infinite.  This section concluded with why 
‘nothing is infinite’ and how this exemplifies the self-transcending immanence of thought 
for Hegel.   
The Logic, however, only concerns what self-transcending immanence is in its 
element of pure thought or pure knowing.  It is the Phenomenology that attempts to 
explain why one would adopt such a stance.  Because it attempts to justify taking this 
stance, the Phenomenology acts as the presupposition of the Logic.  Now that we have 
come to grasp what Hegel thinks to be the center of his system, i.e. the true infinite 
known through the self-determining development of thought itself, begun from nothing 
but itself, it is now time to examine the presupposition of such thought as it is articulated 
in the Phenomenology.  As we will see, nothing and the true infinite are integral to the 
project of the Phenomenology, each playing prominent roles in the unfolding drama of 
consciousness. 
 
2. Infinite Self-Consciousness: Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
 If nothing as negation is the key to Hegel’s system, the Phenomenology of Spirit 
was intended to be the door. From the side of the Logic we noted Hegel’s claim that the 
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Phenomenology left behind the oppositions of ordinary consciousness that separates 
subject and object (form and content), and thus demonstrating the necessity of the 
standpoint of absolute knowing.  To pass through the door of the Phenomenology is to 
exit the realm of ordinary consciousness and enter the abode of speculative philosophy.  
This second section will examine just how Hegel seeks to accomplish this passage into 
absolute knowing and ask whether he actually accomplishes it. 
On the side of the Phenomenology, Hegel indicates his goal to elevate natural 
consciousness into the airy realm true knowledge (PS ¶77/PG 72), a process that can lay 
aside “the love of knowing and be actual knowledge” (PS ¶5/PG 14).  Instead of speaking 
of immediacy and mediation or the question of beginnings as in the Logic, Hegel frames 
his discussion as understanding truth “not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” (PS 
¶17/PG 23), which entails that “all content is its own [Substance as Subject] reflection 
into itself” (PS ¶54/PG 53).  Uniting content and form as substance and subject is 
accomplished through the patient labor and suffering of the negative (PS ¶18-19/PG 23-
24).  The system of true knowledge “that Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed 
through the representation of the Absolute as Spirit (Geist),” and when Geist knows itself 
as Geist becomes the science Hegel intends to establish (PS ¶25/PG 28-29), becoming the 
presupposition of the Logic. 
As Hegel hopes to show, the life of Geist does not shrink back from death, but 
endures and dwells in death as a “tarrying with the negative” (PS ¶32/PG 36).  Here H. S. 
Harris sees an allusion to Jesus as the first figure to embrace death as an individual 
subject representing universal substance, preparing the reader for the Calvary of absolute 
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spirit at the end of the Phenomenology (PS ¶808/PG 591).33  This tarrying with the 
negative feels like death for ordinary consciousness unaccustomed to the rigors of 
scientific thought.  To purify ordinary consciousness of it commitment to representational 
thinking (a thinking which separates subject from object) it must pass through its own 
stations of the cross (PS ¶77/PG 72),34 a “way of despair” that acts as the “education of 
consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science” (PS ¶78/PG 72-73).  This emphasis on 
negation as the feelingof death reveals the fundamental congruence between the Logic 
and the Phenomenology regarding the way of thought.  Within the austere atmosphere of 
the Logic there is no need to speak of life, death, or despair.  But below, in the rough and 
ready world of phenomenal consciousness, Hegel is bracing the reader for a severe 
journey. 
The goal of this journey is that “point where knowledge no longer needs to go 
beyond [transcend] itself (sich selbst hinauszugehen), where knowledge finds itself, 
where Notion (Begriff) corresponds to object (Gegenstande) and object to Notion” (PS 
¶80/PG 74).  Two thing to note from this formulation: first, that the Notion and object 
would correspond and vice versa is exactly what the Logic assumes as its beginning in 
pure knowing.  And, second, the idea of something not needing to go beyond itself should 
immediately remind us of the status of the true infinite as self-transcending.  But Hegel 
continues by making this key statement: “Consciousness, however, is explicitly the 
Notion of itself.  Hence, it is something that [immediately] goes beyond limits, and since 
                                                
33 H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1997), 78, 107 n. 139. 
34 Harris, Hegel’s Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 175. 
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these limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond itself” (PS ¶80/PG 74).35  
Having encountered the Logic, when we read that consciousness is that which goes 
beyond or transcends (das Hinausgehen) limits, we should immediately think of how 
Hegel describes the true infinite as having transcended the transcending of limits.  He is 
saying that consciousness is that which transcends all limits, and is therefore self-
transcending as that which “goes beyond itself.”  Hegel is preparing us for the eventual 
realization that consciousness (expanded into self-consciousness and Geist) is itself the 
true infinite as absolute knowing. 
As our interest is both on the role of Verstand in placing limits (especially the 
limit of the beyond, Jenseits), and how consciousness transcends these limits, we will 
trace three movements in which consciousness goes beyond its own limits. And because 
Hegel likens the freedom of thought to “voyaging on the open sea, with nothing under us 
and nothing over us” (E §31), this investigation of the Phenomenology will take the form 
of three sounds in which Hegel seeks to plumb the deep sea of consciousness.  The first 
sounding concerns the understanding (Verstand) and its encounter with the supersensible 
beyond, an encounter that prompts the transition from consciousness to self-
consciousness. This transition into self-consciousness sets up the second encounter 
between the Unhappy Consciousness and its in God as transcendent other.  The 
                                                
35 The full text reads, “Das Bewußtsein aber ist für sich selbst sein Begriff, dadurch 
unmittelbar das Hinausgehen über das Beschränkte und, da ihm dies Beschränkte 
angehört, über sich selbst.” The particular difficulty is with the phrase “dadurch 
unmittelbar das Hinausgehen über das Beschränkte.” Miller unfortunately drops 
unmittelbar altogether, but attempts to catch the nounal form of das Hinausgehen as 
“something that goes beyond.”  Pinkard translates this phrase more literally as “and as a 
result it immediately goes beyond the restriction” but loses the distinctive sense of das 
Hinausgehen by making it into a verb thereby (over)emphasizing the activity of 
consciousness rather than its nature as “the going beyond” of limits. 
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movement beyond this limit encompasses the rest of the Phenomenology, provisionally 
accomplished on the socio-historical level through mutual forgiveness at the end of 
chapter VI, but made explicit by Christianity in the incarnation and crucifixion in chapter 
VII.  This explicit encounter within Christianity constitutes the third and final sounding 
we will take, noting how it issues into the thought of pure knowing as the absolute.  
These soundings, especially the second one, will also lay the groundwork for 
understanding Hegel’s social theory examined in the next chapter. 
After these sounding are made this section will end by asking whether Hegel has 
indeed accomplished his goal of uniting subject and object by overcoming all otherness.  
It will be shown that just as the Logic only includes ‘nothing’ by first excluding it as a 
non-thought, so too the Phenomenology includes ‘the beyond’ and ‘otherness’ by first 
excluding them as non-thoughts.  This inclusion through preemptive exclusion results in 
a lack of true encounter with the ‘beyond’ or ‘other’ of thought, always reducing it to the 
indeterminacy of non-thought. And if this is the case then Hegel, even in the 
Phenomenology, will merely have assumed his own argument rather than having proved 
it.  
 
Consciousness and the Infinite: First Sounding 
 
Force and Understand 
 
The Phenomenology opens with three chapters on consciousness, examining three 
forms of consciousness and the types of objects that are opposed to this consciousness.  
In each form consciousness is attempting to secure certainty of knowledge regarding the 
object with having to make reference to itself.  In each case this ultimately fails.  The first 
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two forms of consciousness (chapters I and II) seek to establish certain knowledge of the 
object by referencing, first, a purely sensuous ‘This’, and second, a perceived ‘Thing’.  
The sensuous ‘This’ succumbed to internal contradiction as space (‘Here’) and time 
(‘Now’) were introduced to identify the ‘This’, a space and time quickly multiplying into 
a plurality of Here’s and Now’s creating a structural instability only resolved through the 
introduction of the activity of consciousness.  Likewise, the supposedly independent 
‘Thing’ entered a plurality of relationships with itself and other things rendering its 
supposed independence void.  Attempting to avoid making consciousness the constitutive 
center of the object, the understanding next posits ‘force’ as the unity of objects.  Chapter 
III of the Phenomenology investigates this attempt to establish knowledge of objects 
through reference to ‘force’.  From the perspective of the understanding (Verstand) the 
new object of investigation in chapter III is “force,” but for the phenomenologist looking 
at the entire process (which is the perspective of Hegel and the reader) the new object is 
the understanding itself.36  
  The first move of the understanding is to substantialize force, thereby saving this 
new object as somehow in the world.  This force is both the inner ‘principle’ unifying 
each thing and the outer ‘expression’ of its diverse properties (PS ¶135/PG 109-111).  As 
both ‘principle’ and ‘expression’ force is the “unity of itself and its externalization.”37  
But substantializing force way causes its two moments (inner and outer) to split into two 
forces, the active and passive forces within and between objects.  The substantializing of 
force causes it to fall apart into the play of many forces. 
                                                
36 Harris, Hegel’s Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 263. 
37 Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit trans. by 
Samuel Cherniak and John Henkman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 
121. 
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While moving quickly and somewhat forced,38 Hegel’s claim is that the 
understanding’s attempt to give force substance results in placing the ‘truth of force’ 
within the ‘thought of force’. If the ‘truth of force’ is at the same time the ‘thought of 
force’ then “the realization of Force is at the same time the loss of reality” because force 
cannot be perceived in things as a substance but only conceived behind, above, or 
beyond, these things (PS ¶141/PG 115).  For Hegel, this realization is the movement from 
the first thought of force (as substance) to the second thought of force as only “an object 
for the Understanding,” an object which “is the inner being of things qua inner” (PS 
¶142/PG 115-16). 
 With the realization that force is the inner qua inner of things (not the sensible, 
perceived, or substantial), and that it is through the understanding that this non-sensible 
inner is known, the understanding comes to see that it is that which “looks through this 
mediating play of Forces into the true background of Things” (PS ¶143/PG 116).  This 
admission of the necessity of mediation is a conclusion consciousness has been 
attempting to deny ever since positing the immediacy of sense-certainty (against the 
mediation of space, time, or language), or by positing the immediacy of the perceived 
object (against the mediation of other objects).  
 But the understanding again attempts to dodge this result by externalizing its own 
mediation between the sensible and the inner world of things by positing ‘appearance’ as 
that which mediates between the understanding and the inner world (of the things) (PS 
                                                
38 Hyppolite comments that “this whole dialectic concerning the being of things for 
consciousness prefigures a dialectic of sprit, a dialectic which seems to be more profound 
in the world of spirit than in nature. Here, Hegel’s subtlety strikes us as somewhat empty 
and forced.  What is essential is to understand the direction of his whole argument: to 
lead us to see the dialectic of intelligence in the dialectic of the real” (Genesis and 
Structure, 124). 
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¶143/PG 116-17).  Appearance is the sensible (sinnlichen) world of experience in 
contrast with the supersensible (übersinnliche) world of the beyond (Jenseits) (PS 
¶144/PG 117).  The construction of this syllogism (between consciousness and 
supersensible mediated by appearance) is the first time consciousness willfully posits a 
mediation rather then suppressing it, inferring the supersensible on the basis of the 
sensible (PS ¶145/PG 117).  The positing of this supersensible beyond as a means 
understanding the unity of experienced objects brings us to the cusp of our first sounding. 
 
Understanding and the Beyond 
 
 Concerning the supersensible beyond, Hegel begins with a typically Kantian 
conception of it as “empty, for it is merely the nothingness of appearance,” the 
unknowable “inner being of Things” (PS ¶146/PG 117).  Hegel contends that this 
emptiness is not based in any limitation (beschränkt) of reason (Vernunft), but merely 
because the terms demand that the beyond of consciousness (Jenseits des Bewußtseins) to 
be an empty void in which nothing is known (PS ¶146/PG 118).  This initial definition of 
the beyond should immediately remind us of how the Logic began with the nothingness 
of pure being as the failure of thought, a failure of thought indicating the failure of the 
Kantian understanding (Verstand) concerning the limits of reason (Vernunft).  Here Hegel 
is not concerned with the derivation of the categories of logic, but with exposing the false 
priority of Verstand within Kantian epistemology. 
 Unlike Kant who understood the noumenal realm as marking the limits of reason, 
Hegel faults the conception. If the supersensible beyond has no link with sensible 
phenomena then every quest for true knowledge will fail.  But because the supersensible 
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beyond (übersinnliche Jenseits) has come into existence as a inference from the sensible, 
the supersensible beyond must be connected intelligibly to appearance, such that the 
supersensible is the truth of the sensible.  Or as Hegel says, “the supersensible is 
therefore appearance qua appearance” (PS ¶147/PG 118).  To say that the supersensible 
world is the truth of appearance means the supersensible world is the true interpretation 
of the sensible; it is appearance thought through.39  To understand this we must closely 
follow the thread of Hegel’s argument concerning understanding and force. 
 When the understanding looks upon the “play of forces” known as the world of 
appearance, it learns to think the supersensible beyond standing behind this play.  The 
understanding posits a law as that which gathers and guides this play of forces (Phen. 
¶148/PG 119-20), such that the “absolute alternation”40 of the play of forces contrasted to 
the law as the “stable image of unstable appearance” (PS ¶149/PG 120).  While the 
sensible world is known as the incessant change of alternating forces, the understanding 
posits a law within the supersensible world acting to balance all equations, uniting the 
difference on both sides of the equal sign. 
 But, as could be easily guessed by Hegel’s typical procedure, the stable image of 
the supersensible world rapidly runs into its own internal contradictions. Indeed, the 
“tranquil kingdom of laws, the immediate copy of the perceived world, is changed into its 
opposite” (PS ¶157/PG 127).  This occurs because law as an abstraction is empty and 
                                                
39 Harris, Hegel’s Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 281.  See also E §5 on how 
philosophy thinks-over (Nachdenken) things. 
40 What is rendered here as “absolute alternation” (absoluten Wechsel/absolut 
wechselnde), following Harris (Hegel’s Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason 
[Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997], 283) is “absolute flux” in Miller (¶148 and ¶149).  Miller’s 
“flux” seems to emphasize the chaos and movement of the sensible world to the 
detriment of the more ordered movement of opposites which “alternation” brings to the 
fore.   
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indeterminate.  If this is the case then the supersensible beyond still as empty as a 
Kantian beyond and is therefore of no use for securing knowledge.  Only a law is 
determinate.  But no single law can explain the multiplicity of forces leading to plurality 
of laws within the supersensible beyond.  
 The understanding, however, moves to blame itself for these failures, suggesting 
that the multiplicity of laws is merely its own attempts to “explain” the inner workings of 
the supersensible world.  This attempt fails because these explanations are themselves 
tautologies, making distinctions (within understanding) without a difference (to the 
supersensible world) (PS ¶154-55/PG 124-26).  In taking up “explanation” as a possible 
solution the understanding begins to see itself as “the law of appearance.”  If these 
explanation have no relationship to the supersensible beyond then this beyond is again 
rendered empty.  To avoid this situation all the distinctions created by the 
understanding’s attempt at ‘explaining’ the multiplicity of laws must also be posited 
within the supersensible world for otherwise connection to knowledge of the object 
would again be lost (PS ¶156/PG 126-27).  Because of this, the “absolute alternation” of 
forces thought to be mitigated by understanding’s explanation is now see to have 
penetrated into the heart of the “tranquil kingdom” causing its inversion into a “second 
supersensible world (zweite übersinnliche Welt)” (PS ¶157/PG 127).  This is an inversion 
from the stable kingdom of laws to the unstable alternation of laws. 
 The admittance of second supersensible world is the second time the understanding 
is compelled to do something it otherwise would not want to do.  The first was the initial 
admittance of the supersensible beyond after the understanding failed to describe force as 
a substance available to sensuous perception. In the attempt to find a stable realm of laws 
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behind the world of fluctuating appearance, understanding has instead found that nothing 
is ever at rest, neither itself nor the supersensible world.  Both the sensible and the 
supersensible are worlds in constant motion.  Instead of perpetually seeking to find 
stability in a realm beyond change, the understanding must altogether eliminate “the 
sensuous [representation] of fixing the differences” (die sinnliche Vorstellung von der 
Befestigung der Unterschiede) within a stable order as an attempt at securing knowledge 
and must instead allow that the supersensible is itself “pure change” (reine Wechse), or 
“inner difference” (der Unterschied als innerer) (PS ¶160/PG 131).  Rather than positing 
a infinite regress of supersensible worlds (third, fourth, fifth, etc.), which it would do 
while under the sway of “sensuous representation” (sinnliche Vorstellung), the 
understanding must eliminate this way of thinking and learns to think “pure change” as 
the “inner difference” of objects themselves.  When the understanding does this it learns 
to think the totality of differences within the supersensible “as an infinity” (als 
Unendlichkeit), which is nothing other than itself (PS ¶160/PG 131). 
 
Understanding and Infinity 
 
 This incredibly compressed argument makes sense when compared to the 
derivation of the infinite in the Logic.  Here in the Phenomenology, the sensible plays the 
role of the finite while the supersensible is the spurious infinite.  To halt a infinite regress 
of higher supersensible worlds posited to guarantee the truth of the sensible, the 
understanding must change its perspective on the situation, just as was the case for the 
spurious infinite.  To do this the understanding must think the pure change of “inner 
difference” (innern Unterschiedes) as “a difference which is no difference” (ein 
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Unterschied, welcher kein Unterschied ist) (PS ¶161/PG 131).  This “inner difference” 
where sensible and supersensible are united through ““a difference which is no 
difference” parallels the need to view the finite and the infinite in their separateness 
(Trennung) while remaining inseparable (untrennbar).  In both cases the infinite is the 
name Hegel gives to that change of perspective needed to resolves the inner 
contradictions off an infinite regress.   
 What this means for the development of consciousness within the Phenomenology 
is that the three terms previously held apart, the two extremes ends of (1) the 
understanding and (2) the supersensible mediated by (3) appearance, have all collapsed 
together.  The understanding comes to know that the supersensible is nothing other than 
its own experience of itself (its operations of knowing).  The understanding had 
misrecognized this situation because it had posited something besides itself (the 
supersensible beyond) as the cause of the sensible world.  As Hegel says rather 
poetically, when the (sensible) curtain hanging in front of the inner being of things is 
taken away, consciousness comes to sees itself there in the empty place (PS ¶165/PG 
135).  The pulling of the curtain in which consciousness sees itself expresses the 
mirroring effect of consciousness becoming aware of itself through its own process of 
thought.  Consciousness, now conscious of itself, is therefore a self-conscious 
consciousness (PS ¶164/PG 134-5).   
 As was the case in the Logic, Hegel’s opening investigation into the operations of 
consciousness culminates in a failure that is a success.  At each step, consciousness has 
failed to secure the independence of the object.  The object of sense-certainty vanished 
within emptiness of spatial and temporal indexicals. The object of perception was lost 
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within its contradictory relationships. And the supersensible beyond only proved to be the 
work of the understanding itself.  In each case, but especially with the supersensible 
beyond, consciousness attempted to separate substance (object) from subject 
(consciousness).  But these failures redoubled in consciousness coming to know itself as 
self-consciousness.  The failure of consciousness to secure knowledge of its objects 
without reference to its own operation has revealed that consciousness is also self-
consciousness.   
 This failure, preeminently as the collapse of the supersensible beyond, constitutes 
the first sounding of the Phenomenology as consciousness encounters its beyond.  
Consciousness has come to know itself as a self-transcending immanence because it 
transcends its objects of knowledge even while remaining immanent to itself as a 
conscious self-consciousness. The exposition of this self-consciousness and its own form 
of the beyond we will now turn in the second sounding as we follow Hegel in plumbs the 
depths of thought. 
 
Self-Consciousness and the Infinite: Second Sounding 
 
 With the curtain of appearance raised, the social drama of self-consciousness 
begins.  Moving from the shadows of the “nightlike void of the supersensible beyond,” 
self-consciousness now steps center stage, lit by the “spiritual daylight of the present” 
(PS¶ 177/PG 145).  Now an engaged actor, rather than passive observer, self-
consciousness participates in the dramatic struggle of life and death, demands 
recognition, confesses sins and offers forgiveness.  Certainly the shadowy figure of the 
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‘beyond’ will make a return appearance, but for now all attention is focused on self-
consciousness. 
 The stage on which self-consciousness acts is “the native land of truth” (PS 
¶166/PG 137) on which self-consciousness now seeks its own self-certainty rather than 
the certainty of its objects.41  As Gadamer says, “truth is no longer like the foreign 
country of otherness into which consciousness seeks to penetrate.”42  Instead of 
transgressing the barriers of a forbidden land (i.e. the supersensible beyond), self-
consciousness is now at home in the land of truth, the master of its own domain.  
Unfortunately, self-consciousness soon finds other forces at work in this land, and most 
importantly, finds that it is not alone. 
 The focus of this sounding will not be on the social and political aspects of 
Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness and recognition, as these will be investigated more 
closely in the next chapter.  Rather, the focus will be on how Hegel places of self-
consciousness between the otherness of life below and the otherness of the beyond above.  
The former reveals how self-consciousness is in truth a spiritual being not reducible to 
natural life.  The latter indicates the potential problems of this spiritual being, its failures 
and success. While many focus more on the middle section of chapter IV concerning the 
master/slave dialectic, we will spend more time on the before and after his dialectic 
seeking to understanding how self-consciousness as Geist separates itself from both 
natural life and a supernatural God. 
 
The Self-Conscious Life as Desire 
                                                
41 Hegel’s title for chapter four is “The Truth of Self-Certainty,” and is the only chapter 
within section B on “Self-Consciousness.” 
42 Gadamer, Hege’s Dialectic, 59. 
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With the shift to self-consciousness we should not think that consciousness is 
forgotten or discarded.  Instead, the rather static consciousness is contained within the 
more dynamic self-consciousness.  Explaining this in reference to otherness (the problem 
so fundamental to consciousness), Hegel notes that self-consciousness “is essentially the 
return from otherness” such that in this return consciousness and “the whole expanse of 
the sensuous world is preserved” (PS ¶167/PG 138-9).  In the return from the otherness 
of objects (which were found not to be truly other but already within constituted by the 
understanding), self-consciousness now finds itself at home in the world.  It is no longer 
merely aware of the world and its forces, but is aware of itself within a world that is its 
own.  As Harris says, “Being at home in the world is a matter of making a home in it.”43 
This making of a world rather than observing it is what Hegel calls desire.  Indeed, “self-
consciousness is Desire in general” (es ist Begierde überhaupt ) (PS ¶167/PG 139). 
 Self-consciousness finds that rather than merely being a thinking being it is also a 
living being.  Its own life, and the continuation of this life, is the principle object of desire 
through which objects are filtered (PS ¶168/PG 139-40). That self-consciousness is a 
living being means it no longer has theoretical objects of cognition but practical objects 
of desire.  But the demands of this biological life threaten the independence of self-
consciousness and its life of thought.  To regain its confidence as more that mere 
biological life self-consciousness eliminates other objects (through consumption or 
destruction) in an attempt to prove that they really are not and that it really is (PS 
¶174/PG 143).  In this way self-consciousness gains its self-certainty as more than merely 
natural; i.e. self-consciousness (as infinite thought) goes beyond itself (as finite life).  
                                                
43 Harris, Hegel’s Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason,320. 
  
 
96 
This elimination of other objects proves that self-consciousness is still the master of its 
domain.  The desire for self-certainty (that is its more than a living being) is satisfied as 
self-consciousness returns from the otherness of life. 
This satisfaction, however, is short lived.  This is the case for two reasons.  First, 
another desire is always produced by the needs of biological life.  And second, whenever 
self-consciousness negates an object as proof of its mastery self-consciousness 
simultaneously destroys the condition by which it proves its own mastery (PS ¶175/PG 
143).  The satisfaction of self-consciousness seems forever deferred within the endless 
task of negating natural objects. 
This is the case unless a new kind of object appears.  The problem with natural 
objects is that self-consciousness is the one negating them.  But if there were an object 
that “effects negation within itself” (selbst die Negation an ihm vollzieht) because “it is in 
itself the negative” (er ist an sich das Negative), then self-consciousness could achieve its 
goal (PS ¶175/PG 143).  This new kind of object, able to negate itself, would persist 
before self-consciousness because the needed negation comes from the side of the object.  
Because this negation is a self-negation of and by the object itself, this new kind of object 
would give a lasting confirmation that self-consciousness is truly a self-consciousness.  
But the only object that is (1) independent of the self-consciousness but (2) can also self-
negate its own independence and thereby prove the independence of self-consciousness, 
is another self-consciousness.44 
                                                
44 Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 52. 
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 If this is true, then “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another 
self-consciousness” (PS ¶175/PG 144).45  The desire of self-consciousness to confirm 
itself as more than mere biological life is satisfied only through another self-
consciousness who is also more than its biological life.  This recognition, gained through 
another, is the means of securing self-certainty for self-consciousness.  When the desire 
for life is transformed into the desire for another self-consciousness (the desire to be 
recognized by another self-consciousness), then self-consciousness enters the more than 
merely natural life of Geist.  As Hegel says in anticipation of later developments, the 
fullness of this life of Geist is the “unity of the different independent self-
consciousnesses” as they enjoy “perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and 
‘We’ that is ‘I’” (PS ¶177/PG 145).  Unfortunately, the full experience of this “I that is 
We and We that is I” must await the long process of Geist’s development ending in 
chapter VI (to which we will turn at the end of this sounding).   
What concerns us for the moment is the movement of the infinite in the process of 
recognition.  Hegel tells us “self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the 
fact that, it so exists for another” (PS ¶178/PG 145).  All of this occurs through a 
“process of recognition” between two self-consciousnesses which is “infinity realizing 
itself in self-consciousness” (PS ¶178/PG 146).46  Hegel goes on to elaborate how the 
first self-consciousness comes to recognize itself through its other and how this other 
self-consciousness comes to recognize itself through the first self-consciousness (PS 
¶184/PG 147).  This elaboration parallels Hegel’s discussion of how, once the true 
                                                
45 Hegel emphasizes the entire sentence. 
46 Translation from Pinkard.  Miller inexplicably overlooks this entire phrase (der sich im 
Selbstbewußtsein realisierenden Unendlichkeit) in his translation. 
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infinite is understood properly, it makes no difference whether one starts with the finite 
or the infinite because the finite always receives itself back from the infinite and the 
infinite receives itself back from the finite. As he says in the Logic, each is the self-
sublation of the other, or rather “both the finite and the infinite are this movement in 
which each returns to itself through its negation” (SL 147/WL 162).  If we replace finite 
and infinite with self-consciousness and its alternate self-consciousness, then we have the 
process of recognition whereby each returns to itself through the its other.  This is the 
movement of the true infinite played out on the level of self-consciousness, a movement 
of recognition that Hegel calls “spiritual unity” (geistigen Einheit) (PS ¶178/PG 146). 
Through this process of mutual recognition Hegel is explaining “the transition 
from a natural to a spiritual being,”47 such that within the native realm of truth self-
consciousness is a spiritual being within/as Geist.  For Hegel this is the nature of self-
consciousness as it returns from otherness: it first returns from the otherness of cognitive 
objects and then the otherness of another self-consciousness. 
 
 The Unhappy Consciousness 
 
This opening investigation into self-consciousness is necessary before 
encountering Hegel’s famous ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ and its confrontation with an 
extreme form of otherness, the Unchangeable God.  As just noted, for self-consciousness 
to truly recognize itself (to gain self-certain of itself) another self-consciousness is 
required.  But Hegel’s account of the initial encounter between these two self-
                                                
47 Axel Honneth, “From Desire to Recognition: Hegel’s Account of Human Sociality,” in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide ed. by Dean Moyar and Michael 
Quante (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 77. 
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consciousnesses is not a cordial mutual recognition.  Rather, this process of recognition 
begins as a struggle to the death, a struggle then raised to a new level of opposition 
between the Stoic and Skeptic consciousnesses, culminating in the Unhappy 
Consciousness as the internalization of both, all experienced as a contradictory of 
existence (PS ¶206/PG 163). 
 From where does this experience of contradiction come?  It comes initially from 
the incomplete movement of recognition between the master and the slave.  In the 
struggle for recognition one self-consciousness fights another for the right to be 
recognized, resulting in one negating itself (denying its independence) before the other.  
The slave thinks it better to side with life rather than pursue its own self-recognition in 
the face of death.  But the master’s victory is short lived.  In the self-negating act of the 
slave, moving from independence to dependent, the slave becomes unequal to the master 
and therefore loses its ability to confirm the mastery of the master (PS ¶191-2/PG 151-2).  
The condition of possibility for recognition is lost in the servitude of the slave.  Because 
of this loss, as Jean Hyppolite says, “the path of mastery is a dead end in human 
experience; the path of servitude is the true path of human liberation.”48  The path of 
servitude leads to liberation because while working for the master the slave comes to 
understand itself as both the master of itself and master of the world, even if not yet 
master of another self-consciousness.  Rather than merely consuming objects as the 
master does, the slave learns that it can create objects.  Through these independent 
objects of creation, the slave comes to see its own independence from the master (PS 
¶195/PG 154).  
                                                
48 Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 174. 
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Through this work the slave remembers (returned through the otherness of its 
created objects) that it is not merely a living being, but also a thinking being.  From this 
achievement of independence comes a new experience of freedom in the form of Stoic 
self-consciousness.  The Stoic understands it true identity as thought freed from the 
servile work in the world below, dwelling instead within in a tranquil kingdom above.  
The Stoic expresses the “pure universality of thought” whether on the throne or in chains, 
seeking to “maintain that lifeless indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the 
bustle of existence…into the simple essentiality of thought” (PS ¶199/PG 157).  Much 
like how the understanding posited the “supersensible beyond” as the dwelling place of 
inner essences, now the Stoic places itself in the pure realm of thought above the 
polluting fluctuations of everyday life. 
But this abstract freedom of thought cannot persist.  Just as there was no tranquil 
kingdom of law for the understanding but instead only constant alteration (Wechsel), so 
too the abstract and lifeless freedom of the Stoic is inverted as the permanent change 
(Wandel) of everything (PS ¶205/PG 161).  The Skeptical self-consciousness understands 
that because it is essentially thought it is unchangeable, but because it has thoughts it is 
also always changing.  The Skeptic revels in this contradiction between unchangeable 
thought and changeable thoughts by focusing this contradictions outside itself, rather than 
within.   This is, however, a self-contradictory state for the Skeptic who willfully 
suppresses its own duplicity (ignoring its own embodied existence) even while exposing 
the duplicity of the Stoic (PS ¶205/PG 161).  In the end, neither the Stoic nor Skeptic 
have embraced existence below, each opting for different escapes into the realm of 
thought above.  Only the Unhappy Consciousness knows that it cannot use the freedom 
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of thought to flee its finite existence (i.e. it is both a living and a thinking being) (PS 
¶206/PG 163).  The Unhappy Consciousness comes on stage as the full expression of the 
contradictory existence of self-consciousness caught between infinite thought 
(unchangeable) and finite being (changeable). 
All throughout, however, self-consciousness has not given up its attempt to gain 
self-certainty.  In view of this desire, the Unhappy Consciousness seeks to unify itself 
with the Unchangeable (now projected as God) as a way to garner a minimal level of self-
certainty.  The Unhappy Consciousness seeks this unity with the Unchangeable in three 
phases: the immediate phase of pure feeling; the external phase of work and enjoyment; 
and the mediated phase of penance.  The first seeks union with the Unchangeable through 
the “pure feeling” of devotion through its “infinite yearning.”  But in seeking to lay hold 
of the Unchangeable in its beyond (Jenseits), the Unhappy Consciousness only ends up 
laying hold of its own feeling because it cannot think the beyond, much less go into there 
to find the Unchangeable. “Where that ‘other’ is sought, it cannot be found, for it is 
supposed to be just a beyond, something that can not be found” (PS ¶217/PG 169).  
Hegel’s positioning of the Unchangeable God in the ‘beyond’ (Jenseits) of thought 
parallels the understandings encounter with the “supersensible beyond” (übersinnliche 
Jenseits), revealing the symmetry between consciousness and self-consciousness. 
After this failure of immediacy, the Unhappy Consciousness goes back into the 
world to find union with the Unchangeable (PS ¶218/PG 170).  The Unhappy 
Consciousness now finds the world not merely as something to negate through its 
consumptive activities, but as already both null (nichtig) in its separation from the 
Unchangeable and yet sanctified (geheiligte) as created by the Unchangeable, mirroring 
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the plight of the Unhappy Consciousness itself (PS ¶219/PG 170-1).  This return to the 
world again takes the form of work as it had for the slave.  In its work and the enjoyment 
of the goods produced, in recognizing the gifts of creation and the power of freedom to 
work the land, which both come from “the Unchangeable beyond” (dem unwandelbaren 
Jenseits) (PS ¶220/PG 171), the Unhappy Consciousness gives thanks and therefore gains 
a sense of unity with the Unchangeable (PS ¶222/PG 172).  But this unity again breaks 
down because the thanksgiving is an inauthentic surrender to the Unchangeable.  The 
Unhappy Consciousness knows that it was active and free in its work, not the 
Unchangeable to whom is attributed true activity and freedom.  The Unhappy 
Consciousness has only recapitulated the freedom of the slave at a more fundamental 
level (PS ¶222/PG 172-3). 
 In having proved itself independent through work and yet still lacking union with 
the Unchangeable, the Unhappy Consciousness renounces all such attempt to negate 
something in its search for self-certainty, and instead considers its own independence as 
if it were itself nothingness (Nichtigkeit) (PS ¶224/PG 173).  Self-consciousness repents 
of its pursuit of self-certainty and negates itself before the transcendent master, the 
Unchangeable God.  In this way the Unhappy Consciousness has made itself nothing.  Of 
course the irony for the reader of the Phenomenology, and especially readers of the Logic, 
is that the beyond (Jenseits) of the Unchangeable is itself actually nothing, a truth that the 
Unhappy Consciousness is not yet privy.   
But as always, the failure of thought as it encounters nothing, in this instance the 
Unhappy Consciousness (as something made into nothing) before the Unchangeable (a 
nothing thought to be something), is productive for thought. While the Unhappy 
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Consciousness knows itself to be nothing, this knowledge of itself as nothing comes only 
in relation to the Unchangeable.  The self-negation of the Unhappy Consciousness 
(through repentance) is mediated through an experience of the Unchangeable (PS 
¶226/PG 174).  This mediation is accomplished between the Unhappy Consciousness and 
the Unchangeable by a middle term “which presents the two extremes to one another, and 
ministers to each in its dealings with the other.”  This mediator, likely a priest though 
only called a servant (Diener) (PS ¶228/PG 175), administers the forgiveness of the 
Unchangeable to the individual consciousness that has surrendered itself in repentance.  
When the Unchangeable is mediated to the Unhappy Consciousness it receives its self-
certainty through the Unchangeable, but in an unequal manner (PS ¶230/PG 176-7).   
 
Forgiving the Unhappy Consciousness 
 
It is hard to underestimate the full significance of this resolution for the Unhappy 
Consciousness and the introduction of a mediator. The role of the mediator (priest) is 
essential because it re-inserts humanity within the process of recognition.  The full 
significance of this is not experienced until the end of chapter VI where ‘conscience’ 
overcomes of the moral point of view at, setting the stage for the expression of mutual, 
rather than one-sided, forgiveness.   
In Hegel’s view, Kantian morality mirrors Stoic detachment resulting in the 
impossibility of actually knowing and acting morally. The rise of ‘conscience’ breaks this 
deadlock because one’s actions are immediate known to be morally good (PS  ¶637/PG 
468).  Moral deliberation according to abstract maxims is replaced with the immediacy of 
personal moral conviction.  Conscience makes itself objective in the world through its 
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actions.  The problem, however, with basing one’s morality on one’s own conscience is 
that every (objective) action can elicit divergent (subjective) interpretations.  Because 
every individual conscience believes itself to be good, each actor must consider 
alternative interpretations of its actions (by rival consciences) to be evil (PS ¶649/PG 
477-8). This ends in a plurality of individuals acting conscientiously, all claiming the 
good for themselves and evil in others (PS ¶653-9/PG 479-85).  This conflict repeats the 
earlier struggle for recognition, but now on the level of justifying moral action. 
This conflict of interpretations splits the individual consciences between those 
who act and those who judge.  Those who act bite the bullet and risk entering their action 
into the conflict of interpretations, opening themselves to the interpretations of others 
who seek to unmask their convictions as mere self-serving hypocrisy.  In this way, the 
ones who act commit themselves to the truth and goodness of their action, even if others 
might call it evil (PS ¶662/PG 486).  Those who judge refuse to enter into such a conflict 
of interpretations and would rather retain their moral purity as the judge of those who act 
(PS ¶664/PG 487).  The former (actors) take their stand within changeable particularity 
and the latter (judges) within unchangeable universality.  This is a repetition of the 
estrangement between the Unhappy Consciousness and the Unchangeable, but now on 
the intra-human (social) level between those who act and those who judge. 
This creates a situation of mutual hostility and moral instability between the 
estranged parties.  The solution for Hegel is for each party to confess its one-sided 
commitment to either particularity (actors) or universality (judges), and thereby forgives 
one another.  When mutual forgiveness occurs then reconciliation between the two 
parties is accomplished.  This reconciliation allows for the achievement of a true mutual 
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recognition.  This confession make here is not abject debasement of oneself as it was in 
the act of penance for the Unhappy Consciousness (actor) before the Unchangeable 
(judge).   Rather, this confession is a giving over of a one-side and subjective position in 
light of a dawning equality of one-sidedness (PS ¶666/PG 490).  In other words, each 
confesses the sinfulness of their own finitude.49  The actor and the judge each desire to 
claim the perspective of infinite thought within finite being.  Only in confessing their 
own one-sided commitment (to either acting or judging) and only in forgiving each other 
can each come to recognize one another, realizing that infinite thought within finite being 
is only accomplished through their mutual recognition. 
Hegel states that this process is how “the wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no 
scars behind” (PS ¶669/PG 492).  The beginning of this wound goes all the way back to 
the struggle for recognition, a wound deepened in the encounter between the Unhappy 
Consciousness and the Unchangeable.  This wound appears in various forms throughout 
the Phenomenology: from the divide between duty to family (Antigone) and duty to city 
(Creon) in the Greek city-state up to the divide between Enlightenment Freedom and 
Revolutionary Terror.  All of these wounds are resolved in the mutual forgiveness within 
a community of actors/judges that unites infinite thought and finite existence.  Through 
mutual forgiveness self-consciousness accomplishes what it has been seeking from the 
beginning of chapter IV.  In mutual forgiveness it has now achieved self-certainty 
through a process of mutual recognition.   
What we have seen in this sounding from IV of the Phenomenology (completed 
only at the end of chapter VI) is the development of self-consciousness as that which 
                                                
49 On the sinfulness of finitude see Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 519-521. 
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“goes beyond itself.”  As that which goes beyond itself as more than natural, self-
consciousness did not achieve recognition in its struggle to the death, eventually 
developing into the Unhappy Consciousness limited by God (the Unchangeable).  This 
limitation was provisionally mitigated by the mediation of God’s presence through 
another human being.  Self-consciousness only goes beyond this limit in a community of 
those who confess and forgive their mutual limitations (the sinfulness of their finitude).  
This mutual forgiveness is the infinite process of mutual recognition expressing the “I 
that is We and the We that is I” as perfect freedom and independence (PS ¶177/PG 145). 
 In this mutual forgiveness, Hegel says, God is no longer the Unchangeable above 
humanity, but is now found within human community, mediated not through a priest set 
apart, but through each person who renounces their own one-sided perspective.  As Hegel 
says in the concluding lines of chapter VI:  
The reconciling Yea, in which the two ‘I’s let go their antithetical existence, is the 
existence of the ‘I’ which has expanded into a duality, and therein remains 
identical with itself, and in its complete [emptying] (Entäußerung) and opposite, 
possesses the certainty of itself: it is God manifested in the midst of those who 
know themselves in the form of pure knowledge. (PS ¶671/PG 494) 
 
In the mutual forgiveness that secures mutual recognition and self-certainty, God is seen 
to be no longer locked in the beyond above, but walking on the earth below, manifested 
in the infinite recognition between individuals.  This life of Geist, as mentioned earlier, is 
the “unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses” as they enjoy “perfect 
freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’” (PS ¶177/PG 145).  This 
unity of ‘I’ and ‘We’ as an accomplished mutual recognition, securing the self-certainty 
of self-consciousness as more than merely life below and yet not limited by God above, is 
our second sounding.  This second sounding has shown how Hegel seeks to overcome the 
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otherness of natural life and the otherness of the God beyond through the mutual 
recognition within human community. This overcoming of otherness in human 
community is the life of Geist.  By “going beyond itself” as more than life below shows 
self-consciousness to be self-transcending. By eventually establishing mutual recognition 
without reference to a beyond self-consciousness shows itself to be immanent.  In this 
way Hegel establishes self-consciousness as self-transcending immanence. 
 
Religion and the Infinite, and Beyond: Third Sounding 
 
Our third and last sounding concerning Hegel’s system relates to the “God 
manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge” 
(PS ¶671/PG 494), but now known explicitly from the standpoint of religion rather than 
from morality. At the beginning of chapter VII Hegel makes it clear that religion has 
already made its presence felt along the way, even if unrecognized.  Religion first 
appeared for consciousness in the form of the supersensible (Übersinnlichen) of the 
understanding (Verstand), and then for self-consciousness in the form of a beyond 
(Jenseits) for the Unhappy Conciousness (PS ¶673/PG 495).50  But now, with religion 
comes the explicit self-consciousness of Geist as Geist instead of the implicit form 
encountered in the community of mutual forgiveness (PS ¶672/PG 495). 
As with the other soundings, it is impossible to cover in detail all that Hegel has 
to say regarding religion.  Instead we will again focus on those parts that present his 
philosophy as self-transcending immanence.  This means we will jump from God 
                                                
50 The other instances of religion that Hegel notes are the underworld for the Greeks, 
heaven for the medievals, and the re-instatement of the ‘supersensible beyond’ in the 
Enlightenment.  
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appearing (erscheinende) in the mutually forgiving community to God revealed 
(offenbare) as the basis of such reconciliation, focusing primarily on Christological issues 
rather than Hegel’s Trinitarian reformulation. This sounding will again outline the 
encounter between self-consciousness and its beyond, showing how Hegel attempts to 
move beyond the object/subject divide (or the substance/subject divide) as a means of 
articulating his philosophy of self-transcending immanence. 
 
Incarnation 
 
 Hegel’s concise definition of the “simple content of the absolute religion” focuses 
on the “incarnation (Menschwerdung) of the divine Being, or the fact that it [divine 
Being] essentially and directly has the shape of self-consciousness” (PS ¶759/PG 552). 
For Hegel, through the Incarnation divine Being reveals itself as a self-consciousness, 
breaking down the divide between substance and subject.  But how does this object (the 
Incarnation) reveal God to be both substance and subject?   
 To understand how the incarnation reveals divine being to be substance and 
subject we must look at the unity established by and the movements of the Incarnation as 
Hegel understands it.  On a historical level, the Incarnation unites the two previously 
disparate movements of consciousness found in Greek ethical life and Roman law. On a 
religious and historical level, the development and contradictions of Greek ethical life 
and Roman law recapitulate the developments of the Stoic, Skeptic, and Unhappy 
Consciousness (PS ¶748-53/PG 545-49). In Hegel’s mind, these forms of consciousness 
“stand impatiently expectant round the birthplace of Sprit (Geist) as it becomes self-
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consciousness” (PS ¶754/PG 549).  The allusion, of course, is to the birth of Christ 
(situated within world history but stripped of its place in Israel’s history).51 
  Hegel calls the Incarnation the unity of these two movements (Greek and 
Roman).  He reminds us that implicitly, “Spirit has in it the two sides which are presented 
above [Greek ethical life and Roman law] as two converse propositions: one is this, that 
substance [empties] (entäußert) itself from itself and becomes self-consciousness; the 
other is the converse, that self-consciousness [empties] (entäußert) itself from itself and 
gives itself the nature of a Thing, or makes itself a universal Self.” (PS ¶755/PG 549).52 It 
should be noted that each is an self-emptying of itself, not caused by another.  Through 
this reciprocal self-emptying (gegenseitige Entäußerung) where each becomes the other, 
“Spirit comes into existence (Dasein)” (PS ¶755/PG 550).  This dual self-emptying 
should of course immediately remind us of the dual self-emptying in the form of 
confession and forgiveness needed to complete of mutual recognition (PS ¶671/PG 494).  
Likewise, this movement of dual self-emptying should remind us of the dual movements 
through otherness of the finite and infinite, and the mutual vanishing of being and 
nothing.53   
                                                
51 “Hegel does not seem to be arguing that Christianity per se was a necessary 
development.  He is, however, arguing that something very much like Christianity is the 
proper fulfillment of the possibilities opened up by Greek life and its Roman aftermath; 
Christianity contingently happened to be the religion that stepped into the ‘social space’ 
opened up by stoicism, skepticism, and the Hellenistic forms of the ‘unhappy 
consciousness’” (Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, 253). 
52 Miller translates entäußert as “alienates” but later in the same paragraph translates 
Entäußerung as “externalization.”  Miller tries to mitigate his translation by inserting 
“kenosis” (which is not in the text) after his first use of “externalization”.  For 
consistency and clarity of exposition I will follow Pinkard by using “empties” and 
“emptying,” respectively, which implies divine kenosis without distorting Hegel’s text. 
53 See Dale M. Schlitt, Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim, 180-184.   
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  Through the unity of these movements Geist has entered existence and becomes 
an object of “complete immediacy” such that “God is sensuously and directly beheld as a 
Self, as an actual individual man” (PS ¶758/PG 552).54  As we know all too well, 
however, immediacy is always problematic for Hegel.  That Geist, the supposed unity of 
consciousness and self-consciousness, is in the Incarnation as an immediate individual 
means that the Incarnate One is merely a sensuous other standing against consciousness.  
The Incarnate God-man is merely a sensuous ‘this’ or a perceived ‘thing’ (PS ¶762/PG 
555).55  To resolve the deadlock of immediacy and its indeterminacy, the immediate self, 
as the “immediately present God,” must vanish (Verschwinden) into its negative moment 
(negatives Moment) so that it might be taken up into “the universal self-consciousness of 
the [religious] community, a self-consciousness which reposes in its own substance, just 
as in it this Substance is a universal Subject” (PS ¶763/PG 556).  The Incarnate God-man 
must vanish from immediate, individual existence so that it can be taken up within the 
universal, communal self-consciousness.  This vanishing allows for a more proper union 
between Substance and Subject because now the Incarnation is not merely an immediacy 
in opposition to self-consciousness.56  The necessity of vanishing and the moment of 
                                                
54 VPR 3:236-8 speaks in more detail on immediacy of incarnation (also 3:251). 
55 Although we did not look closely at Hegel’s discussion of the aporias of sense-
certainty, it should be noted that Hegel is here reducing the Incarnation to the level of the 
sensuous, just as he had do for the Eucharist host (PS ¶217/PG 169).  This reduction to 
indeterminate immediacy should be seen as Hegel’s positioning of these conduits of the 
‘beyond’ as nothing more than empty, needing to be filled by self-consciousness.  See the 
comments by Peter Kalkavage, The Logic of Desire: An Introduction to Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2007), 147. 
56 Here Substance and Subject can both be applied to either the divine Being or the 
communal self-consciousness.  In vanishing, the divine Being as Substance enters the 
religious community which is Subject.  Or, in vanishing, the divine Being as Incarnate is 
the individual Subject that enters the Substance of the religious community. 
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negativity prompts Hegel to deepen his account of the Incarnation by referencing the 
crucifixion.   
 
Crucifixion 
 
As mentioned, the immediacy of the incarnate one must vanish (Verschwinden) in 
order to be raise up into universal self-consciousness as the unity of substance and 
subject.  Unlike the conceptual vanishing between being and nothing, on the historical 
level of existence this vanishing becomes the necessity of death.  To makes sense of this 
Hegel turns to his account of the Trinity as a framework for understanding the necessity 
of the death of the Incarnate One in order to move into life in the Spirit.  Hegel maps the 
Trinity onto his logical framework of 1) abstract indeterminacy, 2) determinacy as and 
through otherness, and 3) return from otherness as self-determinacy.57  The first moment 
of the Trinity is that of pure thought, or the content of consciousness as “pure substance,” 
the Father.  The second is a passing into otherness, “or picture-thinking as such” (das 
Vorstellen als solche), identified with the Son or Word/Logos.  The third moment “is the 
return from picture-thinking and otherness” to “the element of self-consciousness,” which 
is Spirit (PS ¶767/PG 557-8).  Hegel expands this by first considering the immanent 
Trinity (PS ¶769-72/PG 558-61) and then the economic Trinity in creation and the 
community of reconciliation (PS ¶773-87/PG 561-74).58  In each case, in the thought of 
                                                
57 Along with his presentation of the Trinity, Hegel tirelessly reminds us that the “form of 
picture-thinking (Form des Vorstellen) constitutes the specific mode” of Geist in the 
religious community (PS ¶765/PG 556) and thus speak of “begetting” within the Trinity 
(PS ¶769/PG 559) and of the Trinity “creating” the world (PG ¶774/PG 561), all of which 
are the improper form of conceptual thought, even if it is the proper content.  
58 Considerable attention has been given to Hegel’s Trinitarian thought.  See Schlitt, 
Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim; Walter Jaeschke, Reason in Religion: The Foundations of 
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the religious community, picture-thinking (Vorstellen) dominates as the “standpoint 
which takes the moments of the movement which Spirit is, as [if they were] isolated 
immoveable Substances or Subjects, instead of transient moments,” making the 
speculative truth of the Trinity into an heirlooms of religious traditions (PS ¶771/PG 
560). 
 The main concern for our purposes is the transition from the second to the third 
moments, from the Incarnation of the God-man to the community of Geist, as the 
complete content of the manifest religion. Hegel had introduced the Incarnation as the 
culmination of the Unhappy Consciousness in the historical sequence of Greek and 
Roman life, now adding how the Incarnation is a moment in the conceptual life of the 
Trinity.  As for pure being, which could not remain abstractly indeterminate but had to 
become determinate being (Dasein), so too divine essence in its abstraction must take on 
existence.  But as we have seen, this immediate existence must again become universal as 
its return from otherness. The first other-ing of itself as divine Being (its self-emptying) 
in Incarnation must be negated by a second other-ing so that it might be raised to 
universality again.  This second other-ing, or second negation, is the death of the God-
Man, so that it can then passes into the life of Geist.  As Hegel says, “This death is, 
therefore, its [divine Being] resurrection as Spirit” (PS ¶779/PG 565-6).  Why? 
 Two points will make this clear.  First, when self-consciousness could not secure 
the truth of itself, it turned into the Unhappy Consciousness in its wretched changeability 
                                                                                                                                            
Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion trans. by J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson 
(Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1990), pp.303-348; Cyril O’Regan, The 
Heterodox Hegel (Albany: SUNY, 1994); Peter C. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian 
Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp.127-140. 
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and posited beyond itself the Unchangeable.  The Unhappy Consciousness could not 
unite itself with the Unchangeable, and instead had to confess its own brute existence as 
evil (in its non-unity with the Unchangeable).  Happily, the Unhappy Consciousness was 
absolved of this burden by the priest, the middle term between the changeable and 
unchangeable.  In this way the Unhappy Consciousness could claim for itself a mediated 
union through self-negation.  The evil of existence (finitude) is partially overcome 
through this mediation.  But, secondly, we must also remember the figure of the one who 
acts out of conscience and is considered evil for doing so.  The action is deemed evil 
because by definition because it is both finite in its objective occurrence and finite in its 
subjective interpretation (the self-interpretation of the actor but also of those judging the 
action).  Only when the actor and the judge renounce their (sinful/evil) particularity and 
forgive each other can they entire a universal self-consciousness as “reciprocal 
recognition which is absolute Spirit” (PS ¶671/PG 493). 
 What Hegel has already mentioned as the outcome of self-consciousness before 
the Unchangeable (the feeling of wretchedness) and as the process of conflicting 
interpretations concerning moral action (the imputation of evil), is now rendered 
explicitly ontological in the Incarnation.59  In the Incarnation the divine essence takes on 
the (evil/sinful) finite existence.60  And this assumption of finitude is only complete with 
                                                
59 Criticisms concerned about Hegel making evil part of creation itself or an aspect of 
God (or both) are true, but miss the point.  Evil is not merely a Gnostic claim about 
existence as such, but rather a claim that finitude and particularity always raise a conflict 
of perspectives and that only the universal perspective of the community can finally deem 
what is or is not evil in each instance.   
60 On the sinfulness of finitude see Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 519-521. 
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the death of the God-Man, for the nature of finite things is always their ceasing-to-be.61  
Therefore, in unity with human nature and its natural existence, the divine essence must 
die.  But this death loses its merely natural meaning (natural life/death is no use to self-
consciousness in seeking its self-certainty) and becomes “transfigured” (verklärt) from 
the “non-being of this particular individual, into the universality of the Spirit who dwells 
in [its] community” (PS ¶784/PG 571).62  Once this universality is achieved, this 
transfiguration of death allows the spiritual community to die daily (confess its evil 
particularity/finitude) while also be daily resurrected (into universality/infinity).  The 
incarnate one must die so the spiritual community can learn to mutually forgive itself of 
its finitude.  In this way, self-consciousness is able to “go beyond itself” (PS ¶80/PG 74), 
surpassing the natural limit of finitude. 
 But this is only what happens from the human side of the divine-man.  Hegel also 
considers what happens from the side of divine essence, and it is here that he reintroduces 
the idea of a mediator, first seen as the one who mediated between the Unhappy 
Consciousness and the Unchangeable.63  Hegel says, “The death of the Mediator is the 
                                                
61 “The death of the divine Man, as death, is abstract negativity, the immediate result of 
the movement which ends only in natural universality” (PS ¶784/PG 570). See also LPR 
3:124-5/VPR 3:60 where Hegel say, “The pinnacle of finitude is not actual life in its 
temporal course, but rather death, the anguish of death; death is the pinnacle of negation, 
the most abstract and indeed natural negation, the limit, finitude in its highest extreme.  
The temporal and complete existence of the divine idea in the present is envisaged only 
in Christ’s death.  The highest divestment of the divine idea…is expressed as follows: 
‘God is dead, God himself is dead.’ [This] is a monstrous, fearful picture (Vorstellung) 
which brings before the imagination the deepest abyss of cleavage.” 
62 Miller translates seiner in “der in seiner Gemeine lebt” as “his” as if referring to the 
death of the divine-man. But, following Pinkard, it is better to translate seiner as “its” 
referring back to the now achieved universality of Geist. 
63 Technically, Hegel had only mentioned the middle term (diese Mitte) or servant (das 
Diener) earlier (PS ¶228/PG 175), whereas now he calls the divine-man the mediator 
(Mittlers). 
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death not only of his natural aspect…but also of the abstraction of the divine Being” (PS 
¶785/PG 571).  Hegel goes on to explain this is the death of divine abstraction by saying 
that this death 
contains, therefore, at the same time the death of the abstraction of the divine 
Being which is not posited as Self.  That death is the painful feeling of the 
Unhappy Consciousness that God Himself is dead…This feeling is, in fact, the 
loss of substance and of its [taking a stance] (Gegenübertretens) over against 
consciousness; but it is at the same time the pure subjectivity of substance, or the 
pure certainty of itself which it lacked when it was object, or the immediate, or 
pure essence.  This Knowing is the inbreathing of the Spirit (Begeistung), 
whereby Substance becomes Subject. (PS ¶785/PG 572) 
 
Hegel has been preparing us all along for this painful feeling that “God is dead,” 
appearing now at the apex of the journey of consciousness in its purification.  We have 
finally entered the way of the cross whereby self-consciousness learns to “tarry with the 
negative” (PS ¶32/PG 36).   
This lose of divine substance in its abstraction is at the same time the recovery of 
this substance in the form of subjectivity.  Through the collapse (death) of the mediator, 
the previously opposed terms of divinity and humanity now collapse into the 
“subjectivity of substance,” mirroring both the collapse of the opposition between the 
understanding and the supersensible beyond mediated by appearance, and the collapse of 
the opposition between the one who acts and the one who judges mediated by mutual 
confession.  As with the overcoming of the beyond (Jenseits) for the understanding 
within consciousness, in the death of the mediator the God of the beyond has now 
emptied itself into the community of Geist.  Within this community there is no longer a 
‘beyond’ to go beyond because the need has been transcended.  Consciousness expanded 
into self-consciousness, as that which “goes beyond itself” (PS ¶80/PG 74), no longer 
needs to go beyond itself into a ‘beyond’, but has return to itself through its other (in this 
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case, divine Being).  Therefore, just as consciousness came to terms with its 
supersensible beyond as its own activity, so too self-consciousness comes to terms with 
the divine beyond through the death of the mediator. What was the drawing back of the 
curtain (of appearance) by which consciousness came to see itself is now, in the death of 
the mediator, the tearing of the veil (in the Temple) by which self-consciousness comes 
to see itself as divine within Geist. 
 The death of the God-man shows that the God of the beyond is not really other 
than self-consciousness, uniting Substance and Subject.  This content of the manifest 
religion expresses the same movement of mutual self-forgiveness (PS ¶786/PG 572).  
That the moral community of mutual forgiveness and the religious community express 
the same content is block for the religious community because its thought is still 
governed by Vorstellung.  The religious community, therefore, takes the emptying 
(Entäußerung) of Substance to be an action of Substance itself (as God), rather than as 
the action of self-consciousness as both Substance and Subject (PS ¶787/PG 573).  
Because of this the community of Geis must make one final step on its journey to 
absolute knowing. 
 
Absolute Knowing 
 
 If chapters VI and VII of the Phenomenology each end with mutual forgiveness, 
on the social and religious levels, it is because these two movements represent the unity 
of consciousness and self-consciousness in the form proper to thought itself.  The initial 
shift from consciousness to self-consciousness was that of replacing a theoretical stance 
of knowledge with a practical one, i.e. self-consciousness seeking its own self-certainty 
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through objects and then through others.  But this practical quest resulted in the 
debasement of self-consciousness before the Unchangeable beyond.  
The odyssey of self-consciousness arrived on the shores of moral ‘conscience’ as 
the immediate conviction of moral knowledge, the unity of theory and practice.  After the 
division of this community of conscience (into those who act and those who judge) 
comes its reconciliation through the mutual renouncing of one-sidedness and the offering 
of forgiveness for sin of finitude. In this way the unity of theory and practice is not within 
the particular existence of individuals but the universal self-consciousness of the 
community as Geist.  This is the moment of “God manifested in the midst of those who 
know themselves in the form of pure knowledge” (PS ¶671/PG 494), the moment that 
prompted the movement through religion.  After passing through religion, Hegel 
reiterates this social reconciliation as the appearance of pure knowing (PS ¶793/PG 579), 
and now shows how they must fit together as two moments of true reconciliation, or 
absolute knowing. 
Religion and conscience are two sides of the same reconciliation.  The former 
possesses an “absolute content” (the religious Vorstellung of incarnation and crucifixion), 
while the latter is “a form devoid of content” (the moral action of conscience), the 
unification of which “closes the shapes of Spirit” (PS ¶794/PG 579).  In a manner that 
draws together several strands throughout our exposition, Peter Kalkavage summarizes:  
In religion, reconciliation is only in itself or divinely objective, in morality 
[reconciliation is] only for itself or humanly subjective.  Each side must make up 
for the lack in the other by giving itself to the other.  The objective divine must be 
infused with the form of self-certainty, and moral action must be infused with 
absolute content or truth.  Once this mutual infusion occurs, self-consciousness 
will experience the world in which it actually lives as the home of divine 
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presence, the house of God.  It will know divine truth divinely, that is, as 
Science.64 
 
However, unlike Kalkavage, we cannot only emphasize that the world is now filled with 
the presences of God.  It was self-consciousness that had entered world as the “native 
realm of truth” seeking its self-certainty there, a search it has never given up (PS ¶166/PG 
137).  For Hegel, self-certainty has now been raised and divine truth has been lowered to 
self-consciousness as the community of Geist, the community of pure knowing.  This is 
the case because the form of self-certainty achieved from the human side as the unity of 
substance (mutual recognition through forgiveness) and subject (individual conscience 
and action) is united with the content of truth in the form of divine substance that has 
now become subject.  Because the (religious) content was in the form of Vorstellung, and 
therefore only implicit as absolute knowing, the unification must comes from the side of a 
communal self-consciousness as a giving itself its own content (PS ¶797/PG 582).  In 
realizing that Geist is that which gives itself its own content it comes to know that it is 
both substance and subject as pure knowing. 
Consciousness, as that which expanded into self-consciousness as the community 
of Geist, has encountered and moved through the dual ‘beyonds’ of consciousness (the 
supersensible) and self-consciousness (the Unchangeable), such that truth can now be 
considered both substance and subject.  Consciousness no longer presupposes an 
independent object existing over and against it, but knows itself through its other.  This 
purifying of ordinary consciousness, its elevation into Geist through Geist, is the 
preparation for philosophical science.  From this elevation Geist can enter the ether of 
Science (PS ¶ 805/PG 589), or as Hegel says later “the realm of shadows, which is the 
                                                
64 Kalkavage, The Logic of Desire, 430 (brackets added). 
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system of logic” (SL 58/WL 5:55).  This ending leads us to the beginning of the Logic 
with pure being, returning us also to the beginning of this chapter. 
 
Beyond Others: Summary 
 
These, then, are the three soundings taken from the Phenomenology.  This has 
been a long journey through the cultivation of consciousness beyond the limits of the 
understanding, to the emergence of self-consciousness and its search for recognition, and 
the self-consciousness of Geist in coming to know itself in religion.  Each of these 
soundings encountered the ‘beyond’ and exhibited the movements of the true infinite in 
overcoming this ‘beyond’.   
First, when the understanding begins by positing an infinite regress of 
supersensible worlds in order to account for appearance, the understanding finally 
acknowledged the supersensible as its own operation.  The supersensible beyond that 
began as a pure void (nothing) and then found to be pure change (negativity), is finally 
known as the operations of the understanding in reference to the true infinite, a 
realization that splits consciousness into the consciousness of its objects and the 
consciousness of itself, or self-consciousness.  This is the first and most important, 
though understated, encounter with a ‘beyond’ that is found not to be a beyond after all.   
 The second sounding concerned this self-consciousness and its search for self-
certainty. When another self-consciousness is encountered a process of mutual 
recognition occurs that fulfills the desire of self-consciousness to know itself through its 
other (not other objects, but another subject).  Hegel calls this process of recognition 
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“infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness” (PS ¶178/PG 146),65 where each self-
consciousness becomes the middle term by which each returns to itself through the other.  
This dual movement mirrors the movements of the true infinite.66 This spiritual unity 
between self-consciousnesses is the first step within the life of Geist.  
 This, however, was only the immediate and abstract conception of mutual 
recognition.  As we saw, the actual existence of such mutual recognition quickly bumped 
up against a limitation from above.  Springing from the failed attempt at recognition 
between master and slave, passing through the stages of the Stoic and Skeptic, the 
Unhappy Consciousness could not reconcile its own finite being with the infinity of its 
thought, both of which (being and thought) it equality is.  The Unhappy Consciousness, 
therefore, posited the Unchangeable as the truth of thought and assumed the position of 
the changeable. This is the second instantiation of the ‘beyond’.  The Unhappy 
Consciousness makes peace with this situation by seeking union with the Unchangeable 
through a mediator.  This uneasy mediation with the beyond is only overcome much later 
in Hegel’s narrative in the recognition of mutual forgiveness within a moral community.  
This forgiveness overcomes the one-sidedness of either a commitment to existence 
through action (being) or to the moral purity of non-action (thought). In this community 
of forgiveness elf-consciousness has now been reconciled to itself, and as Hegel noted, 
God is no longer locked in a beyond above, but dwells with and among humanity below. 
The third sounding is a repetition of the second but explicitly from a religious 
point of view, seeking to understand the self-consciousness of Geist within human 
                                                
65 Remember that Miller omits this phrase (der sich im Selbstbewußtsein realisierenden 
Unendlichkeit) in his translation. 
66 “Both the finite and the infinite are this movement in which each returns to itself 
through its negation” (SL 147/WL 162). 
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community.  The apex of this journey was the incarnation and crucifixion of the divine-
man as the content of the Manifest Religion.  From the side of the divine, thought and 
being (or subject and substance) are reconciled through the dying of the abstract God of 
the beyond.  This process begins with mediation by a third term (mirroring the priest of 
the Unhappy Consciousness), but ends with the vanishing of this mediating term 
(mirroring the canceling of appearance between understanding and the supersensible), 
resulting in self-mediation through the other.  Through the Incarnation and death of the 
divine-man, the ultimate other as the God of the beyond is now part of the movement by 
which self-consciousness comes to know itself in its other. 
Each of these soundings resulted in an encounter with the infinite as the resolution 
to, or reconciliation of, various impasses posed by the ‘beyond’.  In each sounding, 
seeking to fathom the depths of thought, Hegel lets out more line until he is able to reach 
the bottom (or the beyond) of thought and rebound back to the surface as the self-
certainty of self-consciousness.  But has Hegel really measured the depths, or has he 
merely measured length of consciousness’s line?  In the English system, the measurement 
of depth is recorded in fathoms.  A fathom is the approximate distance between a man’s 
outstretched arms, coming from the Old English fæthm meaning outstretched or 
embracing arms.67  With this Old English meaning in mind, we will conclude this chapter 
by asking if Hegel has actually fathomed the depths of thought and being or only 
embraced everything within the reach of consciousness, excluding all the rest?  Have the 
depths truly been measured or merely been made fathomable to consciousness? 
 
                                                
67 See fæthm (fætdm) in An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, eds. Joseph Bosworth and Thomas 
Toller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 268. 
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3. Beyond Nothing and the Unfathomable 
 
 In answering these questions, to begin directly with the infinite in the 
Phenomenology is already to begin too late.  Nor is it helpful to question the exact 
relation between the finite and the infinite in the Logic. The problem criticisms of Hegel 
focused on the true infinite is that this engages Hegel at the end of his arguments rather 
than at the beginning.  One cannot ask about the possibility of an infinite beyond the true 
infinite because this leads to the immediate reply that the form of the question belies the 
operations of the Verstand and its fixed oppositions.68  To ask whether Hegel has truly 
fathomed through we must return to the beginning and ask about how Hegel positions the 
unfathomable. 
 
Nothing Other Than Thought 
 
As we saw in our initial survey of the Logic, the dialectic of the finite-infinite that 
results in the true infinite (the one we find in operation throughout the Phenomenology) is 
based in the earlier dialectic of being-nothing resulting in becoming.  There it was argued 
that while the Logic formally begins with being, true thought only begins at becoming, 
and does this all from nothing.  This nothing was the failure of Verstand to think any 
thought (i.e. pure thought, “thinking thinking thinking”). It was concluded that the 
nothing beyond finitude is equal to the nothing before becoming, each governed by 
Verstand in its isolation from Vernunft.  In this way the nothing of understanding 
(Verstand) becomes the infinite of reason (Vernunft). In both cases, the nothingness of 
                                                
68 This is a typical tactic of Hegel and Hegelians against critics.  One example is Stephen 
Houlgate’s criticism of the infinite deployed by Levinas. See Houlgate, The Opening of 
Hegel’s Logic, 432-435. 
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thought produces the self-enclosed infinity of being.  This is the key to Hegel’s 
dialectical development as the internalization of nothing through negation.  By excluding 
‘nothing’ as non-thought, has Hegel really fathomed all thought and being or reduced 
thought and to the embrace of consciousness? 
In other words, is reducing the ‘beyond’ of thought to non-thought thinking the 
beyond?  Is nothing the source of thought only as a failed thought?  Plato certainly 
posited the good beyond thought and being and did not consider this good as merely 
indeterminate and abstract (or in any other way deficient).69  Following the lead of 
Plato’s Parmenides, Neoplatonists developed a conception of the ‘one’ beyond being and 
thinking, identified as itself unlimited,70 insights that developed into the tradition of 
negative theology.  The impulse for positing the good or one beyond being is similar to 
Hegel’s motivation in preventing an infinite regress when explaining phenomena. But as 
we have seen, Hegel’s opening moves in the Logic bar this approach of stopping the 
regress in a plentitude beyond thought and being.  As a philosophy of self-transcending 
immanence, Hegel desires an alternative to a ‘good’ or ‘one’ beyond being and thinking, 
for these would inhibit self-determining freedom (at least in the horizons of German 
Idealism). Hegel preemptively eliminates these options by excluding everyone beyond 
consciousness as merely ‘nothing’ and then re-including this nothing as negation. 
                                                
69 Republic VI 509 B 8-10. 
70 Plotinus says “we go back everywhere to one.  And in each and everything there is 
some one to which you will trace it back, and this in every case to the one before it, 
which is not simply one, until we come to the simply one…It is certainly none of the 
things of which it is origin; it is of such a kind, though nothing can be predicated of it, not 
being, not substance, not life” En. 3.8.10.  These three senses speak of Plotinus’ three 
hypostases summarized as proton hen, the first One, the hen polla, or One-Many, and hen 
cai polla, the One-and-Many (En. V.1.8). For the one beyond being see En. V.1.10. 
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As we saw in the first section, Hegel has not really argued against considering 
such a transcendence that could be productive beyond or other than being and thought.  
He has only shown that ‘nothing’ is that from which thought must recoil in its journey 
toward pure knowing.  In essence, he only presupposed the lack of true transcendence.  
Because the presupposition for this Logic is found in the Phenomenology, to criticize the 
Logic in this way requires stepping back and asking whether the Phenomenology has 
actually accounted for all forms of ‘otherness’ in its attempt to break down the divide 
between object and subject (Substance and Subject). 
 
Nothing Other Than Consciousness 
 
In turning to the Phenomenology, the place to start is not Manifest Religion and 
its content of incarnation and death of the divine-man.  Certainly this passage initiates 
various death of God and/or post-metaphysical theologies,71 as well as less radical 
interpretations of Christianity.72  While Manifest Religion seems the most explicit 
encounter between consciousness and its other, and therefore the best place by which to 
judge whether the Phenomenology has truly encountered all others, this encounter is 
already thoroughly saturated by the themes of mutual recognition and the movements of 
                                                
71 See Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (London: Westminster 
Press, 1966); Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University Of 
Chicago Press, 1987); Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology, 
and Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); John Caputo, The 
Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2006); Slavoj Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003). 
72 See Hans Kung, The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel's Theological 
Thought As Prolegomena to a Future Christology (London: T&T Clark, 1987); Quentin 
Lauer, Hegel’s Concept of God (Albany: SUNY, 1982); Peter C. Hodgson, Hegel and 
Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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the infinite.  This saturation of themes makes it very difficult to know whether 
consciousness is truly encountering its transcendent other or if consciousness has already 
pre-formed this religious content on its journey toward pure knowing. 
Moving back to the Unhappy Consciousness and its encounter with the beyond in 
the form of the Unchangeable is also a false start.  This encounter was also already 
configured by the (failed) process of mutual recognition in its search for self-certainty.  
The freedom of self-consciousness is initially limited by its natural life from below.  
Through the sublimation of natural desire in the form of social desire (the desire for 
recognition), self-consciousness enters the domain of Geist.  This spiritual life, however, 
cannot be given from a supernatural beyond for this would also set up another limitation, 
now from above rather than from below.  Hegel needs to show that self-consciousness as 
Geist is neither natural nor supernatural, even while being spiritual.73  Indeed, the entire 
movement from the Unhappy Consciousness to Manifest Religion is Hegel’s attempt to 
articulate the spiritual but not supernatural nature of self-consciousness.  This is the case 
because, for Hegel, the supernatural, the beyond, or transcendence, is assumed to be a 
detriment to the self-determining nature of consciousness, an assumption basic to post-
Kantian German Idealism.   
Because the encounter of the Unhappy Consciousness with the Unchanging is 
also already saturated by the process of mutual recognition as self-determining freedom, 
the best place from which to question Hegel’s encounter with otherness is the first one 
with the supersensible beyond (übersinnliche Jenseits).  There we saw that the 
understanding conceived of the supersensible as “merely the nothingness of appearance” 
                                                
73 It is for this very reason that those like Pippin and Pinkard leave Geist untranslated or 
just substitute it for ‘sociality’ or ‘intersubjectivity.’ 
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(PS ¶146/ PG 117), mirroring how the spurious infinite was conceived as the nothing of 
the finite.  But this indeterminate nothingness was quickly filled through an attempt to 
articulate the truth of appearance as supersensible.  It was only when the understanding 
eliminated its commitment to sensible representation that it could then conceive of the 
supersensible as itself “pure change” or “inner difference” (PS ¶160/PG 131), based in 
the idea of infinity. After the arrival of the true infinite the understanding came to know 
that the supersensible and appearance as the productive power of the understanding itself. 
When understanding saw this it was able to shift from mere consciousness to self-
consciousness. 
 
Other Than ‘Nothing’ 
 
But as we asked for the finite-infinite and being-nothing dialectics, from where 
does this unity of appearance and the supersensible come?  The conception of the 
spurious infinite cannot be used to justified the introduction of the true infinite here in the 
Phenomenology.  The arguments concerning the true infinite in the Logic, no matter how 
tempting it is to import as explanations, are invalid from the standpoint of the 
Phenomenology.  For Hegel, rather than allowing an infinite regress to proceed above 
consciousness, being only stopped with reference to a beyond in some form (God, the 
One, the Good), the infinite regress is halted by positing the unity of the supersensible 
and appearance within consciousness as the understanding’s own product.  Hegel would 
rather bite the bullet of contradiction within consciousness rather than admit it above 
consciousness.  Crafting his argument is this way only reveals that Hegel had already 
assumed the conclusion of the Phenomenology (and the arguments of the Logic) in these 
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opening movements. But if he has assumed these conclusions then he has not overcome 
all opposition between subject and object and has not overcome all otherness to thought.  
He has only preemptively excluded the types of otherness that would challenge his 
system.  
As with the Logic where ‘nothing’ as the first other of thought is included an 
indeterminate non-thought, here in the Phenomenology the first true other of 
consciousness is returned to consciousness as the “nothingness of appearance”, that 
which is not an object of consciousness.  This other is already determined (by 
consciousness) to be indeterminate and therefore deficient.  That ‘nothing’ is determined 
to be indeterminate by thought ensures that thought can become self-determining.  The 
possibility that this other of thought could be ‘overdeterminate’ and therefore productive 
of thought, rather than merely deficiently indeterminate as a thought, is not possible for 
Hegel.74  It is not possible because anything other than indeterminate ‘nothing’ would 
allow for the persistence of something other than consciousness and therefore inhibit the 
self-determining nature of thought as the unity of subject and object.  For Hegel, it is 
consciousness and consciousness alone which ‘goes beyond itself’ as a self-transcending 
immanence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It these three soundings from the Phenomenology we have found that Hegel does 
not reach the bottom of thought (or being).  Rather, he takes the end of the line (the self-
                                                
74 ‘Overdetermination’ is a term frequently used by William Desmond.  See Desmond’s 
The Intimate Strangeness of Being: Metaphysics after Dialectic (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University Press, 2012), 3-43. 
  
 
128 
transcending nature of consciousness) as the determination of thought and claims that 
nothing else exists.  In many ways, the act of lowering this line was merely the pretense 
for catching a glimpse of consciousness reflected in the water.  Hegel has perhaps given a 
persuasive gloss on his metaphysical vision,75 but has not justified it without circularity 
(between the Phenomenology and Logic: i.e. relying on the derivation of the true infinite 
of the Logic to make compelling the various transitions within the Phenomenology).  If 
these criticisms hold then we have achieved the goal of this chapter, to show both that 
Hegel’s philosophy is aptly described as self-transcending immanence, even while 
showing that Hegel only assumes but does not justify such a philosophical perspective.   
Of course, these criticisms only hold for certain interpretations of Hegel.  They 
challenge strong logical and ontological interpretations of Hegel committed 
presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s philosophy.76  If one assumes the Phenomenology as 
the presupposition of the Logic then one would still need to account for the lack of any 
real encounter of a transcendent beyond which is not already preconfigured and made 
amenable to consciousness by reduction into indeterminate nothingness. 
These criticisms also challenge religious interpretations that support Hegel’s 
reconfiguration of Christianity.  Given Hegel’s strong aversion to ontological beginnings, 
the only theistic reading of Hegel would have to be panentheistic, reading God as the 
                                                
75 Charles Taylor is found of saying that where Hegel fails at a conceptual proof he 
succeeds with a persuasive interpretation.  See his Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), 233, 239. 
76 This would be those like Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic; Maker. Philosophy 
Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel; Richard Dean Winfield, From Concept to 
Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006). 
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infinite irreducible to the finite and creation as the finite irreducible to the infinite.77  But 
as we have seen, while on the one hand Hegel notes the necessary separability of the 
finite and the infinite, he more strongly insists on their radical inseparability within the 
immanence of thought.  Indeed, Hegel’s self-transcending immanence puts him at 
considerable distance from Christian orthodoxy, more than most supportive religious 
interpreters acknowledge because they are happy to begin with the finite-infinite dialectic 
(the end of Hegel’s arguments) rather than being-nothing dialect (the beginning). 
These criticisms, however, do not effect the normative or radical interpretations 
offered by Pippin or Žižek.  These interpretations like already Pippin’s or Žižek’s assume 
that the pursuit of modern freedom needs no further justification or proof, and that Hegel 
had always presupposed this position.  These types of interpretation cannot be criticized 
on logical or ontological grounds.  Rather to meet them we must must enter the practical 
arena of political freedom.  Indeed, just as Hegel always positioned his critique of Kant 
within the practical realm of morality, so too must we now turn to Hegel as he seeks to 
actualize modern freedom beyond the self-transcending immanence of thought into the 
social self-determination of ethical life. 
                                                
77 This is the position of Lauer and Hodgson who both just assume Christianity is open to 
pantheism and panentheism, respectively, without making a case for it. See Lauer, 
Hegel’s Concept of God, 243-282, and Peter C. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology, 
248-259. 
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIETY AND FREEDM: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
For that is just what freedom is: being at home with oneself  
in one’s other.1 
 
Introduction 
 
 The last chapter outlined Hegel’s philosophy as a self-transcending immanence. 
There I argued that this self-transcending immanence of thought functioned through an 
exclusion of the overdeterminate through its reduction to an indeterminate ‘nothing’, re-
included as the negativity of thought expressed as the true infinite. In this way ‘nothing’ 
as negativity appears within consciousness, expanding into social self-consciousness, as 
that which “goes beyond itself.”  I argued there that Hegel had not included all otherness 
within thought, but excluded in advance what could not be assimilated into the project of 
absolute knowing, meaning that his system is not truly presuppositionless. 
These criticisms of Hegel, however, only applied to the more traditional readings 
of Hegel that seek either to justify his system or coordinate it with Christian orthodoxy.  
The critique that Hegel does not presuppositionlessly establish his system, however, does 
not apply to those who understand Hegel as offering an interpretation and justification of 
modern freedom as self-determination (like Pippin and Žižek) because they see Hegel 
affirming the project of modern freedom.  The previous critique of Hegel’s logical system 
and its lack of presuppositionlessness fails the more political interpretations of Hegel who 
claims that his entire project exactly presupposes modern freedom.  Interpreters like 
Pippin and Žižek, as noted in the first chapter, do not think Hegel attempted to 
independently justify his system through a presuppositionless beginning.  Rather, they 
                                                
1 E §24 A2. 
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see Hegel as offering an interpretation of modern freedom that both presupposes the 
value of modern freedom itself and refuses reference a transcendence beyond.  To engage 
these interpretations I will have to step off Hegel’s phenomenological ladder, come down 
from the logical ether, and enter the realm of socio-political existence as Hegel 
understands it. 
This chapter will consider Hegel’s political philosophy as articulated in his 
Philosophy of Right, particularly examining his understanding of a free will within ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit) as the unity of individual subject and the ethical substance, extending the 
unity of substance and subject gained in the Phenomenology.  After this exposition the 
limits of ethical life will be explored around the questions of societal change and 
transition, showing why Hegel did not offer a theory of society transformation.  This 
chapter will conclude by indicating the impossibility of holding together ethical 
substance with individual subject, illustrated by the immediate breakdown of the 
Hegelian legacy, a bifurcation continued in interpreters like Pippin and Žižek.  This 
breakdown of the Hegelian project indicates the inherent instability of self-transcending 
immanence as an orientation from which to think political subjectivity, directing us to 
rethink its very possibility.  From that breakdown we will then move to the second part of 
our investigation and explore the Augustinian orientation toward transcendence and 
immanence as more productive of a political subjectivity capable of offering social 
critique and initiating social change.   
 
1.The Subject and Substance of Politics 
 
 Unlike Karl Popper’s depiction of Hegel as the reactionary advocate of Prussian 
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totalitarianism,2 it is much more accurate to think of Hegel as “a reform-minded liberal 
who based his political philosophy on the analysis and fulfillment of individual human 
freedom.”3  As we have seen throughout, Hegel is profoundly concerned with the 
freedom of thought, which if it is not to remain indeterminate must become determinately 
expressed in actually existing individuals and institutions.  Indeed, only through the 
mediation of individuals and institutions is modern freedom truly expressed and 
experienced as the “I that is We and We that is I.”  This first section will examine the 
relationship between subjective will and social substance in Hegel. The second major 
section will examine the institutions of modern life: family, civil society, and the state. 
 Against the negative freedom of non-interference, Hegel develops the tradition 
running from Rousseau and Kant of a more positive freedom in which society is not a 
necessary restriction on freedom but is both the positive expression and condition of 
one’s freedom.4  Hegel attempts to combine the unity of the individual and general will of 
Rousseau with the moral self-legislation of Kant.  To do this Hegel unites the subjective 
(individual) and substantive (institutional) aspects of the will, such that the will retains its 
identity through its other. 
                                                
2 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies: The High Tide of Prophesy: Hegel, 
Marx, and the Aftermath (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).   
3 Kenneth Westphal, “The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. by Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 234. For a critique of the ‘totalitarian Hegel’ see also 
Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), 115-132; Adriaan Peperzak, Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the 
Preface to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 15-31; Paul 
Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 123-
39. 
4 We already explored how Pippin marks this relationship in chapter one.  See also 
Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, 1-32; Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social 
Theory, 55-81. 
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 Unlike interpreters who would sever Hegel’s speculative from his political 
philosophy,5 Hegel bases the Philosophy of Right solidly on his logical system and 
deploys its common terms: indeterminate, determinate, self-determinate, negation, and 
otherness.  The immediate topic, however, is not the logical realm of reason, but the 
practical realm of freedom (which in the end are the same for Hegel): 
The basis of right is overall, the domain of spirit [or spiritual] (Geistige); its more 
precise location and standing point is the will, which is free.  Freedom thus 
constitutes the substance and determination of right, and the system of right is the 
realm of actualized (verwirklichten) freedom, the world that spirit brings out of 
itself as a second nature. (PR §4) 
 
Here Hegel outlines the key aspects of the Philosophy of Right.  First, freedom is an issue 
of the will, a free will, for a “‘will,’ without freedom, is an empty word, just as freedom 
is actual only as will, as subject” (PR §4A).  But what does it mean for a will to be free?  
Hegel’s answer leads to the second key aspect: actual freedom (of the will) is a system of 
determinations acting as a spiritual second nature.6  This is the substantive side of 
freedom. Hegel is attempting to unite freedom as substance and subject, just as he had 
done for truth in the Phenomenology.  And just like the Phenomenology, this freedom 
must pass through otherness in its return to itself.  As he says in the Encyclopedia, 
freedom is a process of self-recognition through otherness in which Geist is “purely at 
home with itself, and thereby free, for that is what freedom is: being at home with oneself 
in one’s other” (E §24 A2).  This first section will move through two sub-sections.   I will 
first explain freedom as it concerns the form and content of the will from the subjective 
                                                
5 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 537-571; Allen 
W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4-6. 
Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, and Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social 
Theory, generally follow this trajectory. 
6 See Robert B. Pippin, “Hegel's Political Argument and the Problem of Verwirklichung,” 
Political Theory 9/4 (1981): 509-532. 
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side as articulated in the Introduction of Philosophy of Right.  Then I will investigate the 
substantive side concerning ethical life and its interaction with the subjective as discussed 
in the third part of the book. 
 
Form and Content of the Will 
 
 Hegel begins his Philosophy of Right with the form or the concept of will, 
following the familiar movements of indeterminate, determinate, and self-determinate.  
The will contains two essential moments, which together (as a third moment) form the 
unity of the will.  The first moment is the act of pure, abstract indeterminacy that 
suspends every immediately given content, be it from nature, needs, desires, or drives 
(PR §5).  This is the one-sideness of “negative freedom, or the freedom of the 
understanding” (PR §5R).  By negative freedom Hegel does not mean the freedom of 
non-interference of the classical liberal tradition (Hobbes, Locke, Mills), but the freedom 
that comes through abstraction, to abstract oneself from among possible alternatives or 
contents.7  Left in its one-sideness, this conception of the will thinks of freedom as the 
capacity to choose between options, which for Hegel “has to do only with the abstraction 
of freedom, not with its idea and its truth” (PR §10R).  The second moment of the will is 
the transition from pure indeterminacy to a concrete determination in a particular action.  
In this movement “the I steps into existence (Dasein) in general; this is the absolute 
moment of the finitude or particularization of the I” (PR §6).  This act is the negation of 
infinite possibilities through the active willing of limitation (Beschränkung) in order to 
                                                
7 Franco, in Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, 178-182, offers a very good discussion of 
the difference between Hegel as compared to Isaiah Berlin’s characterization of negative 
and positive freedom. 
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enter a determinate course of action (PR §6A).8  In this moment the will renounces its 
merely abstract ability to choose between alternatives and instead chooses to make itself 
determinate through a particular action.  These alternative moments of the will mirror 
Hegel’s discussion of the beautiful soul as it splits into the one who judges and the one 
who acts.  But as we will see, here in the Philosophy of Right the overcoming of this 
contradiction is not a movement into religion but into an ethical life guided by habits and 
dispositions.  But this is to get ahead of Hegel’s argument.   
 These two moments of the will are, for Hegel, only abstract moments unified by a 
third moment in which (1) the abstract indeterminacy and (2) the determinate limitation 
of the will becomes “at home with itself” as “the self-determination of the I” (PR §7).  
This third moment is less an actual moment in a sequence of willing, and more of a 
stance of the will toward itself.  Rather than finding itself alienated in its own action 
(alienated because self-consciousness knows itself to be infinite but finds itself within the 
finitude of its action), the subject renounces this one-sidedness and determines itself to be 
that which is self-determining because it has determined its own course of action.  This 
self-determination of the I is best understood as the “relating of negativity to itself,” a 
self-relation that does not deem determinacy an alien limit.  Rather, this limit is a limit 
that the will chooses for itself (PR §7).  This “relating of negativity to itself” is the 
practical correlate of how ‘nothing’ and negativity functions within logical thought. The 
unity of the will as a process of consciousness “going beyond itself” in setting its own 
limits (the determinate negation of abstract negation) is the process by which the will can 
                                                
8 “A will that, like the one analyzed in the previous paragraph [§5], wills only the abstract 
universal, wills nothing and is therefore no will at all.  The particular that the will wills is 
a [limitation] (Beschränkung), for the will must, in order to be will [limit] (Schranke) 
itself in general” (PR §6A). 
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be at home with itself (neither merely indeterminately abstract nor lost in the world of 
determinacy).  The unity of these moments constitute the freedom of the will, mirroring 
the true infinite as “negativity relating itself to itself” (PR §7R).  This is the form of the 
will as self-relating negativity going beyond every limitation except the ones it sets for 
itself (i.e. self-determines). 
 But from where does the content of the will come?  As with the objects of thought 
in the Logic, if the content of the will comes from outside itself, then the will cannot be 
self-determining and free.  This problem is carried over into the first instance of the will, 
the natural will, in that its content comes from outside itself.  The “immediate or natural 
will” is compelled by “drives, desires, and inclinations through which the will finds itself 
determined by nature” (PR §11). These drives, desires, and inclinations direct actions 
toward the continuation of life and are therefore necessary.  This content, however, is not 
yet self-determined.  This lack of self-determination is compounded because even the 
process of determining to act through an evaluative hierarchy of desires does not make 
this content self-determining.  It just highlights the mere subjectivity of the finite will (PR 
§14).   
 This evaluative hierarchy, sometimes confused with true freedom, is called 
willfulness (Willkür) by Hegel.  It consists of the ability to abstractly choose between 
options that are not one’s own (i.e. natural drives and desire) (PR §15).  Hegel notes that 
this is the most common idea of the will (the ability to chose between alternatives), but he 
claims this is only the partial truth of the will, caught half way between natural 
determinism and actual freedom.  Willfulness, in this regard, is only the will within the 
contradiction of finitude (PR §15R).  It is caught in this contradiction because at one time 
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it might choose a certain course of action. But later, in the same situation, the will might 
just as well choose another course.  The mere willfulness (Willkür) can always change its 
mind in the future and therefore never transcends its finite situation but only embarks 
along a spuriously infinite series of disconnected choices (PR §§16-18).  Therefore, 
beyond the natural immediacy of drives and desires and a contingent willfulness, there is 
a need for a rational organization of the will that unites its form with a self-determining 
content. 
 As was the case with thought needing to be purified of its common sense separation 
of subject and object, true freedom must move through the purification (Reinigung) of 
natural determination (form) and subjective willfulness (content) according to a “rational 
system of the will’s determinations” (PR §19).  When natural drives and subjective 
willfulness have been purified, cultivated, or educated into a rational system (PR §20), 
then the will becomes a “self-determining universality” (PR §21).  This “self-determining 
universality” takes up its natural content and making this content its own as a second 
nature.   
 If a rational system can cultivate the will properly, then, the will becomes “truly 
infinite because its object is itself, and therefore is neither other to it nor a [limit] 
(Schranke) for it; instead, in its object it has returned into itself” (PR §22).  Here Hegel 
expresses the same ideas used to speak of self-consciousness: the truly free will returns to 
itself through its other, which in this case is both the other of its own determinate action 
in which it finds itself, and as we will see, the other as “the rational system of the will’s 
determinations” giving truly free content to the free will’s form (this second ‘other’ is the 
theme of the next sub-section).   
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 After this Introduction, the elaboration of this rational system is the task Hegel sets 
for himself in the Philosophy of Right, a task that moves through the two initial moments 
of ‘abstract right’ and ‘morality’.  Abstract right examines the immediate freedom of 
persons in relation to objects, and morality investigates the mediated freedom of subjects 
in relation to themselves.9  But as usual, each of these are only abstract moments needing 
unification within a more comprehensive category, which in this case is ‘ethical life’ 
(Sittlichkeit) giving substantive existence to the subjective will (PR §§33, 141).  To this 
objective ethical life we will now turn, giving special attention to how it perfects the 
subjective will. 
 
The Substance and Subject of Ethical Life 
 
 Hegel’s discussion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is immediately preceded by his 
reflections on morality, culminating in the interrelation of the good and conscience.10  
While conscience seeks to directly will the good as the objectively absolute, the center of 
conscience acting out of conviction (inaccessible to others) tends to makes subjectivity 
absolute.11  This occurs because the good, as the “substantial but still abstract universal of 
freedom” requires practical determination.  This practical determination ends up being 
                                                
9 Hegel uses ‘person’ (Person) or ‘personhood’ (Persönlichkeit) to describe the sphere of 
abstract right (PR §35), and ‘subject’ (Subjekt) or ‘subjectivity’ (Subjektivität) within the 
sphere of morality (PR §§105-6).  Roughly, a person wants things (freedom through 
things) and a subject wants itself (freedom through reflection). 
10 While much more thorough in his critique of conscience and the problems of the evil 
will, the conclusions in the Philosophy of Right reflect the same concerns outlined 
previously in the Phenomenology.  Allen Wood sees the Phenomenology as focused more 
on the problem of German Romanticism and its celebration of the individual, and the 
Philosophy of Right as focused on Jakob Friedrich Fries’ ‘ethics of conviction’ (Hegel’s 
Ethical Thought, 174-75). 
11 Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, 220. 
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conscience itself.  But “conscience, as the purely abstract principle of determination” 
requires that it to be universally objective (PR §141), can only reference itself as this 
universal.  This leads to a vicious cycle accenting on subjectivity because the only path to 
the universality of the good comes through the subjective conviction of conscience.  
Because of these deficiencies the good that is discovered within the morality degenerates 
into a sophisticated form of willfulness masked as conscience.  The emptiness of the 
good and its filling by subjective conscience are the backdrops against which Hegel 
shapes his doctrine of ethical life.12 
 For Hegel, ethical life is the unity of the objective and subjective determinations of 
freedom.  Ethical life is the “concrete identity of subjective will and the [objective] good” 
(PR §141).13  Ethical life is not merely indeterminate or abstract, but is  
the living good that has its knowing, willing, and, through its acting, its actuality, in 
self-consciousness, but that has its foundation—which is in and as itself—and its 
motivating aim in ethical being.  This is the concept of freedom that has become 
both a present world and the nature of self-consciousness. (PR §142) 
 
What was previously thought to be an opposition between the objective good and 
subjective will, bridged through subjective conscience, is now unified by ethical life, not 
requiring a bridge translating thought (the universal good) into (particular) action.  Just 
how these are unified requires looking at ethical life from both an objective and 
subjective point of view.14   
                                                
12 Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, 222. 
13 “The unity of the subjective and objective good that is in and as itself is ethicality” (PR 
§141A). 
14 “It follows that we can display the Idea of freedom in the modern world in two 
complementary fashions.  We can focus on the (philosophical) self-understanding of 
modern individuals and show how this is expressed in the norms of the ethical domains 
they inhabit (Family, Civil Society, and State), or we can focus on these ethical domains 
directly, describing them as they are encountered in the modern world and explaining 
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 As Hegel sees it, the problem of (Kantian) morality is its lack of determinate 
content by which to direct and motivate one’s life.  Reference to an abstract good does 
not ensure freedom but instead perpetuates individual caprice under a moral veneer.  
What is needed is a concrete “ethical objectivity” practically accessible to all so that each 
can practice the good while knowing it to be good (beyond mere subjective conviction).  
The good, in ethical life, becomes a stable and objective content through its laws and 
institutions.  These laws and institutions becomes the ethical (objective) substance that is 
then made concrete in each individual subjectivity (PR §§144).  Unlike typical forms of 
liberalism that prioritize the individual, ethical life is the foundation of the individual’s 
expression and experience of freedom and therefore must be given priority.  This is so 
much the case that Hegel claims that the objectivity of ethical life is the substance and 
necessity in which individuals are mere “accidents” (PR §145, §145R).  Priority must be 
given to the “substantiality of the ethical” for otherwise one must “proceed atomistically 
and build up from the foundation of the individual,” a procedure that “is devoid of spirit 
because it leads only to an aggregate.  Spirit, however, is not something individual; it is 
the unity of the individual and the universal” (PR §156A).  This perspective agrees with 
Hegel’s continuing emphases that individuality, whether of objects or subjects, must pass 
                                                                                                                                            
how the norms that structure them are internalized in the motivation of the inhabitants.  
Taking the first route, we portray Ethical Life as a condition of subjective freedom.  
Taking the second route, examining the institutions which make up the moral world, we 
illuminate the conditions of objective freedom…[T]hese should not be represented as two 
independent perspectives from which the details of Ethical Life can be charted.  They are 
interdependent or complementary aspects of it.  We cannot articulate the norms of 
subjective freedom without showing how they are actualized in the institutional structures 
of social life.  And we cannot describe the institutional or practices of social freedom 
without detailing how these institutions are constructed from the intentional activity of 
those moral subjects who behaviours such institutions comprise” (Dudley Knowles, 
Hegel and the Philosophy of Right [London: Routledge, 2002], 223-24). See also Wood, 
Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 196-98. 
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through otherness as an essential constituting moment.15  Atomistic individualism (and its 
aggregate) can never fully express the life of Geist in its passage through otherness and 
therefore cannot be the basis of Geist and its ethical life. 
 Prioritizing ethical life, over and beyond individual subjectivity, often raises fears 
of a creeping totalitarian impulse in Hegel, of which liberal individualism has always 
been thought to be the cure.  The trepidation that individuals are merely disposable 
‘accidents’ within the necessities of ethical life is only compounded when we read that 
the state (the highest instance of ethical life) is “God’s march in the world” as the “might 
of reason actualizing itself as will” (PR §258A).  But one should not be too hasty in these 
concerns as Hegel frequently claims that the freedom of subjectivity is neither abolished 
nor abandoned, but fulfilled in ethical life: 
The right of individual humans to be subjectively determined as free is fulfilled 
when they belong to an ethical actuality, because their certainty that they are free 
has its truth in such an objectivity; within the ethical they actually possess their 
own essence, their inner universality. (PR §153) 
 
Ethical life is not the negation of individual particularity, as if at first one is an individual 
who is then, later, absorbed into the ethical collective.  This would merely be to first 
assume atomistic individualism (thereby giving it priority) and then to reverse that 
perspective ending up with ethical life.  But Hegel’s ethical life is not a more 
thoroughgoing Hobbesian Leviathan sweeping up individuals as they renounce their 
individual right to unfettered freedom, all under cover of a sentimentality for the ancient 
Greek way of life. Rather, ethical life is the ground and foundation for individual freedom 
without which ethical life would have no “worldly being” or existence (existiert) (PR 
                                                
15 Robert M. Wallace draws this connection clearly in Hegel’s Philosophy of Reality, 
Freedom, and God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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§154).16  While giving priority to ethical life, Hegel understands this priority as the social 
and structural condition of individual freedom, without which ethical life would itself be 
an empty abstraction.  The concern that Hegel is opening the totalitarian door can only be 
made from the liberal opposition between individual and society.  But this is exactly the 
position Hegel refuses to allow because then subject and substance would persist in 
opposition to each other.  But for this to be understood properly we must look at the 
subjective side of ethical life, its duties and habits. 
 For subjective self-consciousness, the objective determinations of ethical life (its 
laws and institutions) seem to present themselves as external objects (PR §146).  This, 
however, is only an illusion or abstraction of the understanding. Ethical substance is “not 
something alien to the subject” but expresses the subject’s own inner essence and 
therefore constitutes its true selfhood (PR §147).  The subject and substance of ethical 
life are so intertwined they admit only a conceptual distinction within their substantial 
unity.  The substance of ethical life is the water in which subjective freedom swims 
unthematized and unreflected.   
 This unreflected immediacy (PR §147) is exhibited in the duties and habits of 
subjects, which partly constitute the “rational system of the will’s determinations (PR 
§19) (the other part being the objective laws and institutions).  While duty within Kantian 
morality is always viewed as an external restriction (Beschränkung) to subjective 
freedom, in ethical life “individual humans are liberated to their substantive freedom” 
through duty because duty ensures both (1) liberation from natural willfulness and 
                                                
16 “In Hegelian metaphysics a substance would be nothing actual without the accidents 
that manifest it…[thus] for Hegel, the dependence of substance and accidents is 
reciprocal” (Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 197). 
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individual moral reflection, and (2) the liberation from an indeterminate subjectivity that 
never attains actual freedom (PR §149).  While this might seem counter-intuitive to the 
liberal mindset, Hegel is being perfect consistent with his conception of the will.  He 
makes this clear saying, 
Duty is a restriction (beschränkt) only on the willfulness (Willkür) of subjectivity; it 
collides only with the abstract good to which subjectivity adheres.  When we say 
that we want to be free, this means at first that we want abstract freedom, and every 
determination and articulation of the state is taken to be a restriction of this 
freedom.  But this reveals duty as a restriction not on freedom, but only on an 
abstraction of freedom [as willfulness]. (PR §149A) 
 
This understanding of duty continues Hegel’s critique of Kantian limitations and, by 
extension, liberal freedom as a whole. As Allen Wood concisely states, “Ethical duties 
are not only things I ‘ought’ to do, they are usually things I spontaneously want to do.  
Leaving them undone does not so much offend my [moral] conscience as empty my life 
of its [ethical] meaning.”17  In Hegel’s mind, what might seem ‘other’ to one’s freedom is 
actually seen as “being at home with oneself” through the other of duty. 
 This spontaneous desire to do one’s duty comes from a cultivated habituation 
resulting in virtue.   Ethical life fully reflected in subjectivity takes the form of virtue, the 
highest of which is rectitude (PR §150).  In an understated way meant to further question 
the supposed difficulties of modern moral reflection, Hegel notes that it is relatively easy 
to know what to do in each situation, and that virtue is not a great achievement. Virtue is 
merely doing “what is prescribed, expressed, and known to be appropriate for one in this 
situation” (PR §150R).18  Virtue is only thought to be a great achievement in ancient 
                                                
17 Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 210 (emphasis in original). 
18 “In a properly constituted ethical life, Hegel argues, it is not difficult to know what we 
have to do to be virtuous; it does not require great feats of self-reflection” (Franco, 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, 227). 
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societies which have “not yet evolved into the free system of self-sufficient development 
and objectivity,” thus requiring the exceptionally virtuous person to compensate for the 
general lack of freedom (PR §150R).  From a moral point of view, rectitude might seem 
like a subordinate virtue compared to the more heroic demands of the self-denying 
asceticism of Kantian morality.  But Hegel think this is merely the posturing of Romantic 
individualism seeking praise for its own exceptionalism (PR §150R).  Rectitude, rather, is 
constancy in doing one’s duty, turning the supposed exceptionalism of virtue into the 
banality of second nature. 
 Rectitude, as an “unreflected ethical disposition,”19 reaches it apex when it has 
become habitual, a “second nature” expressing the ethos of a people.  This is Hegel’s 
final move against the Kantian separation of duty and inclination. Habituation into ethical 
life, a habituation cultivated and educated into individuals, becomes a “second 
nature…put in the place of the initial purely natural will” such that the previous 
inclinations directed by drives and desires have now become habitual inclinations 
directed by ethical duties (PR §151).  Moral reflection intervening between duty and 
inclination is unnecessary within a properly rational society because our rational duties 
are experienced and expressed as habitual inclinations. The particular will of the 
individual conforms to the universal will of the community as the unity of duty and 
inclination.   
 When we look back at the Phenomenology, this fulfillment and highest 
achievement of the particular and universal will was only partially experienced by the 
Unhappy Consciousness when it received absolution for its sin (of existence), and only 
                                                
19 Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, 229. 
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partially expressed as the mutual forgiveness between the doer and the judge.  But as a 
movement beyond the Phenomenology, the practice of mutual forgiveness is wholly 
absorbed into the structures of ethical life and its attending duties (within the family, civil 
society, and the state). This habituation occurs though a pedagogical process.  In a proper 
educative program, what is first thought to be natural is made spiritual in a process of 
being “born again” (wiederzugebären), such that one’s “first nature can be transformed 
into a second, spiritual one so that what is spiritual within them becomes habitual” (PR 
§151A).  This unreflective or prereflective habituation, based on the rational cultivation 
established in ethical life, is the manner in which Hegel conceives of the unity of ethical 
substance and ethical subjects.   
 
Objections 
 
 But before raising more substantial concerns about the limits of Hegel’s ethical life 
I first want to answer criticisms concerning the unreflective nature of ethical life offered 
above. Allen Wood speaks the concerns of many when he comments that “the 
subjectively ethical…seems to be essentially unreflective.  It is the attitude that follows 
ethical custom habitually and unquestioningly.  Thus it might appear that the subjectively 
ethical, the ethical attitude or disposition, is essentially premodern, since it excludes the 
subjectivity found in the moral standpoint.”20  This concern stems from the need to 
safeguard modern moral subjectivity from its submersion within ethical substance, 
whether it been premodern or Hegelian.  In order to guard Hegel against criticisms of 
creeping totalitarianism, interpreters seek to emphasize the possibility of moral criticism 
                                                
20 Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 217. 
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within and/or against ethical life.  Two examples are Frederick Neuhouser and Thomas 
A. Lewis. 
 Frederick Neuhouser seeks to find a substantial place for moral subjectivity within 
ethical life by opening up a gap between real and ideal societies and between reform and 
radically oriented social criticism.  As Neuhouser reasons, because we live in a less than 
ideal (Hegelian) society there is always a need for morally based criticism if a society’s 
customs and habits reinforce oppressive practices.  But this social criticism is always 
reform oriented for Hegel (and Neuhouser approves of this) because radical criticism 
would call into question the very basis of modern freedom: that freedom as self-
determination is the goal of modern social theories rather than freedom through rational 
harmony with nature.  Neuhouser effectively seeks to harmonize Hegel’s political theory 
with the most favorable aspects of the social contract tradition (from Rouseau to Rawls) 
by accentuating the place of moral subjectivity within the gap between real and ideal 
societies.21  He does this by separating the normative aspect of Hegel’s social theory from 
his speculative logic, allowing him to justify the elevation of moral subjectivity within 
ethical life.22  One can certainly understand why Neuhouser would want to elevate moral 
subjectivity within a situation of oppressive social practices.  But this elevation of moral 
subjectivity is not sustainable within Hegel’s system without radical revision.  The 
separation of Hegel’s logic from his social theory leads Neuhouser to misunderstand how 
Hegel’s transitions work, such that what comes latest, ethical life in this case, is always 
superior to and the grounding of what comes earlier, moral subjectivity.  I will expand on 
this in a moment. 
                                                
21 Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 225-280. 
22 Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 270. 
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 Thomas A. Lewis also attempts to read Hegel against Hegel by turning to the 
anthropology of “subjective spirit” where Hegel gives an extended discussion of habits as 
pre-reflective actions that separate and overcome natural impulses.  These habits are 
themselves in need of reflection if they are to be a means of freedom rather than 
instruments of bondage.  As Lewis says, “Through its further development, spirit can 
abstract from and reflect upon any of its particular habits.  And, if spirit is fully free, it 
can change these habits as well—in order to will in accord with reason, not just to choose 
out of habit.”23  This reading of habits from Hegel’s anthropology suggest that habits are 
a lower level of freedom, themselves needing the purifying action of reason.  And 
because Hegel’s account of habits comes early in his account of subjective spirit, before 
the accounts of consciousness and self-consciousness, Lewis reasons that Hegel’s 
conception of ethical life must be pried apart, revealing a prereflective habitual side and a 
self-consciously reflective side, the latter of which is more developed and more fully 
rational.24  The distance between prereflective habituation and reflective moral 
deliberation open a space for transformative social criticism. 
 But the introduction of these gaps, either between prereflective and reflective 
aspects (Lewis) or between the reality and ideality of ethical life (Neuhouser) reveals a 
lack of trust or faith in modern institutions that Hegel did not share.  Indeed, Hegel 
thought that ethical life was so intimate, so immediate for individual subjects that the 
“relationless identity” (verhältnislose Identität) (PR §147R) between the substance and 
subject of ethical life is exactly more intimate than trust or faith because the stance of 
                                                
23 Thomas A. Lewis, Freedom and Tradition in Hegel: Reconsidering Anthropology, 
Ethics, and Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 57. 
24 Lewis, Freedom and Tradition in Hegel, 159, also 163. 
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trust and faith must first introduce a distance that is then traversed by trust or faith.25  
Hegel’s theory of habituation within ethical life is meant to close any such gaps.  Hegel 
in no way disallows critical distance from habituated practices.  Critical distance belongs 
to the sphere of philosophy rather than as necessary for each citizen.  Just as everyone 
does not engage in the struggle to the death to secure self-recognition, so also everyone 
need not reflectively endorse the rationality of habituated practices.  Indeed, Hegel 
assume most do not have the desire or ability to do so.  Therefore, interpretations that 
seek to minimize the habitual nature of ethical life in order to secure a larger place for 
moral subjectivity only indicate that they have less confidence in modernity and the 
rationality of its institutions than Hegel does, and are more concerned with the questions 
of transiting from a less free into a more free society, a concern which Hegel also does 
not share.  
 Rather than showing the promise of Hegel for contemporary political theory, do not 
these revisions of Hegel begin to show the very limits of Hegel?  But, as should at least 
be clear, the limits of Hegel do not consist in him being a proto-fascist requiring blind 
submission to state authorities because Hegel’s account always presupposes the 
rationality of ethical life as he explains it.  But if such rational institutions do not yet exist 
then one is rightfully abandoned to the interior life of moral subjectivity (PR §138R), 
which, like Socrates, is often abandoned (to death) in return by such societies.  
 
2. The Institutions of Ethical Life: Family, Civil Society, and State 
 
 But before continuing the line of questioning centered on our confidence in 
                                                
25 “This relationship [between ethical substance and subject] is immediately yet more like 
identity than are even the relation s of faith or trust” (PR §147). 
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modernity or the possibility of social transformation with Hegel’s system, we must look 
more closely at the social institutions in which subjectivity finds its home.  These are the 
inter-locking institutions that make up ethical life: the family, civil society, and the state. 
Roughly, the family is the immediate unity of ethical life, or “the immediate 
substantiality of spirit” in which each member fulfills thier duties according to the bonds 
of love (PR §158).  Here one’s personhood and individuality is submerged within the 
immediate unity of the family.  The goal, however, of the family is to raise children who 
desire to move beyond this natural immediacy into the realm of self-sufficient freedom 
(PR §175).  When this occurs, the immediacy of family life breaks apart and individuals 
enter civil society as the sphere which satisfies particular needs through a system of 
production and consumption.  The immediate unity of the family passes beyond itself into 
the contradictory state where individuals are opposed to each other and to civil society as 
a whole (PR §182). Civil society is an initial self-relation through others in that while 
each person seeks its particular ends, this very pursuit is also the universal end or goal of 
all (PR §182A).  Through seeking the immediate satisfaction of one’s needs comes the 
mediated satisfaction of the needs of all, distributed through systems of goods and 
services.  This explanation of civil society represents Hegel’s appropriation of English 
political economy.26 
 Hegel claims, however, the state as the true ground from which the family and civil 
society grow, and the goal toward which they aim (PR §256R).  The state is different than 
and superior to civil society.  It must not be confused with civil society for this would 
reduce the state to the merely negative aspect of protecting rights and property.  If this 
                                                
26 Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right, 265-69. 
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were the case then the state would be merely function as the protector of individual 
willfulness rather than securing substantial freedom.  The state is the unity of subjective 
and objective freedom in a way that civil society cannot be because civil society 
functions within the opposition of particular and universal interests (PR §258R).  But as 
the unity of particular and universal interest, the state “is the ethical whole—the 
actualization of freedom” (PR §258A).  That the state is the ethical whole, the totality and 
apex of ethical life, means “the state is the actuality of the ethical idea” and “has its 
immediate worldly being in ethos, and its mediate worldly being in the individual’s self-
consciousness” (PR §257).  It is important to notice that the state’s ethos (its habituated 
second naturedness) is the state’s immediate existence while self-consciousness 
constitutes its mediated existence.  Classical liberalism would reverse the placement of 
immediacy and mediation by emphasizing individuals as the immediate basis of the state 
and all the acquired habits and practices as merely its mediation.  But true to form, Hegel 
prioritizes ethical life in its objectivity within which subjective freedom is expressed. 
 In light of unity subjective and objective freedom, “self-consciousness has its 
substantial freedom through its disposition within the state” (PR §257) practiced as a 
political disposition of trust (broadly thought of as patriotism).  This political disposition 
is expressed as a “willing that has become habitual” (PR §268).  This disposition is the  
consciousness that my interest, both substantial and particular, is contained and 
preserved in the interest and aim of an other (i.e., of the state), i.e., in the other’s 
relation to me as an individual.  In this way, the other is immediately not an other 
for me, and in being conscious of this, I am free.” (PR §268)  
  
This is what Hegel means by freedom in one’s other, in which the otherness of other 
people is mediated through the otherness of the state.  In this habitual disposition within 
the state (not toward the state for this would indicate reflective distance) one is 
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substantially free.  True freedom is achieved through the state as a “being at home with 
oneself in one’s other” (E §24A2), or as expressed earlier in the Phenomenology, the state 
fully expresses the “unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in 
their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that 
is ‘I’” (PS ¶177/PG 145).  This unity of objective and subjective freedom is system of 
rational determination allowing for a truly self-determining will.   
 Hegel’s practical philosophy, then, builds seamlessly upon his speculative 
foundation seeking to reveal the actuality of freedom through otherness.  This otherness 
is the otherness of ethical life, principally the state, which is not really other to 
consciousness but that in which consciousness finds its home.  On the socio-political 
level, ethical life establishes the self-transcending immanence of self-consciousness, 
mirroring Hegel’s logical and phenomenological project.  The individual subject 
transcends its own natural willfulness within the transcendence of the state through a 
cultivation and habituation into particular duties.  But the state is nothing other than the 
immanent freedom of self-consciousness as Geist, floating above natural existence and 
yet not supernaturally constituted.  Ethical life contains the self-transcending nature of 
consciousness within its immanent horizon as the state.  Neither comprised by nature nor 
finding itself situated within a cosmic hierarchy, ethical life is the immanent plane on 
which self-consciousness transcends itself and returns to itself as that which “goes 
beyond itself.”   
 
3. The Limits of Self-Transcending Immanence  
 
 What happens, then, when self-consciousness does not pursue “its substantial 
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freedom through its disposition within the state” (§257), pursuing it elsewhere or rejects 
such pursuits altogether?  What happens when one does not find oneself “at home with 
oneself in one’s other” but finds oneself systematically excluded from such a home?  
What happens when the dependencies on which one finds oneself are not those which 
flourish freedom but hinder and destroy it?  These questions of alienation or exclusion 
from a truly rational and free ethical life are, however, still not the heart of my concerns 
of Hegel’s system.   
 The questions before Hegel, the questions that came crashing down around his 
followers immediately after his death, concern the ability for Hegelianism to think 
societal change and transformation. At first it might seem strange to question Hegel about 
the lack of change within his speculative and political philosophy when the concept of 
becoming (the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be) plays such a central role in the Logic, and 
when Hegel constantly discusses the contingent changes necessary for the development 
of Geist in its historical formation.  Certainly Hegel conceptualizes the 
cultivation/purification of thought in its transformation from common sense Verstand to 
speculative Vernunft.  Was this not the entire purpose of the Phenomenology?  The 
central question must be, however, Can Hegel conceptualize the actual transformation 
from an irrational society of unfreedom into his conception of ethical life with its robust 
interlocking aspects of institutional rationality and subjective habituation? Does Hegel 
actually conceptualize this change itself or just posit its occurrence as having happened?  
And if he cannot conceptualize this change, what does this mean for Hegel’s speculative 
project and its political aspects? 
 Many interpreters have spent so much time distancing Hegel from the image of a 
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reactionary guardian of the Prussian state that they think it a great achievement that Hegel 
distinguished true rational actuality from merely contingent existence (this often centers 
around an interpretation of the notoriously difficult Doppelsatz in the preface to the 
Philosophy of Right: “what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.”).27  These 
interpretations often entail claims that Hegel is neither a theorist of the contingently 
present (a protector of the status quo), nor a theorist of some idealistic future (an 
irrelevant theorist).  The interpretive horns of the dilemma is that either Hegel has 
nothing to say to concrete realities because he is only building the ideal ethical state and 
therefore has nothing to offer those seeking to reform or radically transform existing 
political reality, or Hegel is so closely identified with his own socio-historical present that 
he is either merely justifying the political status quo of modernity as he sees it or enters 
into a perniciously relativizing historicism.  
 The real problem is that you can find justification for both positions in Hegel.  On 
the one hand Hegel says he does not desire to offer any advice for those attempting to 
construct a rational state because his treatise only deals with how the rational state is 
known (PR preface/Grund. 7:26).  While defects can always be found in particular 
existing states, Hegel only seeks to show what is affirmative in the rational state 
expressing the concept of freedom (PR §258A).  On the other hand, by Hegel’s own 
definition of philosophy, if his explication of the actuality of freedom within ethical life 
merely remains as a regulative ideal then it has fallen into the Kantian ‘ought’ which 
never becomes an ‘is,’ a dichotomy Hegel’s entire philosophy is meant to overcome.   
                                                
27 Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right, 63-86; Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Freedom, 123-39; Robert Stern, “Hegel’s Doppelsatz: A Neutral Reading,” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 44 (2006): 235-66; Michael Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: 
The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 52-83. 
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 But the desire to balance these positions (over-identification with status quo vs. 
over-idealized theorist) attributes to Hegel a problem he refuses to recognize.  Hegel does 
not need to balance between over-identifying with historical existence and over-
idealizing rational thought.  As Hegel had already argued in the Phenomenology, he 
believed that historical existence had caught up to rational thought such that practice and 
theory had attained their highest freedom (all of which was definitively articulated by 
Hegel’s own philosophy).  This was the process of Geist becoming self-conscious of 
itself in time as substance and subject.  This supposed unity of historical existence and 
rational thought mind helps us understand Hegel’s statement that “it is as foolish to 
imagine that any philosophy could be beyond its present time as that an individual could 
leap out of his time” (PR preface/Grund. 7:26).  On the one hand Hegel understands this 
according to his retrospective account of the development of Geist in its various forms 
such that he can both appreciate earlier developments (i.e. Greek ethical life) while still 
criticizing them for their lack of maturity (in the case of Greek ethical life, that it did not 
affirm subjective freedom).  And when applied to himself, Hegel of course realizes that 
he also is a prisoner of his own time just as much as any other.  But the difference is that 
Hegel thinks Geist had, in a definitive manner, entered not only its latest, but also its last, 
shape.  Certainly minor adjustment could be made here or there regarding his own 
speculative logic or the details of the rational state.  But these modifications would never 
entail a wholesale transformation in the magnitude of overcoming the inherent 
contradictions of Greek ethical life between Antigone and Creon, nor would current 
historical contingencies require the moral vigilance of a Socrates because of its irrational 
unfreedom. 
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 It is exactly for these reasons that Hegel does not, indeed, cannot posit transitional 
forms and practices that would lead society toward more rational forms.  Such transitions 
are no longer necessary.   And if they were, philosophy could not think them because 
these historical shapes only contingently arrive on the scene and philosophy can only 
comprehend their necessity after the fact.  This is all in line with Hegel’s rejection of a 
moral or political ‘ought’, compelling him to articulate his philosophy as a self-
transcending immanence.  It is self-transcending in that it moves beyond mere natural or 
historical determinacy into the spiritual realm of freedom as self-determination.  But it is 
immanent because it rejects any otherworldly beyond to anchor its claims for self-
determination.  This self-transcending immanence is the unity of substance and subject, a 
logical and political unity that Hegel believed was unfolding in the modern world and 
best articulated in his speculative philosophy. 
 
The Breakdown of Substance and Subject 
 
 This unity of subject and substance, within the rising revolutionary atmosphere of 
Germany in the 1830s and 1840s, which resulted from a combination of political and 
industrial factors, began to tear apart due to its own internal tensions (or rather, due to its 
own internal optimism which seemed more and more out of place).  With Hegel’s death 
in 1831 came the slow breakdown of the systematic unity of substance and subject. The 
‘new-left’ Hegelians took the immanence of Hegel’s thought in a strictly anthropological 
manner and read Hegel as a humanist.28  This humanist reading was most dramatically 
                                                
28 The ‘new-left’ Hegelians must be distinguished from the “old-left” of Hegel’s 
immediate followers like Eduard Gans, often called the “young Hegelians” although the 
generational distinction is also misleading.  See John Edward Toews, “Transformations 
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accomplished in Feuerbach’s inversion of Hegel’s system by reading Geist as a strictly 
naturalistic social theory and understanding God as merely a human social projection.  
This inversion was farther radicalized by Marx who understood self-consciousness less as 
a matter of the self-realization of freedom and more as a material process of production.  
Marx argued that “human consciousness itself is completely socially mediated by these 
material facts having to do with the ‘forces of production’ (what productive potential is 
available in a particular economic and social order) and the ‘relations of production’(who 
owns what).”29 Marx articulated a ‘material substance’ of economic forces and 
productions that determine the ‘false consciousness’ of the subject.  This is the reduction 
of the unity of Hegel’s substance and subject toward a strictly materialist substance. 
 Inversely, Kierkegaard sided with the subject, especially the faithful subject, 
against the substance of modern ethical life.  For Kierkegaard, one can never overcome 
the Kantian problem that we are stuck between the infinitude of consciousness seeking to 
live its own life (according to its reason) and the finitude of existence exposing our lives 
as not really our own.  All such Hegelian reconciliations between the “system” and the 
world are illusions hiding the fact that the Kantian problem remains.  For Kierkegaard, as 
Pinkard says, “the infinite value of self-determination is both impossible to achieve and 
impossible to abandon,” meaning that life is a paradox without resolution.30  Or more 
                                                                                                                                            
of Hegelianism: 1805-1846,” in F. C. Beiser, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 378-413.  See also his Hegelianism: 
The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), and Warren Breckman, Marx, the Younger Hegelians, and the Origins of 
Radial Social Theory: Dethroning the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999).  
29 Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 312. 
30 Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860, 352. 
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precisely, it is a paradox without resolution by reason, requiring something more.  
Because one cannot think oneself out of this paradox one must leap out of it through a 
“leap of faith” which “must simply acknowledge that we are dependent on a power 
outside of ourselves.”31  In this way, by emphasizing the faithful subject, Kierkegaard 
moves in the opposite direction than Feuerbach and Marx, abandoning the implicit 
humanism of Hegel and opting for a more thoroughgoing transcendence beyond self-
transcending immanence.  This is the breakdown of the Hegelian unity of substance and 
subject in the direction of the subject, now reconnected to transcendence. 
 These breakdowns of the Hegelian substance and subject into either a materialist 
substance of historical modes of production or the existentialist subject and its leap of 
faith, and their later intermingling, have set the broad contours of continental philosophy 
ever since.  Each in their own way attempted to think change and transformation beyond 
Hegel: Marx in theorizing the coming proletariat revolution and Kierkegaard through the 
moment of radical faith in taking up one’s life amid its paradoxes. 
 
The Limits of Self-Transcending Immanence 
 
 This breakdown of the unity of substance and subject continues to be the destiny of 
Hegel as articulated by the two prominent interpreters we looked at in chapter one: 
Robert Pippin and Slavoj Žižek.  In a sense, these are the only current options within left 
Hegelianism.  Pippin represents an emphasis on the substance of normative practices 
enabling self-legislating freedom and Žižek represents a commitment to the subject of 
radical action.  Each signifies the limits of Hegel’s self-transcending immanence. 
                                                
31 Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860, 352. 
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 Beginning with Pippin, we noted that he attempts to navigate between a Kantian 
individual moral self-legislation and a communitarian social ontology governed by 
something other than liberal freedom.  For Pippin, Hegel advocates for an ever-evolving 
practice of social normativity promoting a rational freedom such that authentic autonomy 
is achieved only through social inter-dependence.  The evolution of these social practices 
constitutes the life of Geist, the self-transcending achievement beyond, yet within, the 
immanence of nature.  This is Pippin’s version of Hegel’s self-transcending immanence. 
 Unlike Marx who sided with the materialist substance of economic production in 
order to theorize movements of societal change, Pippin bites the bullet of social 
transformation by focusing on the substance of normative practices.  Pippin is explicitly 
against finding a more significant place for moral subjectivity as a means toward 
transitioning from an unfree to a more free society.  This is the case because as 
mentioned above, this would betray the very foundations of Hegel’s ethical life as 
critique of Kantian morality.32  Certainly Pippin often emphasizes that Hegel offers us a 
compelling understanding of past changes in normative practices (the breakdown of 
Greek ethical life for instance), but he is also emphatic that these are only retrospective 
reconstructions of historical events.  Pippin concludes the substantive part of his 
reflections on Hegel’s practical philosophy by claiming that  
the account and justification of…moral progress can be given, but only ‘at dusk,’ 
never in a way that legislates ‘what ought to be done,’…Marx was right about 
Hegel, in other word.  The point of philosophy for Hegel is to comprehend the 
world, not to change it; and this for a simple reason that Marx never properly 
understood: it can’t.33 
 
                                                
32 See Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 210-238, 263-4 (esp. 264 n. 35 where he 
engages Neuhouser’s proposal concerning moral subjectivity). 
33 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 272. 
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Pippin can maintain such a position because he maintains a confidence in modernity and 
its institutions that many of Hegel’s supporter do not.  Because of this Pippin does not 
need to dwell on the conceptualization of societal change, just as Hegel did not.34 
 But in seeking to comprehend the world, does not Hegel fail to account for those 
who do change the world?  As we asked earlier, from where does an Antigone come who 
challenges Creon?  From where does a Socrates come who becomes a gadfly?  Or, 
because these could be merely the exceptionally virtuous within a premodern ethical life 
(although this should not blunt the questions), from where comes the judge who would 
renounce his hard heart and forgive the one who acts?  Why would one allow the 
“wounds of the Spirit” in the first place, even if they were healed later?  How does one 
come to learn how to forgive the sins of existence?  In Hegel’s account, one would do 
this in order to be reconciled to oneself and one’s other in a process of successful mutual 
recognition.  This, however, is only a retrospective justification of the process which does 
not take into account the motivations and understandings of the actors involved (actor 
and judge).  Of course, in the Phenomenology it is religion that teaches us why and how 
to forgive ourselves.  And yet Pippin does not avail himself of the religious aspects of 
Hegel. 
 But Žižek most certainly does appropriate the religious dimensions of Hegel’s 
thought, but not as a means toward buttressing a substantive ethical life of normative 
practices, but toward creating a radical subjectivity beyond such normativity.  As noted in 
chapter one, Žižek understands the significance of Christianity as revealing the death of 
                                                
34 See Robert B. Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions 
of European High Culture, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Idealism as Modernism: 
Hegelian Variations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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the God-man as that through which we come to be reconciled to ourselves as we assume 
the same process of subjective death.  This daily dying is not a process of resurrection 
into new substantial unity but rather the persistent “tarrying with the negative” which is 
subjectivity itself.  The death of God, for Žižek, is not the unmasking of a human 
projection such that once we are rid of it we will become reconciled with ourselves (as 
was the case for Feuerbach).  Rather, the death of God and our participation in it allows 
for one to break free of normative and symbolic constructs.  The subject, as that which is 
nothing but its own failure to become a subject, is the end and beginning of Žižek’s 
Hegel, focused on establishing the possibility of a radical political act intended to trigger 
a revolutionary change in existing socio-political formations.   
 Žižek also supports modernity, but it is a counter-modernity that lives into the gaps 
and lacks of contemporary society by understanding the movements of German Idealism 
exactly as the thoughtful articulation of active negation. Žižek places great emphasis on 
this subjective negativity and thereby redeems Hegel’s idea of world historical 
individuals through whom the development of Geist occurs.35  Žižek calls these 
individuals “vanishing mediators” who dwell within the passage between normative 
orders, misunderstood and rejected by both sides (the old passing order and the newly 
established replacement).36  These vanishing mediators are the heroes within the gaps of 
Žižek’s counter-modernity that, instead of being “the wounds that heal without a mark”, 
are much closer to an orthodox reading of Christianity where the wounds of the crucified 
                                                
35 Allan Wood gives an enlightening summary and evaluation of Hegel’s account of 
“world historical individuals” and the amoralism (or beyond ethicality) he ascribes to 
them (Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 226-236). 
36 See Slavoj Žižek, They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor 
(London: Verso Press, 1991), 179-197; Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the 
Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 33-35. 
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one always remain.  This emphasis on the radical subjective act is Žižek’s version of 
Hegel’s self-transcending immanence, an immanence of subjectivity able to transcend the 
status quo of normative constructs, persisting as a divided subject centered on 
nothingness. 
 However, as noted at the end of chapter one, Žižek does not give an account of this 
radical subjectivity in its motivation toward radical political acts.  In fact, Žižek’s alleged 
valorization of radical political action as the eruption of subjectivity is always 
conditioned by a literary counter-normativity  (Antigone, Oedipus, Jesus, King Lear) that 
threatens Žižek’s assertion that subjectivity at its base is always its own support within 
nothingness.37  This is the reverse of the problem for Pippin for whom the substance of 
normative practices could not think the subjectivity of those who would change the 
practices.  For Žižek it is now the case that the subjectivity of radical change both 
disallows but necessarily presupposes a certain normativity if it is to pass into an actual 
act rather than persist in radical, indeterminate negation.  It seems, therefore, that Žižek 
can only think change without such change ever having any substance and Pippin can 
thinks substance without ever having any substantial change. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 It seems, then, the breakdown of Hegel’s substance and subject itself cannot be 
maintained without either forgoing the thinking of political change or abandoning 
                                                
37 Bruno Bosteels critiques Žižek for equivocating between Lacan and Badiou on the 
nature of subjectivity and the act, an equivocation between the Lacanian subject which 
assumes the impossibility of subjectivity and the Badiouian subject faithful to an event, 
two ‘subjects’ which are irreconcilable.  See his “Badiou without Žižek,” Polygraph: An 
International Journal of Culture and Politics 17 (2005): 235-238. 
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political change within a solipsistic act of subjectivity.  On the one hand is the normative 
Hegel of Pippin that can only admit that change happens, but always comes to late to 
participate in it.  However, according to Hegel’s own dialectic, this abstract 
indeterminacy of Pippin that stands above or behind change must become determinate as 
change in some manner.  On the other hand, is the radical Hegel of Žižek that thinks the 
unthinkable nothing as the core of subjectivity.  But these moments, as we have seen, are 
incomplete in themselves, mutually vanishing into its reverse.  This oscillation between 
Pippin and Žižek suggests the need for a higher conceptuality through which to unify 
these two disparate interpretations of Hegel.  Here it would be tempting to return Hegel’s 
self-transcending immanence to its ‘traditional’ onto-theological interpretation as the 
reconciliation between the normative and the radical Hegel.38  By way of this dialectical 
twist, instead of the traditional Hegel being the naïvely metaphysical interpretation that 
does not understand Hegel’s critical commitments, the traditional reading could be seen 
as the only means of holding together his political theory.  But as tempting as this might 
be it would only delay the above problems by transposing them as questions of causality 
within a panentheism framework. 
 Instead of resolving the dilemma between these three interpretations of Hegel, we 
should take leave of the entire project of a self-transcending immanence and its 
understanding of freedom.  In its place, as a plausible alternative for thinking political 
change in its structures and subjects, is the intervention of transcendence within 
subjectivity and society.  
                                                
38 This is why interpreters like Charles Taylor, even though vigorously disputed by non-
metaphysical Hegelians, offer more coherent readings of Hegel’s entire corpus rather just 
focusing on the part most amenable to assimilation by contemporary social theory (and 
its post-metaphysical tendencies). 
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CHAPTER 4: AUGUSTINE IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEOLOGY  
 
My weight is my love.  Wherever I am carried, my love is carrying me.1 
 
Introduction 
 
 To see how Augustine offers a political and theological orientation beyond 
Hegel’s self-transcending immanence, an orientation able to integrate the social practices 
and subjective positions capable of criticism and change, we must clear the air a bit about 
Augustine’s recent political reception.  This chapter will explore the recent interpretations 
of Augustine and his significance for politics offered by John Milbank and Eric Gregory.  
Exploring these two interpretations will simultaneously reveal the relevance of 
Augustine’s political theology as well as the diversity of opinion concerning his 
relevance.  John Milbank turns to Augustine to overcome modern liberalism and its 
postmodern variants.  Essentially Milbank garners Augustine as an anti-liberal in which 
theology always outstrips the possibilities of secular politics.  Gregory, on the other hand, 
turns to Augustine to revitalize liberalism by reintroducing civic virtues ordered by love, 
and for this end solicits Augustinian themes neglected by contemporary political theory.  
Both Milbank and Gregory stand against the Kantian framework dominating the political 
landscape, whether it be continental philosophies for Milbank or Rawlsian liberalism for 
Gregory.   
 This second part on Augustine will not follow the same pattern as the first on 
Hegel.  The first part on Hegel began with Pippin and Žižek as dual interpretations of 
Hegel, passed through the Hegelian corpus, and then circled back to Pippin and Žižek, 
                                                
1 conf. 13.9.10. 
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showing that these two really did represent the only two viable appropriations of 
Hegelian thought, each articulating their own version of Hegel’s self-transcending 
immanence.  In this second part it will be argued that Milbank and Gregory do not 
represent the only two viable appropriations of Augustine’s thought.  The reasons for 
this, however, will not be entirely clear until we reach chapters five and six.  Indeed, the 
goal of those chapters will be to enlarge the political interpretations of Augustine offered 
by Milbank and Gregory, while also showing how an Augustinian orientation to 
transcendence and immanence is more productive of a political subject capable of 
criticism and change than that available through Hegel.  A critique and enlargement of 
Milbank and Gregory is always in service of the larger contrast between Augustine and 
Hegel. 
 
1. Ontological Peace: Transcendence against Liberalism 
 
 John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory is a landmark text, dealing with 
much more than Augustine and his ontology of peace.  While Theology and Social 
Theory does polemicizes against social theory, the ‘and’ in the title should be taken 
seriously.  It is not so much that Milbank is against social theory as such, but argues that 
theology is its own social theory without needing to out-source these matters to the 
secular sciences.  The true polemic of Milbank’s work concerns secular reason in its 
various forms of political liberalism, scientific positivism, radical dialectics, and 
philosophical difference (corresponding to the four parts of the book).   
It is this last form of secular reason that most concerns us because the 
philosophers of difference examined there all emerge out of the breakdown of the 
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Hegelian unity of substance and subject, particularly as it is filtered through works of 
Nietzsche.  It is against this post- and anti-Hegelian trajectory in 20th century continental 
philosophy that Milbank turns to Augustine’s counter-ontology of peace as a resource for 
theology.  Because of this relation to post- and anti-Hegelianism Milbank’s analysis both 
works as a bridge between the breakdown of the Hegelian system by investigating the 
philosophers of difference, and his analysis reveals the promise of Augustine’s political 
theology as a movement beyond such failed attempts.  We will, therefore, briefly 
examine Milbank’s criticism of postmodern philosophies of difference and then look at 
his deployment of Augustine as an alternative to secular reason.  In this we will see how 
Milbank understands the relationship between transcendence and liberalism, a liberalism 
broadly equated with the autonomy of secular reason. 
 
The Postmodern Problematic 
 
 After Enlightenment optimism concerning universal reason and the progress of 
history toward liberation and freedom comes the critique of Nietzsche and his 
philosophical progeny.  This critique of Enlightenments takes three forms.  The first is an 
absolute historicism undertaken through a genealogical critique of ahistorical reason.  
The second is an ontology of difference offered against a metaphysics of presence.  The 
third is an ethical nihilism standing against all moral foundationalisms.  Most postmodern 
philosophers, according to Milbank, are not nearly as clear-sighted as Nietzsche 
concerning the ethical implications of the first two critiques revealing a failure of 
consistency, if not of nerve. 
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 As Milbank sees it, the entire postmodern problematic comes down to this failure 
of ethical consistency.  The Kantian freedom of self-determination is precariously 
balanced between nature and history.  But once it is granted, after Hegel, that the freedom 
of the will is not ahistorical but historically situated, then the freedom of the will 
promoting equality quickly degenerates into the inequality of arbitrary power.  This is the 
turn in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche concerning the freedom of the will as the will to 
power.  And if this is the case, “then how can one ever talk of there being more or less 
freedom in one society rather than another?”2  But postmodern celebrations of absolute 
historicism long to keep the emancipatory potential of social criticism as a counter 
against consumer liberalism.  As Milbank states it, “All recent French neo-Nietzscheans, 
if not Nietzsche and Heidegger, are loath to renounce the emancipatory claim, and are 
therefore doomed to smuggle back into their philosophies an ahistorical Kantian subject 
who is the bearer of freedom.”3  This is the perennial problem of those replacing Kantian 
humanism with postmodern anti-humanism.  If one follows Nietzsche down the hole of 
thorough-going nihilism then the ability to critique the status quo is vacated for the mere 
management of regimes of power.  Within the coordinates of secular reason the only 
place for securing a criticism of these regimes is a return to a Kantian subject of self-
determination.  But this return to a Kantian subject is always susceptible to Nietzsche’s 
critique.  Milbank claims that postmodern philosophers of difference cannot escape this 
problematic within the horizon of the secular.  For Milbank, this failure necessitates a 
return to theology as the place of emancipatory potential.  To see why we will briefly 
                                                
2 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason 2nd Edition 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990/2006), 279. 
3 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 279. 
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examine Milbank’s discussion of three interlocking themes (the critique of history, 
metaphysics, and ethics) and how these seek to reposition theological discourse, followed 
by his theological alternative to secular liberalism.   
 
Historicism as Genealogy 
 
 The genealogical method inaugurated by Nietzsche, and extended by Foucault 
and others, begins with two ambiguously related claims.  The first is the claim that all 
cultural formations are contingent and therefore arbitrary expressions of power 
masquerading as reason.  No culture has any more inherent right to exist or more intrinsic 
goodness to claim in the face of other cultures.  All that can be known is the endless 
procession of power formations in history.  Second is the claim that this procession of 
power strategies can nevertheless be objectively narrated.  The objectivity of this 
narrative, that it indeed reveals how ‘power’ governs the course of history, is what 
supplies the genealogical method its critical edge.  Through its various interpretations 
genealogy gives us more than an interpretation of human history.  It offers a positive tool 
for evaluating cultural formation as either more or less honest about its own strategies of 
power.  But, Milbank asks, does this not make the identification of power with reason an 
ahistorical presupposition that transcends context that is then used to unmask power 
strategies?4 
 Of course the genealogical method cannot make a foundationalist claim for itself 
and must therefore prove its own plausibility by reading its most potent rival according to 
this narrative of power.  For Milbank, the reason why Nietzsche’s polemic is directed so 
                                                
4 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 282. 
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strongly toward Christianity is because Christianity has an opposed reading of power 
within history.  If Nietzsche can show that Christianity is merely the most sophisticated 
version of power masquerading as reason then he will have overcome all opposition to 
his genealogical perspective.  From Nietzsche’s perspective, “if every denial of power is 
a ruse of power, then the absolute denial of power must be the final ruse of absolute 
power.”5  This is the case because the natural human state is the ceaselessly creative 
power of will, a will to power contrasted with the reactionary refusal of such strength.  
For Nietzsche , this reactive stance to power is equated with Christianity and its 
celebration of weakness. 
 As a provisional response to Nietzsche, Milbank asks if the creative power of will 
might just as easily be equated with charity rather than dominion.6  Of course the 
genealogist would answer that all acts of charity place the recipient into a position of 
dependence and therefore can be one of the subtlest instruments of coercion.  In the end, 
this counter-interpretation offered by the genealogist that every act of charity is an act of 
coercion only presupposes its geneological narrative of power rather than proving it.  Of 
course Milbank has not proven the possibility of Christian charity, only suggested its 
plausibility.  It is for these reasons that the absolute historicism of genealogy must be 
supplemented with an ontology of difference as a means toward proving its legitimacy as 
a tool for social criticism.  
 
The Critique of Metaphysics 
 
                                                
5 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 286. 
6 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 289. 
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 For those like Nietzsche generally, and Heidegger specifically, Western 
philosophy and its metaphysics is “the attempt to give a ‘total’ classification of being, 
and to ground the temporal and shifting in ‘truth’.”7  Heidegger claims that metaphysics 
is really a strategy for forgetting historical existence and the existential circumstances of 
life itself.  For Heidegger, in Milbank’s words, this forgetting of “mortality and 
temporality is at one with our forgetting of ‘the ontological difference’, the difference 
between beings on the one hand…and Being itself on the other.”8  Rather than affirming 
the ontological difference, Heidegger sees metaphysics and onto-theology as obscuring 
and escaping this difference through speculative discourse.  To overcome metaphysics 
means to enter the questioning of Being only through our own mortality, temporality, and 
finitude.  Of course Heidegger knows that Being can never be directly encountered or 
experienced.  He takes account of this not through the mystery of Being opening toward a 
theological discourse, but by claiming that Being is always both a concealing and 
unconcealing, indicating a primordial ontological rupture between and within beings and 
Being. 
 Here again Milbank questions the plausibility of this reading of both the 
ontological situation and the history of philosophy.  Milbank does not so much dispute 
the claims of ontological difference or the importance of finitude, but rather the negative 
slant given to this difference.  For “to give this concealment the overtones of 
dissimulation, of violence, of a necessary suppression” is a questionable matter for “one 
might want rather to say that as much as a being is a particular existence and not Being 
                                                
7 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 295. 
8 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 299. 
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itself, it yet exhibits in its sheer contingency the inescapable mystery of Being.”9  Only if 
one has excluded the possibility of an analogical relationship of beings to Being is 
ontological violence necessary to explain the difference between beings and Being.  
Milbank’s claim is that no strong philosophical reason is given to support this necessary 
ontological violence beyond the preference for a non-theological reading of the 
ontological situation.  But if this preference is as ungrounded as the one give by a 
theological description then theology should feel no need to adjust itself to postmodern 
philosophies of difference.  
 
The Critique of Ethics 
 
 Beyond the preferential option of ontological violence being as ungrounded as an 
ontology of peace, Milbank concludes his discussion of the postmodern problematic by 
turning to ethics.  It is his claim that postmodern philosophies of difference follow 
Nietzsche’s absolute historicism even while attempting “to claim for itself a continuing 
critical reserve” of Kantian freedom.10  As Nietzsche saw clearly, “the rigorous 
implication of post-humanism is this: freedom is only a reality as arbitrary power,” 
meaning that “the Rousseauian-Kantian egalitarian extension of freedom has been 
transformed into the asymmetrical extension of power.”11  If this is the case then the 
critical reserve through which postmodern philosophers denounce exploitative systems 
evaporates into another strategy power.  For  
how is one to decide when to abide in illusion, and when to dismantle it?  Either 
course is in a sense hopeless, and nothing can really guide our decision as to when 
                                                
9 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 302. 
10 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 318. 
11 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 318.  
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is the appropriate moment for one or the other.  The decision must itself be 
arbitrary, and persuasion to either course a strategy of deception.  In which case, it 
would appear, only a fascistic politics remains viable.12 
 
Milbank claims this fascistic politics necessarily flows out of an ontology of difference.13  
This is the dilemma of postmodern philosophy caught between its commitment to 
historicism and freedom.  Milbank’s articulation of this dilemma exactly explains the 
renaissance of Hegel in political theory (a renaissance beginning around the same time as 
the publication of Theology and Social Theory).14  If postmodern continental philosophy 
could not integrate Kant and Nietzsche then why not split the difference and return to 
Hegel as an alternative to both? 
 Of course Milbank’s trajectory is different than, but analogous to, a return to 
Hegel.  For him, if there can be no return to a Kantian humanism of universal freedom 
nor a dwelling in a Nietzschean anti-humanism of power, then one must return to a 
theology which can offer, in a non-foundationalist manner, a counter-history and a 
counter-ontology able to affirm both difference and peace rather than difference as 
violence.  Milbank thinks that Augustine offers us such a theology. 
 
Augustine and the Two Cities 
 
 To say that theology is its own social theory means that it is an explication of the 
socio-linguistic practices of the church as the true interpretation of human history.  This 
approach “refuses to treat reason and morality as ahistorical universals, but instead asks, 
like Hegel, how has Christianity affected human reason and human practice” from within 
                                                
12 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 319. 
13 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 319-23. 
14 Both Pippin and Žižek published major works on Hegel in 1989, the year before the 
publication of Theology and Social Theory. 
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the history of the world?15  The task, then, is to offer a counter-history and a counter-
ethics able to rival the plausibility of a postmodern Nietzschean anti-humanism, all 
grounded in a counter-ontology of peace. 
 
Counter-History 
 
Because a postmodern theology must acknowledge that all subjects and objects 
are positioned by a particular set of cultural practices and narratives, it must attend both 
to these narrative practices while not falling into anti-realism nor narratival 
foundationalism.16  A postmodern theology needs to articulate itself as a metanarrative 
which is also embedded in history and therefore open to development.  According to 
Milbank, the Church interprets itself as responding to the original story of Jesus, a story 
that is nothing less than the founding of a new community.  That this story is linked to the 
Son and Spirit of God, who are fully divine, shows that this story belongs within the 
“narrative manifestation of God” within history.17 This story, as a “narrative 
manifestation of God,” is therefore equally a regulative metanarrative as historical 
narrative.  Because this narrative as metanarrative claims also to be a recounting of actual 
history, not merely a founding myth, this narrative are best understood not according to a 
Kantian narrative epistemology but as something more akin to a Hegelian philosophy of 
history, now based in faith rather than reason.   
The historical claim is that a new community has come into being through the 
ministry of the Son and Spirit, a community that is the truth of all human community.  
                                                
15 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 383. 
16 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 386-88. 
17 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 389. 
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This is a claim which the Church cannot surrender to other ‘social sciences’ because the 
“logic of Christianity involves the claim that the ‘interruption’ of history by Christ and 
his bride, the Church, is the most fundamental of events, interpreting all other events.”18  
Christianity, therefore, is not merely different from other social formations, but is the 
difference from all other cultural systems and communal narrative.19 
This difference is historically narrated as the difference between two cities.  By 
re-reading Augustine’s City of God Milbank seeks to articulate the historical ground of 
social critique arising from the Biblical tradition as Augustine understood it. Grounded in 
history, this narrative protects against a false appeal to universal reason.  Likewise, as 
equally the story of God this historical embedded social critique cannot be reduced to 
mere historicism.  Rather than making power and suspicion fundamental to human 
history, Augustine challenges the assumptions of universal antagonism by arguing from 
the standpoint of fundamental peace.20   
On the one hand is the earthly city, the city of war, of which Rome is the 
archetype.  Roman society is based on conquest and domination such that even its virtues 
only find their truth in war.  As Milbank states, for Rome there 
can only be virtue where there is something to be defeated, and virtue therefore 
consists for them, not only in the attainment and pursuit of a goal desirable in 
itself, but also in a ‘conquest’ of less desirable forces.21   
 
This is true not only of virtue but is true of the foundational myths of Rome and its gods.  
Roman myths assume a prior order of violence that is only stopped or contained by a 
leader or a god (Romulus or Jupiter) such that the legal and civil order of Rome is “traced 
                                                
18 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 390. 
19 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 383. 
20 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 392. 
21 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 393 (emphasis in original).  
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back to the arbitrary limitation of violence by violence, to victory over rivals, and to the 
usurpation of fathers by sons.”22  This foundational violence is perpetually repeated in the 
form of foreign conquest, seeking to replace a perceived anarchy with dominion. 
On the other hand is the heavenly city, the city of peace.  In the city of peace the 
cycle of violence warring against violence is broken and another beginning is made.  
While it is true that finite reality has fallen from its original peace, this means that now  
salvation from sin must mean ‘liberation’ from cosmic, political, economic and 
psychic dominium, and therefore from all structures belonging to the saeculum, or 
temporal interval between the Fall and the final return of Christ.  This salvation 
takes the form of a different inauguration of a different kind of community.  
Whereas the civitas terrena inherits its power from the conqueror of a fraternal 
rival, the ‘city of God on pilgrimage through this world’ founds itself not in a 
succession of power, but upon the memory of the murdered brother Abel slain by 
Cain.23 
 
Unlike the founding of a city on the memory of the brother (Romulus) who murdered his 
brother (Remus), the city of peace is founded on the memory of Abel, a foreshadowing of 
Christ, the brother to all.  This alternate community institutes a political society 
inhabiting a trajectory of peace rather than a repetition of violence. Augustine’s 
philosophy (or better, theology) of history is therefore very concerned with the 
beginnings of political communities, in contrast to the more Hegelian perspective 
focusing on the aporias and eventual dissolution of political systems.   
 
Counter-Ethics 
 
 This counter-history activates a counter-ethic that is neither ancient nor liberal.  In 
Milbank’s mind, Christianity is the difference between cultural systems and therefore 
                                                
22 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 393-94. 
23 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 394. 
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cannot be reduced to either ancient virtue or liberal detachment.  The social practice of 
Christianity is other than these options.  In making this point Milbank desires to protect 
Augustine (and theology) from a dominant interpretation.  Milbank fears that too many 
have read Augustine’s critique of ancient culture as the first steps toward Cartesian 
inwardness and liberal detachment, a reduction that then under-values Augustine’s actual 
critique and appreciation of ancient culture.   
 Milbank sees Augustine not as rejecting all aspects of ancient thought, but rather 
as seeking to overcome its dualisms.  The first dualism overcome in the Church is the 
separation between oikos and polis.  Rather than reducing the household around the needs 
of the city, the Church unites the oikos and polis such that each family is itself a little 
republic where cultivation of character should occur.  Likewise, society as a whole is re-
imagined as a family bound by the strong bonds of love.  In this way household and city 
stand together rather than the city exercising dominion over all households.24  Similarly, 
Augustine seeks to overcome the dichotomy between soul and city (and its derivative 
distinctions of body/soul and passion/reason) such that the city no longer needs to control 
or dominate its individual members (congruently the soul need not be thought to 
dominate the body, nor reason the passions).  Augustine seeks a deeper integration 
between these dichotomies by introducing a third element above them.  “Souls, 
households and cities can only be ‘internally’ right insofar as this apparently ‘internal’ 
order is really part of an entirely ‘external’ sequence within which it must be correctly 
placed,” an external sequence guided by a transcendence of peace.25  It is precisely 
because this internal sequencing is accomplished through a social and transcendent 
                                                
24 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 407. 
25 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 408.   
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ordering that Milbank warns against reading Augustine as an incipient liberal.  Rather 
than initiating the inward turn, Augustine emphasizes the turn to transcendence to 
account for the peace of the city and the soul.  
But none of this is a denial of the fall or of sin, the tragic disarray humanity finds 
itself.  Given the persistence of sin in others  
there is only one way to respond to them which would not itself be sinful and 
domineering, and that is to anticipate heaven, and act as if their sin was not there 
(or rather acting with a ‘higher realism’ which releases what is positive and so 
alone real in their actions from negative distortion) by offering reconciliation.26 
 
Forgiveness is the true form of virtue in this life because it short-circuits the absence of 
virtue in others by “not taking offence, assuming the guilt of others, doing what they 
should have done, beyond the bounds of any given ‘responsibility’.”27  But even more 
than this reversal of sin in forgiveness, love is that which opens up the space for others in 
their differences.  “If forgiveness alone, a gratuitous self-offering beyond the demands of 
the law, reflects virtue, then this is because virtue itself as charity is originally the 
gratuitous, creative positing of difference, and the offering to others of a space of 
freedom, which is existence.”28   Christianity in the form of charity, a productive 
fraternity of liberty and equality, is the practice of harmonious difference, knowing that 
difference is not ontologically violent even if it is ontologically ultimate. 
 
Counter-Ontology 
 
The positive evaluation of difference is possible because Augustine views God 
not as one who limits a primordial chaos, but is actually the Unlimited who nonetheless 
                                                
26 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 416-17. 
27 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 417, 
28 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 422. 
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creates the difference of creation.  God does this not in contradiction to God’s nature or 
essence but because God is already both infinite being and internal difference in harmony 
(as Trinity) such that God is simultaneously all being and all difference.29  Because of 
this difference in harmony 
creation is not an appearance, a mixture of truth and untruth, related to God by a 
minus sign, but is rather the serial occurrence of differenetial reality in time, and 
related to God by a mysterious plus sign which construes methexis as also 
kenosis: God who is ‘all’ being nonetheless ‘gives’ a finite being which he is 
not.30 
 
Milbank draws on both Augustine and Dionysius to argue for understanding violence as 
an unnecessary ontological intrusion (rather than the necessary conditions which must 
then be stayed by a counter-violence) in the form of the privation.  Evil is not a thing in 
existence but a failure to properly relate to God (the source of existence) and other 
created things (the community of existence).  This occurs through a bending of desire 
toward (self-) possession rather than openness to others in their differences.  As the desire 
for self-possession, evil is a violation of charity.  This counter-ontology that sees evil as 
privation and violence as contingent completes Milbank’s rebuttal to postmodern 
nihilism.  This theological orientation, based in Augustine, begins from a self-
immanenting transcendence (the God who creates and re-creates) rather than the self-
transcending immanence of Hegel. 
 
Evaluation 
 
 Milbank, then, seeks to give a compelling theological response to modernity and 
its postmodern variants by internalizing the postmodern critique of foundationalism 
                                                
29 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 437-38. 
30 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 438. 
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without allowing this critique to become determinative for theology.  He does this by 
accepting the necessity that theology is itself a social theory embedded in narratives and 
practices, but refuses to import the necessity of an agonistic struggle within society or an 
ontological violence as difference.  Milbank instead reads difference through the peaceful 
formation of true human community grounded in an ontological vision of peace.  
Through this ontological orientations Milbank seeks to affirm the place of transcendence 
within the immanence of secular reason. 
 The grand scope of Milbank’s endeavor, however, often entails a rather 
impressionistic reading of Augustine.  The rhetorical fervor of Milbank’s theological 
project makes one wonder if Augustine is being fitted into a theological project that 
might not be true to the specific trajectories of Augustine’s own thought.  In this sense, 
while Milbank’s interpretation might be broadly congruent with Augustine it often 
glosses over the details of how Christ relates to the Church, of how this metanarrative 
becomes the narrative of one’s life.  Milbank often gestures toward the unity of ecclesial 
practices and individual freedom against modern liberalism and its postmodern variants, 
but he never concretely explores the interweaving of these objective practices, the 
subjects engaged in them, and how God is working in and through both.  As a movement 
‘beyond secular reason’, Milbank’s use of Augustine tends to remain focused on 
theological reason as a theoretical project, neglecting the practice formation of subjects. 
In other words, the theological correction to secular reasons seems to come at the 
cost of over-emphasizing the ontological aspects of Augustine’s theology to the detriment 
of the more soteriological parts of Augustine’s thought.  Milbank scarcely discusses the 
manner in which this counter-narrative becomes the specific narrative of an individual.  
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He hardly speaks of the manner in which Christ is the way back into this ontological 
peace, preferring to focus on the interruptive nature of the Christ event.  Milbank 
certainly makes clear that Christianity is not merely different from other social formation 
but is the difference between all social formations. Milbank, however, does not make 
clear how Christianity draws people into this difference in and through Christ.  The how 
is as fundamental to Augustine’s ontology as it is to his soteriology (a point argued in the 
chapter five).  In Milbank’s presentation, the soteriological how is overwhelmed by the 
ontological that because he emphasizes the ‘counter-’ aspects of Augustine’s theology as 
it stands in opposition to modern liberalism.  This lack of focus on the soteriological how 
leads to a rather thin account of how political subjects are formed.  Because of this thin 
account it is not clear how, on his account, one would move beyond merely offering 
social critique into practices of constructive change.  Milbank seems so focused on the 
ontological status of Christian practices (theology in particular) that the question of the 
subjects capable to engage in such practices does not arise.31 
Because of these concerns, political theologians like Eric Gregory have turned 
from Milbank’s rhetorically charged appropriation of Augustine as an anti-liberal and 
begun offering an account of Augustine focused on the subjective motivational structure 
of properly ordered love, all much more amenable to modern liberalism.  This, however, 
is not a turn away from transcendence or ontology, but merely a different way of reading 
Augustine, turning him toward liberalism rather than away from it. 
 
2. Ordered Love: Transcendence for Liberalism 
                                                
31 Milbank does address some of these issues in Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon 
(London: Routledge, 2003), but Augustine is not there the focus.  In this later work the 
drift is toward Thomas Aquinas and the theological resources he provides Milbank.   
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 Rather than an outright critique and rejection of liberalism, Eric Gregory longs to 
rejuvenate a civic liberalism by turning to Augustine’s understanding of love for God and 
others.  To do this Gregory must clear the air concerning rival versions of an Augustinian 
liberalism. The first he notes is Augustinian Realism as promoted by Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Robert Markus.32  Their political use of Augustine focuses on the sinfulness of 
humanity and the fallibility of politics.  Against political optimism and utopianism, 
Augustinian political realism is constantly aware of human self-aggrandizement and 
domination.  But this realism is also grounded in the virtue of hope as it looks toward the 
eschatological fulfillment of human society. Gregory fears this hope is often lost as 
Augustine is read as focusing on the limited aspiration of the earthly city because of sin, a 
limitation thought to make Augustine a precursor to Hobbesian liberalism.  The second 
political interpretation of Augustine joins him to Rawls by focusing on the epistemic 
constraints of a liberal society (connected to the likes of Paul Weithman and Edmond 
Santurri).33  Wary of the use of political power to coerce belief, this interpretation reduces 
the realm of politics to the publically rational in order to protect against epistemic hubris.  
The virtue of justice is put forward as the guiding light in political deliberation.  For 
Gregory, while both of these interpretations have merit they tend to avoid the essentially 
Augustinian topic of love and its place in human sociality.  Gregory’s third, and 
preferred, interpretation sees Augustinian politics as a form of civic liberalism attempting 
to overcome the thin subjects of modern liberalism according to a thicker account of 
                                                
32 Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic 
Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 82-95. 
33 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 94-107. 
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human sociality and the necessity of virtues within liberal discourse and practice.34  
Gregory joins the ranks of Jean Bethke Elshtain and Oliver O’Donovan in linking 
Augustine’s social ontology of moral motivation to a robust liberalism focused on more 
than just sin.  Indeed, this version of Augustinian politics emphasizes the virtue of love 
within politics as a means toward expressing a more holistic account of human nature.  
 These interpretations, however, are not the only forms of political Augustinianism 
with which Gregory must deal.  A fourth Augustinian interpretation deploys Augustine 
against liberalism.  Gregory’s main target here is the work of John Milbank.35  Gregory 
agrees with Milbank about placing love at the center of Augustine’s political thought, and 
he agrees with Milbank that Augustine’s theological anthropology is essentially a social 
ontology opening toward transcendence.  But he disagrees that this entails a focus on 
ecclesiology to the exclusion of a broader political theory.  Gregory worries that Milbank 
conflates Christology into ecclesiology rather than highlighting the “interruptive 
character of the Augustinian Christ.”36  Gregory’s contention is that an Augustinian 
defense of civic liberalism does not entail a theological capitulation to secular reason.  
There is no capitulation because an Augustinian Christology of love bridges the divide 
between a liberal love of others and a theological love of God.  The constructive part of 
his project is positioned around Hannah Arendt’s criticisms of Augustine’s political 
thought.  To this criticism we will turn before examining Gregory’s interpretation of 
Augustine. 
 
Augustine’s Political Vice: Against Love 
                                                
34 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 107-125. 
35 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 125-48. 
36 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 131-32. 
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 Gregory focuses on Arendt because she both questions the appropriateness of love 
as a political category, and specifically investigates Augustine on this account.  For her, 
love is a political vice best kept away from social deliberations.  Arendt “challenges the 
political implications of both divine love and the goodness of love itself—finding in 
neither the capacity for action nor mutual respect.”37  In many respects Arendt is carrying 
forward the project of Kantian disinterestedness in regard to political motivation.  
Gregory sees Arendt offering a two-pronged criticism of love as a political category in 
regard to others and God, presenting a major objection to Gregory’s overall project. 
 In the first place, Arendt worries that solidarity and mutual respect are lost when 
love enters into the calculus of political deliberation.  Love is too intimate, too 
passionate, and too partial to produce a politics of equality.  Love is too often the hidden 
font of human cruelty.38  She is indebted to a Kantian liberalism that contrasts the 
dispassionate reason needed for public politics from the private passions of individuals.  
In this scheme love is pushed into the realm of private ethics while reason can reign in 
the sphere of public politics.  It is Arendt’s contention that this is exactly the problem 
with Christian love in that it abandons politics of reason for an ethics of love that easily 
slides into a self-love through others.  For Arendt, “love becomes self-consuming of 
politics, legitimates violence, and therefore cannot ground an ethics of liberal citizenship 
that respects the separateness of person.”39  Love, therefore, fails to secure solidarity and 
equality in the political realm.  
                                                
37 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 198. 
38 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 208-209. 
39 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love,  218. 
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 Matters become even worse, however, when love is connected to a divine source.  
If love was faulty as a political category in general, it becomes downright dangerous 
when related to God.  Arendt sees the Christian pursuit of God as making a desert out of 
the world generally, and, specifically, reducing neighbor-love to an instrument of God-
love.  The monolithic love for God overwhelms and devalues all that is not-God.40  
Arendt worries that rather than grounding neighbor love within divine love as its 
transcendent source, divine love only makes neighbor-love a form of self-love in one’s 
ascent to God.  The ultimate exemplification of this is the Incarnation.  Rather than the 
perfect expression of love for neighbor, the Incarnation is a betrayal of neighbor-love in 
that God-as-neighbor (Jesus, the Incarnate God-man) evacuates the inherent significance 
of neighbor qua neighbor and makes the neighbor an instrumental step toward God-love.   
Gregory contends, however, that Arendt too quickly dismisses love as a political 
category instead of entering into the hard work of discriminating between well ordered 
and poorly ordered loves. Rather than abandoning love all together, Gregory turns to 
Augustine as offering an account of properly ordered love that actually elevates the 
neighbor and properly motivates civic liberalism.  This account turns on the possibility of 
connecting neighbor-love and God-love.  For Gregory, this connection is accomplished in 
the Christological union of the love commands to love God and love our neighbors.  
 
Augustine’s Political Virtue: Ordered Love 
 
 Much like Milbank was guided in his confrontation with Nietzsche, Gregory 
directs his Augustinian inquiry according to Arendt’s criticisms hoping to show 
                                                
40 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 222. 
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specifically that Augustine overcomes such problems en route to a general 
recommendation of Augustine’s account of love as a neglected resource in contemporary 
approaches to Augustine’s politics.  Gregory first tackles the problem of love as a source 
for political theory.  He then explores how love relates to God in such a way as to 
enhance rather than thwart neighbor-love.    
 
Love for Others 
 
 For Gregory, civic liberalism needs to reclaim the place of the emotions and 
passions within moral motivation and political practice.  Gregory argues that Augustine’s 
“intersubjective ontology” of creaturely dependence and other-relatedness requires a 
robust account of love as the affirmation of and openness toward others.41  For 
Augustine, “love is not a blind drive but a complex disposition that informs a way of 
being in the world.”42  But this focus on love must not slide into a romantic or 
paternalistic politics that either sentimentalizes or coerces others in the name of love.  
Humans are apt to sin through wrongly ordered loves directed toward self-love without 
relation to or in domination over others.43  This need to organize love and to form the 
character of the lover is Gregory’s primary interest.44   
This need for an organized love beyond sentimentalism compels Gregory to admit 
that the best form of an Augustinian liberalism is one where “love and sin constrain each 
other.”45  The necessity of love and sin mutually constraining each other gives rise to 
                                                
41 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 243. 
42 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 251. 
43 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 273. 
44 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 41, 56. 
45 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 245. See also 15, 30-34, 41-46. 
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some Augustinian advice for loving one’s neighbors.  Concern for one’s neighbor should 
be emblazoned by love yet chastened by sin.  This chastening should be exhibited as 
compassion fused with prudence.46  Compassion for one’s neighbor is a healthy 
emotional motivation for assisting them in their time of need.  But this compassion is 
only truly expressed if it upholds the dignity of those in need, not reducing the neighbor 
to the status of a helpless victim. Prudence is vigilant against such sinful reduction of the 
other into a mere object of compassion rather a subject of respect.  Through this 
combination of compassion and prudence love is properly ordered as a political virtue.  
Likewise, a properly ordered love is able to love all equally even while expressing this 
love as non-identical treatment.47  While Augustine claims love is universal he is also 
committed to proximity in the exercise of this love.  For Augustine, friends and local 
community are providential gifts of God through which we express the natural constraints 
of our embodied existence.  Lastly, Gregory’s Augustinian advice for loving one’s 
neighbor is a constant counsel against harm.  Augustine is ever aware of the social 
pathologies that can spring up when one’s neighbor becomes subject to “the false 
autonomy of the self’s egoism.”48  It is not because he devalues the neighbor (as Arendt 
fears), but exactly because he value neighbor love so much that Augustine refuses the 
neighbor qua neighbor as an object before the self.  The autonomous self cannot be trust 
with such an object without good turning into harm, inadvertently or not.  It is exactly 
this reason that requires the coupling of neighbor love to God love in Augustine, not as 
                                                
46 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 292-94 
47 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 294-96. 
48 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 297. 
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an other-worldly escape but as a way to affirm the neighbor within the “conceptual role 
of love for God.”49 
 
Love for God 
 
Gregory desires to show that love of God protects the neighbor from the 
instrumentalization of sin.  This is accomplished by understanding the love of others 
within a love for God.  Against the much maligned distinction between use (uti) and 
enjoyment (frui) which seems to place neighbors within the sphere of objects to be used 
on the way to enjoying God, Gregory seeks to rehabilitate this distinction as the only way 
to properly respect the neighbor.  To love one’s neighbor for oneself is a perversion of 
love.  But to love one’s neighbor in God is to properly love the neighbor as a created 
being ordered toward the source of all being.  This is essentially a social vision of 
neighbor love connected to an all-encompassing vision of God.50 
The connection, for Gregory, between neighbor love and God love (between uti 
and frui) is Christological.  Through the Incarnation there is an ethical and ontological 
relation between God and the world opening up the possibility of enjoying God’s gifts in 
creation.  This possibility is only maintained if this enjoyment is properly ordered toward 
God.  For Augustine, “to love God is to love the whole of creation existing in God.  The 
love for God is expressed in an ordered love that loves God in loving God’s world.”51  
Though loving God by loving the world we see that love for God is always world 
affirming through an “immanent teleology” of ordered love based in the Christological 
                                                
49 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 320. 
50 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 335-43. 
51 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 323. 
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reality that God has become “the neighbor of humanity.”52  Because of the Incarnation 
“true love of self is now itself taken into the intersubjective triune love of God.  It is this 
participatory love that frees the self from its own needy self-enclosure.”53   Because of 
this participatory love the “Incarnation issues a challenge to any form of deistic or 
Neoplatonic ontology that perpetuates a competitive tournament of loves between God 
and the world.”54  Neighbor-love and God-love are Christologically non-competitively.   
This Christological non-competitive relation creates the unity of the two love 
commands.  That Christ has become the neighbor of humanity is not the ultimate 
reduction of the neighbor, as Arendt thought.  Rather, Christology is the manner in which 
the command to love God and to love one’s neighbor are united without reduction of 
either.  Christology, for Gregory, is the theological ground allowing for a politically 
useful appropriation of love in Augustine.  This Christological ground allows for the 
tension (mutual constraint) between love and sin that affirms creation generally and 
neighbor love specifically, even while seeking to order this love toward God as a check 
against sinful domination.  Within this tension is a space for “vulnerable encounters with 
others that is characteristic of liberal politics.”55  As Gregory says, “Christology shapes a 
way of seeing the world that offers insights for political citizenship” because  
Christology is both the form and substance of Augustinian theology.  To put it 
bluntly, Book 10 of the City of God is the basic text for Augustinian politics: the 
heart of Augustine’s account of the true worship of the crucified God and the 
charitable service of neighbor in collective caritas.56 
 
                                                
52 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 327. 
53 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 329. 
54 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 330. 
55 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 362. 
56 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 379. 
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This “collective caritas” issuing beyond ecclesial walls into the world, ordered around 
love of God, is the basis of an Augustinian civil liberalism that opens onto a fuller 
account of humanity in the world, with others, and before God.  The self-immanenting 
transcendence of God exhibited Christologically is the basis of an Augustinian account of 
a politics of love offering conceptual resources to civil liberalism. 
 
Evaluation 
 
 The depth and breath of Gregory’s engagement with criticisms and 
misunderstanding of Augustine’s political theory is stunning and appreciated.  Drawing 
widely from the work of others, Gregory rejects the notion that Neoplatonism tilted 
Augustine toward an other-worldly escape and skillfully shows that Stoicism did not 
render Augustine’s anthropology void of emotional connection, all without abandoning 
Augustine’s essentially eudaimonistic vision.57  Overcoming these objections Gregory 
weaves together an anthropology of love through the Christological union of divine and 
human love.  And yet he keeps in mind the deleterious effects of sin as corrupted desire, 
leading to an understanding of the necessity of mutual constraint of love and sin.  In these 
ways Gregory has offered a compelling interpretation and application of Augustine’s 
account of love for the rehabilitation of civic liberalism, recovering love as a potent 
motivational aspect within political theory. 
                                                
57 In that they were printed in the same year, Gregory does not engage Nicholas 
Wolterstorff’s Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 
where Wolterstorff argues that Augustine was not a eudaemonist (see 180-206). 
Wolterstorff sides with Nygren’s separation of eros and agape and reads Augustine’s 
abandonment of the uti/frui distinction in City of God as proof of Augustine’s movement 
away from an eros based eudaemonism for a rights based ethic. 
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 The of recovering of love as a political category by emphasizing properly 
‘ordered love’ leaves one question hanging, which Gregory never answers.  How exactly 
is love properly ordered?  Much space is spent arguing that love can and should be a 
political virtue because when it is properly ordered it creates space for mutual respect and 
compassion.  Much space is devoted to showing how a properly ordered love is 
conceptually possible given the Christological union of the love commands.  But scarcely 
any time is given to explaining how disordered loves can become ordered loves.  Gregory 
makes vague reference to the need for moral and spiritual formation, a “kind of askesis” 
through which “the self must learn to love rightly.”58  But the manner in which the self 
undergoes such formation is left to the side.   
 Of course Gregory could object that the book he intended to write did not contain 
such questions within its scope because he was writing to recommend Augustine before a 
skeptical audience.  This could be true.  But the centrality that Gregory places on 
Christology makes this a fair question.  For Augustine, it is exactly through 
Christological mediation that humanity is re-ordered in its loves.  In his concern to show 
how Christology unites divine and human love Gregory downplays the actual mediator of 
Christ in securing justice and love within the city of God.  Gregory is explicit that he 
wants to move the center of gravity for political Augustinians from book 19 of City of 
God to book 10.  His focus on book 10, however, is merely another instance of uniting 
divine (worship) and human (works of mercy) love.  Gregory omits the specifically 
soteriological work of Christ’s mediation between God and humanity within the 
sacramental practice of the Eucharist.  As we will see in chapter six, it is precisely these 
                                                
58 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 22.  See also 48, 263, and 274. 
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soteriological aspects of Augustine that allow for the proper ordering of love such that 
works of mercy might be accomplished in the world. 
The focus for Gregory is on the ontological guarantee of Christ’s two natures as 
the means by which the political virtue of love can be directed both toward God and 
humanity.  Gregory persistently emphasizes the ontological order between love of God 
and neighbor without adequately investigating the soteriological ordering of such love.  
In other words, Gregory neglects the soteriological how of such ordering in his emphasis 
on the ontological what of such an order (the soteriological how of a converted will and 
the how of justice and love are the topics of chapters five and six, respectively).   
 
Conclusion 
 
 As we have seen, Milbank offers an Augustinian theology that overcomes a 
secular reason that seeks to subordinate the Church.  Milbank shows how true critique 
and change only come through a counter-ontology of peace. The focus on a counter-
ontology and its counter-narrative are applauded as a means of reintroducing God’s 
transcendence with the immanence of secular reason.  However, as noted above, arguing 
that Christianity makes possible an alternative social formation is not the same as 
showing how such a formation comes to be.  This oversight reduces Augustine to more of 
a philosophical theologian focused on ontology.  This lack of focus on the soteriological 
how leads to a rather thin account of how political subjects actually are formed through 
the mediation of Christ.   
Similarly, Gregory also focuses on the ontological aspects of Augustine, but now 
not antagonistically related to liberalism. Instead, Gregory focuses on the ontology of 
  
 
191 
properly ordered love and sees Christology as the key to integrating love for God and 
love for neighbor.  As mentioned above, as laudable as this is, it altogether neglects the 
process of re-ordering love away from self-love to love of God and love of neighbor.  By 
only focusing on ‘ordered love’ to the neglect of the process of ‘ordering love’, Gregory 
again leads toward a thin account of political subjectivity because he has failed to account 
for the transformation of subjects from self-love to God- and neighbor-love.  The 
possibility of such a transformation animates so much of Augustine’s theology that its 
neglect is glaring (again these points will be substantiated in the following two chapters). 
Moving through Milbank and Gregory’s interpretations of Augustine has helped 
us begin to see the differences in orientation between Augustine and Hegel.  Both 
Milbank and Gregory rely on a fundamental distinction between Creator and creation, a 
distinction Hegel refuses.  For Milbank, God interrupts the immanent realm of secular 
reason.  This Christological interruption within history allows for both critique and 
change, even if Milbank focuses more on the ontological aspects allowing for critique of 
ontological violence according to an ontology of peace, rather than focusing on the actual 
subjects of change (how they are changed and how they effect change).  For Gregory, in 
Christ God unifies neighbor-love and God-love such that transcendence and immanence 
are non-competitively related without reduction of one into the other.  This unification 
breaks apart a pernicious self-love and its immanent orientation.  Milbank and Gregory, 
each in their own way, begin outlining an Augustinian theological orientation beyond 
Hegel’s self-transcending immanence.  The purpose of the next two chapters is to fill out 
this theological orientation that takes God’s self-immanenting transcendence seriously.  
Against humanity’s self-transcending immanence articulated by Hegel, it will be shown 
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that God’s self-immanenting transcendence offers more coherent resources for 
conceptualizing a political subject capable of critique and change. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONVERSION AND FREEDOM: CONFESSIONS 
 
That is the sum of it: not to will what I willed and to will what you willed.1 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter revealed an Augustine deployed to either bolster or disrupt 
certain forms of liberalism, each with its own theological agenda. Milbank and Gregory 
agree in emphasizing the importance of transcendence for understanding Augustine’s 
political thought, a transcendence offering resources to either overcome the nihilism of 
modernity or the lack of neighbor-love in liberalism.  But in their affirmation of 
transcendence Milbank and Gregory seemed to emphasize the ontological aspects to the 
detriment of the soteriological aspects of Augustine’s thought. 
The next two chapters seek to show that because Augustine integrates ontology 
and soteriology he is able to provide a basis for both social criticism and substantial 
change (something Hegel was unable to achieve).  Indeed, when looked at with less of a 
concern to critique or consolidate liberalism, Augustine proves sufficiently capable of 
resisting the dichotomies of subject and society, offering an integrated moral psychology 
and social theory.  He is capable of doing so because of his openness to a transcendence 
not assimilated to the self-transcending immanence of human thought.  Rather, because 
of God’s self-immanenting transcendence Augustine can conceive of the subject opening 
(or being opened) beyond itself to others and God, breaking the weight of habits and the 
                                                
1 conf. 9.1.1. 
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customs of prideful domination.2  The intervention of transcendences within the 
immanence of subjectivity and the immanence of societal practices is the means by which 
each is integrated together and while also being drawn out of its own self-absorption. 
This chapter, then, will investigate how Augustine integrates the self and the 
social practices through a reading of his Confessions, while the next chapter examines the 
City of God and its concerns with society.  As we will see, while there are certain 
congruencies between Hegel and Augustine regarding the subject and society, Augustine 
is keen to show not only how a subject expresses its freedom within a given society, but 
rather how a subject transitions between societies, one society given over to an enslaved 
will and an alternative society where the will is free.  In the City of God these two 
societies are the earthly and heavenly cities.  But within the Confessions the primary 
focus is the division within the will itself.   
By emphasizing the process of transition we will see how Augustine complexifies 
Hegel’s account of subject and society by adding the issue of change from one society to 
another.  This raises the questions of how someone moves from a subjective formation 
established within one set of social practices to an alternative subjective formation and its 
social practices.  Does the subject first change her mind and then enter an alternative 
society? Or is one introduced into this alternative society before the accompanying 
subjectivity is formed by it?  Can the subject merely decide to change her subjective 
formation? And, if the alternative society comes first, and if this alternative is so different 
then how can we account for the subject being drawn to this alternative in the first place?  
                                                
2 As when I introduced ‘self-transcending immanence to describe Hegel’s philosophy, at 
this point ‘self-immanenting transcendence’ is used as a heuristic devise receiving 
justification only at the end of my exposition of Augustine. 
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These are the types of questions Hegel (via Pippin and Žižek) could not answers, if they 
even bothered to raise them.  Of course all these questions are far from the regular idiom 
of Augustine and the conceptual constellations by which he navigates.  However, in 
examining his understanding of the bondage and then freedom of the will, the importance 
of this Augustinian orientation will become clear in offering answers to questions such as 
these. 
The first section of this chapter will focus on the conversion of the will and God’s 
providential intervention.  This section will cover this terrain by discussing the nature and 
causes of the divided will, concluding with the famous garden scene of Augustine’s 
conversion.  The second section will deepen this seemingly solitary account of subjective 
conversion by elucidating how Augustine skillfully reveals the social aspects of his 
conversion.  Here it will be shown that his conversion is better thought as equally 
Augustine’s entrance into an alternative society as it is God’s miraculous intervention.  It 
is the coordination between this alternative society and God’s providence that converts 
Augustine’s will.  The last section will explore the cosmological and Christological 
foundation from which Augustine builds his account of conversion, making explicit the 
importance of God’s self-immanenting transcendence in integrating an account of 
subjective and social conversion. 
 
Augustine and the Subject 
 
 But to finish the introduction of this chapter I have to return to a question raised in 
the general introduction.  Namely, is there really an Augustinian subject comparable to 
Hegel’s subject?  Investigating Augustine’s theory of the subject often seems like the 
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most natural thing to do.  Did he not create the autobiographical genre?  Was he not 
obsessed with the inner life, retreating from the world?  Did he not grant the centrality of 
subjectivity to Western philosophy?  These questions are commonly answered in the 
affirmative.  But as with Hegel, we must problematize the received tradition and ask 
whether or not Augustine should indeed be thought to have set Western philosophy and 
theology on its solitary journey inward.   
  
The Inward Turn 
 
Those who see Augustine as a central figure in developing the concept of the self 
or subjectivity are legion.  Charles Taylor, in his influential Sources of the Self, suggests 
“on the way from Plato to Descartes stands Augustine.”3  For Taylor, Augustine is the 
turning point between the ancient and modern understanding of the subject.  Augustine 
continues the Platonic oppositions between spirit and matter, higher and lower, eternal 
and temporal, and immutable and changeable.  But these are now re-described 
“essentially in terms of inner/outer” such that rather than looking up for Plato, Augustine 
looks in.4  This inward turn, according to Taylor, shifts from the objects known to the 
activity of knowing such that “to look towards this activity is to look at the self, to take 
up a reflexive stance.”5  Inaugurating this reflexive stance vaults Augustine into the 
milieu of Descartes and modern subjectivity.  As Taylor says, “It is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that it was Augustine who introduced the inwardness of radical 
                                                
3 Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 127. 
4 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 129. 
5 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 130. 
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reflexivity and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of thought.”6  Especially in 
philosophical contexts, but even in theology, scholars often assume that Augustine is as 
concerned with the ‘self’ and ‘subjectivity’ as modern philosophy. 
From within this reflexive stance Augustine can doubt everything but his own 
existence on his way to proving the existence of God.  This reflexive stance offers a 
process of seeking the certainty of God within the certainty of self-presence.7  Cutting 
memory from its Platonic roots in a prenatal vision of the Ideas, Augustine lays the 
groundwork for the development of innate ideas.  And severing volition from reason and 
desire, Augustine is the first to develop the notion of the will.8  Because Augustine’s 
notion of the will cannot be reduced to reason or intellectual vision the will itself 
becomes the center of moral responsibility.9  Both as intellectual self-presence and as the 
center of moral responsibly, the inward self of the Western tradition springs from 
Augustine’s genius.10 
 
                                                
6 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 131. 
7 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 140. 
8 Here Taylor is drawing from Albrecht Dilhe, The Theory of the Will in Classical 
Antiquity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), and Charles 
H. Kahn, “Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine,” in The Question of 
“Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, eds. J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
9 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 138-39. 
10 For an extended summary and critique of Taylor’s views on Plato, Augustine, and 
Descartes see Thomas Harmon’s “Reconsidering Charles Taylor’s Augustine” in Pro 
Ecclesia 20/2 (2011): 185-209, and Michael Hanby, Augustine and Modernity (New 
York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 6-12. This priority of the inward turn connected to Plato and 
then Neoplatonism is enlarged in the work of Robert O’Connell and Philip Cary, and 
related to Descartes by Stephen Menn.  See Robert J. O’Connell, St. Augustine's 
Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989); Stephen 
Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Phillip 
Cary, Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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The Inward Enigma 
 
 But is this really the case?  Does Augustine talk about the ‘self and ‘subjectivity’ 
as a proto-modern, or has a modern fixation been projected onto Augustine?  For John 
Cavadini, too often “the claim that Augustine thinks of, talks about, has theories of, or 
discovers something called ‘the self’ seems so self-evident that it recedes from view 
precisely as a claim in need of argument.”11 He finds fault for this common assumption in 
the English translations of Augustine that emphasize the “inner self” rather than the more 
literal “inner man” or “inner human being” when translating Augustine’s interior homo 
or interirois hominis mei.12  Another translation issue occurs with the overuse of reflexive 
pronoun “such as ‘myself,’ ‘yourself,’ and ‘oneself’ that sound like possessive pronouns 
plus the noun ‘self.’”13 This overuse of reflexive pronouns creates the illusion that 
Augustine is examining some stable, interior reality beyond the shifting external world. 
This purported inner self as a stable interior reality glimpsed by the inward gaze is readily 
consumed by modern philosophy.   
Cavadini also sees these problems compounded by a cursory reading of 
Augustine’s use of the ‘interior human’ in opposition to the ‘external human’, such that 
the former is thought to be the stable, immaterial soul which gazes about its inner space 
and the later is the unstable, material body caught up in the lesser things of the world.  
But this dichotomy overlooks the intended similarity between the two where the inner 
human is given full sensuality (it looks, tastes, feels) such that the “‘interior homo’ is just 
                                                
11 John C. Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma: Reconsidering the Self in Augustine’s 
Thought.” Augustinian Studies 38/1 (2007), 119 (emphasis in original).  
12 Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma,” 120-21. 
13 Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma,” 121. 
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as incomplete as the ‘exterior homo,’ and just as needy—its senses in need of just as 
much correction and re-orientation as that of the exterior human.”14 Cavadini also notes 
that while Augustine certainly does speak of an inner self-awareness, this self-awareness 
is not a stable possession, but a constant 
struggle, a brokenness, a gift, a process of healing, a resistance to healing, an 
emptiness, a reference that impels one not to concentrate on oneself, in the end, 
but on that to which one’s self-awareness propels one, to God.15   
 
As we will see below, Augustine does not so much offer a stable conscious entity, but a 
self-awareness constantly in need of re-creation.  In this sense, whatever might be called 
subjectivity for Augustine is more like the impossibility of closure and stability.16 
If there is a self to be found in the writings of Augustine, it would be better 
identified with the prideful self of the philosophers who seem to know the homeland (of 
God) without knowing the way (Christ).17 The reified structure of philosophical pride 
thinks itself inwardly stable and self-identical even while in reality it is incoherent and 
self-contradictory.18  But beyond this pride of the philosophers is the plight of everyone 
possessing a ‘divided self’ and seeking re-integration.  This re-integration, however, is 
precisely not through the power or stability of one’s own ‘self’ but by coming into a 
proper relation with God the Creator.  Through this relation to God Augustine effectively 
“inverts the subject” by “developing a notion of interiority which is circumscribed by 
exteriority,” a transcendent exteriority condescending to the human situation.19 
                                                
14 Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma,” 124. 
15 Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma,” 123. 
16 Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma,” 124. 
17 Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma,” 127. 
18 Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma,” 127. 
19 Jon Mackenzie, “Subjectivity as a Methodology in Augustine’s Confessions,” 
Augustinian Studies 40/2 (2009), 207. 
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 With all this in mind I will use ‘self’ and ‘subject’ in as non-committal a manner 
as Augustine uses ‘heart,’ ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ and ‘will’ as he search to find rest in God, not 
investing in them too much inherent ontological weight, but instead measuring them by 
their proximity or distance from God.  As we will see, just as much as Hegel, Augustine 
longs to be at-home-with-oneself, but finds this to mean something drastically different 
than that offered by a self-legislating freedom (be it through social practices or subjective 
acts).  We will trace such a conception of the self through a reading of Augustine’s 
Confessions by looking, first, at the conversion of the will in book 8, a locus classicus for 
discussing Augustine’s moral psychology.  Then we will deepen this account of 
conversion by examining the oft forgotten social elements in Augustine’s account of his 
conversion.  We will conclude by looking at how Augustine integrates the subjective and 
the social within a cosmological, and thus Christological, orientation.  All throughout 
reference will be made to Augustine’s understanding of God’s self-immanenting 
transcendence. 
 
1. Conversion of the Will: Conflict and Intervention 
 
We have already encountered paradoxical understandings of freedom.  Rousseau 
declared that people must be “forced to be free” and Hegel claimed that freedom comes 
through state institutions.  Both run counter to the dominant theory of freedom as non-
interference.  Augustine likewise offers an understanding of freedom that is equally 
paradoxical for modern readers.  For Augustine, as Charles Mathewes says, the “self is 
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most free when it is determined by God” exactly because “grace is freedom.”20  
Contemporary philosophers may think Augustine lacks the basic (modern) intuition that 
freedom of the will consists in the power of choice between alternatives and that such 
determination by God is a lack of freedom.  But Augustine could just as well counter that 
contemporary philosophers lack the basic (ancient) intuition that freedom of the will 
consists in willing the good.21  Because Augustine has such a different understanding of 
freedom the significance of his notion of the will is often lost, being reduced to the 
dubious status of precursor to or progenitor of the modern conception of the will. 
This loss of a true appreciation of Augustine’s moral psychology occurs because, 
just as with the concept of the ‘self,’ interpreters come to Augustine with a presupposed 
theory of the will as that which can choose between alternatives.  As Albreht Dihle 
claims, it is “generally accepted in the study of the history of philosophy that the notion 
of will…was invented by St. Augustine.”22  According to Dihle Augustine did not derive 
his theory of the will from any earlier philosophical doctrines, but broke with classical 
intellectualist understandings by making the human will “prior to and independent of the 
act of intellectual cognition.”23  More recent scholarship has toned down the strong claim 
to originality, finding that Augustine cobbles together his theory of the will from multiple 
                                                
20 Charles Mathewes, “Augustinian Anthropology: Interior intimo meo.” Journal of 
Religious Ethics 27/2 (1999): 195, 203. 
21 James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 221-222. 
22 Dihle, The Theory of Will, 123. 
23 Dihle, The Theory of Will, 127. 
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sources.24  But for many philosophical engagements with Augustine, Dihle’s conclusion 
still holds:  
St. Augustine’s essential contribution to the development of the medieval and 
modern notion of will has to be seen in the wider context of the change from the 
ontological to a psychological approach to religion and ethics which he initiated.25 
 
And Augustine appears to confirm this in his earlier writings on the will (from his early 
dialogues up to De libero arbitrio) where he seems to pursue a more strictly 
psychological approach. 
But many have begun to question this typical account of Augustine’s theory of the 
will as merely the ability to choose between alternatives against reason or desire.26  The 
real question for Augustine is not whether one has a will but what it might be to say that 
the will is free.  To have a will is to possess the ability of free choice between 
alternatives.  But the free choice of the will is not necessarily freedom.  To have a free 
will is to love and delight in doing the good. Mary Clark makes this point succinctly: 
“Without the distinction that Augustine made between human choice and human freedom 
                                                
24 See Kahn, “Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine,” pp. 234-59; Michael 
Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011), 153-174; Sarah Byers, “The Meaning of Voluntas in Augustine.” 
Augustinian Studies 37/2 (2006): 172-190. 
25 Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, 132. 
26 See James Wetzel, “Will and Interiority in Augustine: Travels in an Unlikely Place,” 
Augustinian Studies 33:2 (2002): ; J.M. Rist, “Augustine: Freedom, Love and Intention”, 
in Il Mistero del Male e la Libertà Possibile (IV): Ripensare Agostino, eds. Luigi Alici, 
Remo Piccolomini, and Antonio Pieretti (Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 
1997) 7-21; T. D. J. Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of 
Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).  Before 
these are the work of Mary T. Clark, Augustine: Philosopher of Freedom, A Study in 
Comparative Philosophy (New York: Desclée Company, 1958) and Etienne Gilson, The 
Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. By L. E. M. Lynch (New York: Random 
House, 1960/1943), who similarly problematize the all too quick reduction of the will to 
free choice. 
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(arbitium voluntatis and libertas), his doctrine of freedom [is] incomprehensible.”27  Free 
choice is a good faculty of humanity used either for good or evil.  But human freedom 
entails the use of this faculty directed toward and delighting in the good, for true freedom 
(libertas) is merely the good use of free choice (liberum arbitrium).28  Anticipating the 
argument below, it could be said that “the wrong use of free will is only an apparent 
freedom; it is actually a descent into slavery.”29  While descending into this slavery, free 
choice is retained even while freedom is lost (the freedom to choice the good).  And 
when grace is applied to the will, it is not the case that free choice is overturned or 
cancelled.  Rather, through grace free choice is retained while true freedom regained.30  
For Augustine, then, to talk of a free will is not merely to speak about the good human 
faculty of free choice between alternatives but also the good use of this faculty to choose 
the good. 
Because of this necessary distinction I will generally refrain from speaking of 
‘free will’ because it obscures the difference between the free choice of the will and 
freedom of the will, the latter of which is Augustine’s true concern even if he generally 
equates will (voluntas) with free choice (liberum arbitrium).  The difficulty of speaking 
about the Augustinian will comes from the fact that the will is not as it should be.  Every 
human will is always in process, moving between a bondage to sin and a longing for 
freedom.  It is exactly within this movement that interpreters often lose the thread of 
                                                
27 Clark, Augustine: Philosopher of Freedom, 91.  See also her introductory statement on 
page 45 and attending list of passages from Augustine in the first note. 
28 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 161-63; Clark, Augustine: 
Philosopher of Freedom, 82. 
29 Mary T. Clark, Augustine: Philosopher of Freedom, A Study in Comparative 
Philosophy (New York: Desclée Company, 1958), 87. 
30 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 161. 
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Augustine’s argument.  The movement from bondage to sin (and its attending society) to 
the freedom of grace (and its alternative society) is not a movement from free choice 
(having a will) to determination by God (losing one’s will).  Free choice is assumed on 
both ends of the movement from slavery to freedom. 
 But untangling these issues is a difficult and demanding process.  As Clark notes, 
“The only just way of representing Augustine’s doctrine on freedom is the simultaneous 
confrontation of what he said about free choice in the De Libero Arbitrio with what he 
said about freedom in the writings against the Pelagians and with what he experienced of 
free choice and freedom as related in the Confessions.”31  Along with Mary Clark, James 
Wetzel and T. D. J Chappell have attempted such a detailed reading.32  But for the 
purposes of this chapter we will focus on the Confessions and its depiction of the 
movement from the bondage to the freedom of the will through a reading of Augustine’s 
moral struggle as it is depicted in book 8 of his Confessions.  In our first pass through 
Augustine’s conversion account we will focus on the nature of Augustine’s divided will 
through a close reading of the last sentence of Confessions 8.5.10.  This reading will give 
opportunity to see the development of Augustine’s conception of the will, the causes of 
the divided will, and the movement of God in resolving this conflict.   
 
The Two Wills 
 
 After hearing the story of Victorinus’ conversion, told by Simplicianus, Augustine 
declares, “Thus did my two wills, the one old, the other new, the first carnal, and the 
                                                
31 Clark, Augustine: Philosopher of Freedom, 83. 
32 Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue; Chappell Aristotle and Augustine on 
Freedom. 
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second spiritual, contend with one another, and by their conflict they laid waste my soul” 
(conf. 8.5.10).33  This cry of despair, setting up the problem of book 8, is only finally 
resolved as Augustine reads a passage from Romans and at once “it was as if a light of 
relief from all anxiety flooded into my heart” (conf. 8.12.30).  Between these two 
exclamations is a wasteland of conflicts, a war of wills within a solitary soul. 
 Before writing his Confessions, when considering the will, Augustine seemed 
solely concerned with a psychology of ‘free choice.’  In his early polemics against 
Manichean dualism Augustine advanced an understanding of the will that seem to 
function sui generis.  Along with their cosmology, the moral dilemma of akrasia 
prompted the Manicheans to posit two warring souls (one evil/dark, one good/light) 
within each human being.  Whether intended or not, the positing of two warring souls 
tended to naturalize evil as a part of the world and therefore neutralize moral culpability.  
Against this dualism Augustine argues for the unity of the soul by granting the will the 
ability to either pursue evil or do good.  In De duabus animabus Augustine defines the 
will as the uncompelled, or uncoerced movement of the mind to either obtain or retain 
some thing or some action.  Within this definition sin is an exercise of the will to obtain 
or retain what is forbidden.34  The problem is that when Augustine tries “to ‘denaturalize 
sin’ and virtue in De duabus animabus, he adds to our nature the sui generis power of 
volition and threatens to sever our actions from their motivations,” ending with a 
definition of the will as free choice between alternatives.35 
                                                
33 ita duae voluntates meae, una vetus, alia nova, illa carnalis, illa spiritalis, confligebant 
inter se atque discordando dissipabant animam meam. Translation by John K. Ryan, The 
Confessions of St. Augustine, (New York: Image Press, 1960). 
34 duab. an., 10.14. 
35 James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 93. 
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Augustine could not quit resolve the problem this sui generis conception of the 
will created within his generally ‘intellectualist’ framework of cognition.36  This problem 
is seen in his more extended treatment of the will in De libero arbitrio.37  In this work 
Augustine seeks to link a Stoic conception of willing (more spontaneous in nature) to a 
Platonic order of immaterial objects of delight, producing an uneasy synthesis between 
the two that seems to crumble later in the text.  At the end we see Augustine claiming 
both that (1) “nothing is so much within our power as the will itself…and since it is in 
our power, we are free with respect to it” and (2) that “only something that is seen can 
incite the will to act.”38  Here Augustine is caught between the will as either independent 
of a motivating framework or the will drawn along by the beatific vision.  
 These aporias compel Augustine to abandon beginning with a psychology of sin 
when discussing evil, freedom, and God.   Rather than making ‘sheer volition’ the key for 
unlocking Augustine’s view of the will and then reading it forward into later works like 
the Confessions, we must take the question of the will as problematically posed as only 
free choice in his early works.  By the time we get to the Confessions (with hints already 
in De duabus animabus and De libero arbitrio) Augustine is not asking about the free 
choice of the will but the fact of two warring wills within one soul.  This is the contrast 
between free choice and freedom itself.  For Augustine, we can not ask about the 
                                                
36 I agree with Chappell who says, “The tradition has it, apparently that Augustine is a 
thoroughgoing ‘voluntarist’ who occasionally makes remarks which can be 
misinterpreted as ‘rationalist’.  I am arguing that, on the contrary, Augustine is a 
thoroughgoing ‘rationalist’ who occasionally makes remarks which can be misinterpreted 
as ‘voluntarist’” (Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom, 201). 
37 Wetzel investigates these shifting and overlapping developments in detail in Augustine 
and the Limits of Virtue, 45-98.  See also Clark, Augustine: Philosopher of Freedom, 45-
81, who perhaps downplays the development too much.  
38 De libero arbitrio 3.3 and 3.25. 
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psychology of the will (voluntas) without also asking about the two wills (duae 
voluntates) because the will is always divided against itself causing Augustine to cry out 
in anguish at 8.5.10.  But what are these two will and where did they come from? 
 
The Old and New Will 
 
 Augustine calls these two wills (duae voluntates) the old (vetus) and new (nova). 
Here Augustine is alluding to Ephesians 4:22-24 and Colossians 3:9-10 which speak of 
putting off the old self with its desires and putting on the new self.39  The old will of 
which Augustine refers is the will to sin, or more precisely, the will to desire sin.  This is 
exemplified in the pear theft in book 2, alluding to the sin of Adam and Eve.  As 
Augustine says,  
I wanted to carry out an act of theft and did so, driven by no kind of need…My desire 
was to enjoy not what I sought by stealing but merely the excitement of thieving and 
the doing of what was wrong…I became evil for no reason.  I had no motive for my 
wickedness except wickedness itself…I loved the self-destruction, I loved my fall, 
not the object for which I had fallen but my fall itself (conf. 2.4.9) 
 
Augustine willed to be evil without purpose and without cause, without intention or aim.  
This old will is both unhinged from material desire and reason, desiring only its own 
privation.  Rather than offering an explanation for the willing or the desire for sin, 
Augustine examines the mystery of it all.  Elsewhere he has characterized sin as the 
pursuit of lesser good (immediately in Conf. 2.5.10-11 and earlier in De libero arbitrio 
1.16), which, although misguided, still seeks a certain good as its reason and motive.  But 
here Augustine narrates a desire without utility or purpose.  
                                                
39 James O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, Latin Text with English Commentary. 3 
vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3:33. 
  
 
208 
 This mystery of sin, however, is not the end of the story of the old will.  The 
origin of sin may be a mystery but its effects are well known.  The old will is old 
precisely because it endures from the past into the present as the accumulation of past 
decisions.  The old will is the accumulation of past evil willing, producing ignorance and 
difficulty in presently willing the good.  Before Confessions, Augustine claimed that this 
accumulation becomes the “resistance of carnal habit, which develops almost naturally 
because of the unruliness of our mortal inheritance,”40 a “habit formed by connection 
with the flesh and our sins” which “begin to militate against us and to put obstacles in our 
way.”41  In these earlier works it seems as though reason and will could cause one to “let 
go of the deadly charm of destructive habits” through a discipline of virtue.42  But in 
Confessions this hope is forsaken because habit is now seen as binding the will in strong 
chains.  As Augustine says in the same paragraph before our text: 
I sighed after such freedom, but was bound not by an iron imposed by anyone else 
but by the iron of my own choice.  The enemy had a grip on my will and so made 
a chain for me to hold me a prisoner.  The consequence of a distorted will 
(voluntate peruersa) is passion (libido).  By servitude to passion, habit 
(consuetudo) is formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes 
necessity.  By these links as it were, connected one to another (hence my term a 
chain), a harsh bondage held me under restraint. (conf. 8.5.10)43 
 
This bondage comes not from an external source for this would violate the principle that 
the will cannot be held responsible if it is coerced.  Rather, through one’s own freely 
chosen past actions one is bound to the old will as sinful habit. Because of this self-
                                                
40 lib. arb., 3.18. 
41 duab. an., 13.19. 
42 lib. arb., 3.25; duab. an.,13.21. 
43 Also, “We are dealing with a morbid condition of mind which, when it is lifted up by 
the truth, does not unreservedly rise to it but is weighed down by habit (consuetudine)” 
(8.9.21), and “So I was in conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself.  The 
dissociation came about against my will. Yet this was not a manifestation of the nature of 
an alien mind but the punishment suffered in my own nature” (8.10.22). 
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binding of free choice, Augustine held himself responsible for the current condition of 
being unfree to will the good (conf. 8.5.11). The old will then, which is the bondage of 
the will to sinful habits, is the result of the actions of a single will extended in time.  The 
warring of wills, then, is not between different wills (good and evil), nor between 
different objects of delight (temporal/sensible or eternal/intelligible), but according to the 
diverse willing of a single will accumulated through time.  As James Wetzel notes, in this 
situation  
our present state of will…includes its past states in the form of habit, and 
therefore the discrepancy between our past practices of willing and our present 
willingness for change can be expressed as volitional paralysis.44 
 
Sinful habit blocks present action based in knowledge of or desire for the good because 
“the force of habit seems to spring from desire that has lost it ratio.”45 This lost reason 
(lost to the past) is still presently binding the will.  By placing the division between the 
past and the present Augustine is able to keeps the link between willing, reason, and 
desire.  The divided will is divided between past reasons and desires in conflict with 
present reasons and desires.46 
 Now, the new (nova) will is the “will which had begun within me, to wish freely 
to worship you and find joy in you, O God, the sole sure delight” (conf. 8.5.10). This new 
will consists of willing the eternal law rather than the temporal law of one’s members 
(alluding to Romans 7:22-23) (conf. 8.5.12).  Augustine makes clear in Ad Simplicianum 
that this will is given to us by God, unlike the earlier works where Augustine seemed to 
                                                
44 Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 135. 
45 Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 137. 
46 See Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom, 154-175, where he argues for the 
consistent link between reason and voluntary action in Augustine, i.e. actions have reason 
for Augustine, even if they are not ordered toward the good. 
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suggest that one could will the good will.47  In expositing Romans 9, Augustine grapples 
with the claim that “many are called but few are chosen.”48  He claims that God must call 
people to salvation in different ways: those not chosen are called ineffectually and those 
chosen are called effectually.  As he say,  
Many, that is to say, are called in one way, but all are not affected in the same 
way; and those only follow the calling who are found fit to receive it…For God 
calls in the way that is suited to those who follow his calling. The call comes also 
to others; but because it is such that they cannot be moved by it and are not fitted 
to receive it, they can be said to be called but not chosen…Those are chosen who 
are effectually called…He calls the man on whom he has mercy in the way he 
knows will suit him, so that he will not refuse the call.49 
 
This calling is such that “having suited situation to person, God enables those called to 
acknowledge their own desire for beatitude.”50  Because of this Augustine notes, “there 
are two different things that God gives us, the power to will and the thing that we actually 
will.”51  Therefore, as he makes clear in Ad Simplicianum, while he may have earlier 
given the will the power to choose the new or good will, after answering Simplicianus’ 
questions (and here expressed in the Confessions) the new will is only given to us by 
God.  As we will see shortly, this gifted nova will is masterfully recounted in the Garden 
scene where all talk of Augustine’s will vanishes and we see him transformed in his 
reading of Romans 13:13-14 (conf. 8.12.29).  Indeed, at the beginning of book nine 
Augustine comments that through all his long years his own free will (i.e. free choice) 
could not turn his neck to bear the light yoke of Christ, but rather this was the work of 
Christ himself (conf. 9.1.1). 
                                                
47 lib. arb., 1.13. 
48 Linking Romans 9 with Matthew 22:14. 
49 Simpl. 2.13. 
50 Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 190-91. 
51 Simpl, 2.10. 
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 In a farther clarification, Augustine speaks of his old will as carnal. This is the 
carnal corruption of his soul (carnales corruptions animae meae) that he brings to mind 
and ponders in book two (conf. 2.1.1).  Instead of staying on the path of the love of the 
mind he followed his passions and the desires of the flesh (concupiscentia carnis) (conf. 
2.12).  The corruption of his will in book 2 and the conflict expressed in book 8 lead him 
to say, quoting Galatians 5:17: “Thus I understood from my own experience what I had 
read, how ‘the flesh lusts (caro consupisceret) against the spirit, and the spirit against the 
flesh’” (conf. 8.5.11).  This concupiscentia carnis, however, is not a merely moment-by-
moment lustfulness, but also the carnal habit (consuetude carnalis) that weighs down the 
will and keeps it from turning to God (conf. 7.17.23).   
 
They Laid Waste My Soul 
 
 Returning to our passage from 8.5.10, Augustine concludes that the two wills 
“contend (confligebant ) with one another, and by their conflict they laid waste 
(discordando dissipabant) my soul.”  This contending and conflict alludes to Romans 
7:16-17 and 7:22-25 as the conflict between what dwells within Augustine through the 
past habits of sin, and what he desires in the Law of God.  As he declares in 8.5.12, 
In vain I ‘delighted in your law in respect of the inward man; but another law in 
my members fought against the law of my mind and led me captive in the law of 
sin which was in my members’.  The law of sin is the violence of habit 
(consuetudinis) by which even the unwilling mind is dragged down and held, as it 
deserves to be since by its own choice it slipped into the habit. 
 
This conflict lays waste (dissipabant) Augustine’s soul.  This dissipabant is not due to 
some outside force bearing upon Augustine’s soul, nor the ontological state of a created 
being, but is rather the consequences of past sinful willing.  For,  
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I was at war within myself, and I was laid waste (dissipabar) by myself.  This 
devastation (dissipatio) was made against my will indeed, and yet it revealed not 
the nature of a different mind within me, but rather the punishment of my own 
nature. (conf. 8.10.22)52 
 
Augustine uses dissipabant here not only to describe the withering conflict of wills 
within himself, but to invoke the image of the Prodigal Son who takes the good gifts of 
his father and wastes them.  In connection to the pear theft, Augustine states he was far 
from the face of God in the darkness of his own passions.  But this ‘far’ from God was 
not a distance in space but a darkness of affections such that like the Prodigal Son “he 
could waste (dissiparet) the substance that you had given him as he started out” (conf. 
1.18.28).53 Therefore, by using dissipabant here, Augustine understands his own struggle 
of voluntas and the laying waste of his soul as an exemplification of the narrative of the 
Prodigal Son which itself illustrates the destiny of all people. 
 Augustine, then, is bound to an evil will through sinful habit and barred from a 
good will according to his own power of will (free choice).  Through the free choice of 
the will Augustine has become unfree and is no longer free to will the good, which is the 
true freedom that he desires.  His present reason and desire cannot unbind him from an 
evil will cultivated according to sinful habit, a habit forged through the use of his own 
free choice.   For Augustine, the turning away from God and the good begins an 
irreversible process of sinful habits becoming immune to the redirection of reason or 
desire.  
In this state of impotence, Augustine recounts his own struggles in a garden, in 
which he received a divine command through the voice of a child.  He hears the voice 
                                                
52 Translation by John K. Ryan. 
53 See also bk. 4.16.30 where he speaks of travelling into the far country in regard to the 
dissipation (dissiparem) of his substance. 
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call out “pick up and read,” leading to a chance reading from Paul’s letter to the Roman.  
There he is commanded to “put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the 
flesh in its lusts.” And “at once, with the last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of 
relief from all anxiety flooded into my heart” (conf. 8.12.29).  While the mechanics of 
conversion are not so much explained as expressed, in the putting on of Christ the will of 
Augustine is relinquished for the will of God, which though thought to be contrary to 
freedom itself, is for Augustine the only means by which freedom is regained, the 
freedom to will the good.  According to a divine intervention staged through the chance 
song of a child, the random reading of a text, and the sudden illumination of the heart, 
Augustine declares that “you [God] have converted me to yourself” (convertisti emin me 
ad te) (conf. 8.12.30).54  This is the conversion of Augustine’s will. 
 At this point we must pause and face a possible objection.  This account might 
easily seem the inverse of the radical act posited by Žižek.  For Žižek, the radical act of 
the subject breaks free of all previous subjective and social formations.  It is a sovereign 
act of subjective assertion.  With Augustine, is he not merely transferring this radical 
subjective act to God’s side who not only interrupts the social and subjective formation of 
Augustine, but altogether overcomes Augustine, the subject?  Instead of the radical act of 
the human subject below, it is the radical act of God above.  If this is the case, is it still 
possible to meaningfully speak of a subject (of the subject’s will)?  Does this not exactly 
suggest a voluntarism on God’s side as a replacement for humanity’s sinful voluntarism?   
If this were the whole story, as many investigations of Augustine’s theory of the 
will claim, then these questions would certainly stand against Augustine.  But his 
                                                
54 Translation by John K. Ryan. 
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narrative is much richer and more expansive than mere divine intervensionism, 
encompassing the communal nature of human willing and, indeed, the conversion of all 
creation.  In this next section, then, we will examine how Augustine’s conversion is more 
properly understood as including a robust social aspect.  In the section after this we will 
see how this subjective conversion within an alternative society moves within an 
Augustinian metaphysics of creation, which is thoroughly Christological.  
 
2. Conversion of the Will: Community and Intervention 
 
 A strictly philosophical or psychological approach to Augustine’s texts, especially 
one like the Confessions, threatens to separate the truth of the matter from the beauty of 
its form, something Augustine was keen not to do.  Such an approach also threatens to 
miss the more pragmatic reasons for Augustine to have written his Confession, such as 
explaining his thorough conversion from Manichaeism to Christianity in the hopes that 
others might follow his example, concluded by a reading of Scriptures consonant with 
such a conversion.55  Indeed, contrary to modern assumptions, it is entirely possible the 
autobiographical material is all prelude to the more philosophical and theological treatise 
that concludes the work. The question of modern readers has been something like “Why 
is an autobiography concluded by a theoretical discourse?” However, it is conceivable 
                                                
55 The question of Augustine creating the autobiographical genre sui generis, just like his 
supposed invention of the self and the will, have become more nuanced or overturned.  
Concerning the antecedents in genre see Frances Young, “The Confessions of St. 
Augustine: What is the Genre of this Work?” Augustinian Studies 30: 1 (1999): 1-16, and 
concerning purpose see Annemaré Kotzé, Augustine's Confessions: Communicative 
Purpose and Audience (Leiden: Brill, 2004).  For an overview of approaches to reading 
and the unity of the Confessions see O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, Latin Text with 
English Commentary, 1:xx-xli.  Though older, see also Aimé Solignac, “Introduction” to 
Les Confessions. Biliothèque Augustinienne 13 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), 9-55. 
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that for ancient readers the question would have been “Why is the autobiographical 
introduction so long?”56  The main question here, however, is not strictly the literary 
antecedents of the Confessions, but the construction and components of his conversion 
narrative and what light these might shed on his thoughts concerning the social aspects of 
such a conversion. 
 
The Myth of Suddenness 
 
 As noted in the previous section, Augustine’s conversion can be read as a divine 
intervention overriding Augustine’s sinful willing with a willing of the good.  This divine 
intervention can sound like a dreadful determinism erasing all freedom.  One way around 
this criticism is to critique the modern ‘myth of suddenness’ through an investigation of 
God’s providential ordering of events leading toward conversion.57  Rather than a sudden 
conversion from the prolonged habit of sin, Augustine comes to conclude that the call of 
grace is equally prolonged and persistent. 
 James Wetzel has drawn attention to the harmony between God’s suitable calling 
and human willing known only in retrospect.  The efficacy of God’s suitable calling 
comes through God’s providential ordering of object of delight drawing the will away 
from carnal habits.  Formerly, the will delighted in carnal things.  But through God’s 
calling new object begin to delight the will and raise it to higher things.  The will 
                                                
56 See Annemaré Kotzé discussion of the structure and use of biographical material to 
introduce a philosophical treatise and examples from pagan and Christian sources in 
“‘The Puzzle of the Last Four Books of Augustine’s Confessions’: an illegitimate issue,” 
Vigiliae Christianae 60 (2006): 65-79. 
57 Gary Wills critiques the “myth of suddenness” by looking at the philosophy of William 
James and his preference for sudden conversions as opposed to gradual ones, stemming 
from a cultural imagination rooted in Puritan religious experiences.  See Wills’ Saint 
Augustine’s Conversion (New York: Vinking, 2004), 14-25.  
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consents (through its free choice) to what delights it and therefore is free (for a will 
without consent is not will at all for Augustine), even if it is not in control of what object 
actually come before it.  Because God both knows what delights us in our innermost 
being and has control over the outward objects of delight, God is able to perfectly arrange 
situations that elicit our voluntary consent to this divine calling.  As Wetzel says,  
The central different between ordinary instances of consent and divinely inspired 
ones is that in the latter the fit between disposition and environment is so good 
that no margin remains for hesitation or irresolution.  We do not need to make a 
choice.  Our choice is, as it were, built into God’s offer.58 
 
According to Wetzel, it is for this reason that the garden scene all but eliminates the 
moments of willing and choosing.  Augustine is simply reacting to the divine calling 
through the voice of a child and the verse of scripture.59  In this way God coordinates a 
suitable calling with human willing that does not violate the structure of free choice.   
This account gives us an understanding of divine action in conversion without 
supplying the inside story of the will’s transformation.  What we get from Augustine, 
after pages and pages describing his inner conflict, is not a dramatic telling of God’s 
intervention and transformation, but only a short statement of inner relief.  Why?  Why so 
little theological bang for so much autobiographical build up?  Wetzel speculates that the 
moment of Augustine’s conversion remains relatively opaque exactly because his 
conversion “contained his recognition that the divine presence had been with him all 
along.  It did not have to enter from outside to resolve his crisis from within.”60  In 
Wetzel’s understanding, what seems like the climatic moment is merely the recognition 
of accumulated past moments in which God had always been present and divinely 
                                                
58 Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 158. 
59 Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 154. 
60 Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 160.   
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coordinating Augustine’s life.  The ‘myth of suddenness’ and its interventionist 
complement is overturned with the recognition that God had always been bringing about 
a suitable calling in Augustine, not from outside but always within and through 
Augustine’s life.   
 
The Stories of Providence 
 
 But is this all that can be said of God’s coordinating of objects of desire into a 
suitable calling and conversion?  Does not the replacement of a sudden intervention with 
gradual conversion merely displace the concern of divine determinism from a synchronic 
to a diachronic paradigm?  Is there not a place for humanity, for human society, within 
this story of conversion?  A closer look reveals just such a place within the story of 
providence, the place of an emerging alternative society.61  To see this we will look at the 
structure of book eight and then relate this to the larger structure at work in books one 
through nine.  
 Book eight consists of three episodes, of which the first two are conversions and 
the third is Augustine’s conversion.  Each of the first two conversations has embedded 
within it the story of a conversion.  The first conversation is between Augustine and 
Simplicianus in which Simplicianus tells the story of Marius Victorinus’ conversion.  
Simplicianus takes up this telling of Victorinus’ conversion in order to exhort Augustine 
to “the humility of Christ hidden from the wise and revealed to babes” (conf. 8.1.3).  As a 
well-known teacher of rhetoric, Victorinus had attained the level of renown to which 
                                                
61 The following section is deeply indebted to Lewis Ayres’s helpful essay,  "Into the 
Poem of the Universe: Exempla, Conversion, and Church in Augustine's 
Confessiones," Zeitschrift fur Antikes Christentum 13:2 (2009): 263-281. 
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Augustine aspired.  But Victorinus eventually learned the humility of the Word and was 
baptized publicly to the joy of all who witnessed it.  Hearing this story prompts 
Augustine to wonder why people are “more delighted by the salvation of a soul who is 
despaired of but is then liberated from great danger than if there has always been hope or 
if the danger has only been minor?” (conf. 8.3.6).  Augustine alludes to the Prodigal Son 
as an example of such a story. 
The delight caused by Simplicianus’ story begins drawing Augustine toward 
conversion. As he notes, when Simplicianus finished his story Augustine “was on fire to 
imitate [Victorianus]” (exarsi ad imitandum) (conf. 8.5.10).62 This delight is the 
proximate cause of the inner conflict of wills at the end of conf. 8.5.10, examined above.  
As Lewis Ayres notes, turning to book 9, the exampla of the saints is intended to produce 
such an effect.63  There Augustine says that “the examples given by your servants…set 
me on fire (accendebant)” (conf. 9.2.3).  Simplicianus’ story, then, prompts the inner 
turmoil and defines the issues facing Augustine.64  But this prompting is not 
accomplished through some divine intervention beyond history and humanity or within 
the inner recesses of the self.  Rather, it is produced through the telling of the life and 
conversion of a flesh and blood person (Victorinus) by another person (Simplicianus) to a 
third (Augustine). 
In book 8 this first conversation leads to a second between Augustine and 
Ponticianus.  While the conversation with Simplicianus references the Platonic books, 
when Ponticianus surprises Augustine with a visit, it is by chance that Ponticianus notices 
                                                
62 Translation by John K. Ryan. 
63 Ayres, "Into the Poem of the Universe,” 268.  Ayres helpfully links the use of exempla 
in Augustine to the larger rhetorical tradition. 
64 O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, Latin Text with English Commentary, 3:3.   
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the writings of Paul on a table (conf. 8.6.14).  The Platonic books enabled Augustine to 
think through the immaterial nature of the will leading him beyond Manichaeism and its 
dualism, a reflection prompted by Simplicianus’ story.  These books, however, had no 
answer for overcoming such a divided will.  It is only through the Scriptures that such a 
solution presents itself, a solution for which Platonism could never have prepared 
Augustine.65  These subtle movements of providence (a surprise visit and a chance 
noticing) set up the next story so that it might also act as an example for Augustine.  
Ponticianus tells of how he and three friends were walking in a garden and separated into 
pairs.  The other couple wandered in a different direction than Ponticianus and they 
happened upon a house in which lived some of God’s servant.  In this house they by 
chance found a copy of the Life of Antony.  Upon reading it one was “amazed and set on 
fire” (et mirari et accendi) and converted (conf. 8.6.15).  In this story of Ponticianus 
Augustine hears again of one ‘set on fire’.  But in this case Augustine hears of one being 
converted to God as the proper response to such a story.  This time not only is Augustine 
told a conversion story, but he is also given an example of people responding to a 
conversion story, the conversion of Antony and the response of those who read it.66 
After the first story (by Simplicianus) Augustine develops a series of reflections 
on the divided will and how he was perpetually delaying a decision (conf. 8.5.12).  The 
second story produces an entirely different result, forcing the issue of decision for 
                                                
65 Augustine skillfully weaves a progressive reading of Romans throughout book 8.  See 
James O’Donnell’s outline of the progression through Romans in Augustine: 
Confessions, Latin Text with English Commentary, 3:3.  It is these types of nuanced 
contrasts that Robert J. O’Connell usually ignores in his attempt to foreground the 
Plotinian commitments of Augustine.  See O’Connell’s St. Augustine’s Confessions: The 
Odyssey of the Soul, 90-104. 
66 Ayres, "Into the Poem of the Universe,” 265. 
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Augustine.  He tells us that at the time Ponticianus was telling his story God was turning 
Augustine around to be able to see himself as he really was.  As Augustine says, “You 
took me up from behind my own back where I had placed myself because I did not wish 
to obverse myself, and you set me before my face so that I should see how vile I was” 
(conf. 8.7.16).  Ayres warns against reading this as if Augustine were having an inner 
dialogue with God as Ponticianus prattles on.  Rather Ayres notes it is “the on-going 
telling of the story that Augustine wishes to identify as the means through which God 
focuses Augustine’s gaze upon himself.”67  Augustine is clear that “if I tried to avert my 
gaze from myself, his [Ponticianus’] story continued relentlessly, and you [God] once 
again placed me in front of myself.”  Through the story itself and through the one telling 
it, God’s providential action is working to coordinate suitable objects of desire and the 
desire itself.  
 
Exampla in the Garden 
 
This, however, is not the end. Not only is divine providence noted in bringing 
together these lives and stories, linking history and humanity as the means of Augustine’s 
conversion.  But also, in returning to the garden scene we find again the exempla of a 
saint as a means of Augustine’s conversion.  While Augustine has mentioned Antony and 
the effect reading about his conversion had on others, Augustine did not speak of the 
actual conversion of Antony.  He holds it back until he is in the throws of agony in the 
garden and hears the voice of a child chanting.  In that moment he searches his memory 
but could not remember a game or chant that included “Pick up and read.”  His memory, 
                                                
67 Ayres, "Into the Poem of the Universe,” 265. 
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the repository of the past, a past now chaining him to sinful habit, fails Augustine.  The 
past has doubly failed him by binding him to past sinful habit and by failing to provide a 
sufficient memory able to interpret the voice.   
Within of this interpretive deadlock Augustine says that he “interpreted it solely 
as a divine command to me to open the book and read the first chapter I might find” 
(conf. 8.12.29).  Between a mysterious voice and a chance verse comes divine command.  
Does this not seem to perfectly fit the model of divine intervention? But this is not where 
Augustine leaves the narrative.  He immediately states that the reason he interpreted this 
voice as a divine command is because “I had heard how Antony happened to be present 
at the gospel reading, and took it as an admonition addressed to himself.”  Lodged within 
Augustine’s memory was the story, the example, of another who had interpreted a voice 
as a divine command.  This memory, from a past which was not properly his, from a 
story which had delighted him and had enflamed others, was the pivotal piece that 
allowed Augustine to move forward.  Between voice and verse is a providentially ordered 
memory of the example of person (Antony) given by still another (Ponticianus).  These 
stories and the society out of which they flowed, coupled with the Scriptures, were the 
means by which Augustine’s will is converted.  As Ayres notes, divine providence  
must not only present new and desirable objects, it must also enable a synthesis 
between memory and desire strong enough to overcome habit…Augustine has 
finally been drawn to conversion because he has been drawn to a point where, 
with the help of grace, the movement of memory, understanding and will brings 
to light and moves toward the correct exempla.  His will is not so much finally 
forced out of old habit; it has been drawn to a point at which new memories and 
desires triumph over old.68 
 
                                                
68 Ayres, "Into the Poem of the Universe,” 273-4. 
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It is in all these ways that Augustine can declare to God, “You have converted me to 
yourself” (convertisti emin me ad te) (conf. 8.12.30)69 without such a conversion being an 
alienation of his own humanity.  Indeed, Augustine is showing us that all along he was 
slowly being converted from one society to an alternative one.  To these contrasting 
societies we will now turn, knowing that a full elaboration will have to wait until the next 
chapter when we turn to City of God. 
 
The Society of Providence 
 
 The contours of this alternative society is best noticed when we step back and 
look at the placement of book 8 within the scope and movement of books 1-9.  As 
William A. Stephany has pointed out, books 1-9 of the Confessions form a chiasm 
centering on book 5, with pairs of books on either side: books 4 and 6, book 3 and 7, 
books 2 and 8, and books 1 and 9.  Book five begins with Augustine meeting what could 
be called a Manichean bishop in Faustus and ends with him meeting a Christian bishop in 
Ambrose.  This decisive shift of allegiances, this subtle movement from one society to 
another, marks the center of the transition from one society to another.  Books 4 and 6 
trace the arc of friendships, love, and the material world.  In books 3 and 7 we hear of 
Augustine’s two great discoveries and intellectual conversions.  In book 3 he reads 
Cicero and dedicates himself to the love of wisdom, and in book 7 he reads the Platonists.  
The pursuit of wisdom beginning with Cicero in book 3, runs afoul in Manicheaism, but 
is overcome with the discovery of Platonism in book 7.  Books 2 and 8 are dominated by 
stories occurring in gardens involving fruit trees.  In book 2 Augustine does the evil he 
                                                
69 Translation by John K. Ryan. 
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does not desire and in book 8 he cannot do the good he desire.  The former reveals the 
way of the divided will and the latter the way out of it.  And finally, books 1 and 9 speak 
of physical birth and spiritual rebirth.70  It is these last two pairings that I want to explore 
more closely. 
 We have already discussed the manner in which Augustine mines his motives for 
the pear theft and finds reason and desire lacking.  The will to sin, the falling for its own 
sake, is mysterious.  But later in book 2 he backs from the utter mystery of it all and 
confesses multiple times that had he been alone he would not have stolen the pears (conf. 
2.8.16-9.17).  Therefore, he concludes, “my love (amavi) in that act was to be associated 
with the gang in whose company I did it” (conf. 2.8.16).  Augustine claims that if he had 
been alone his cupidity (cupiditatis) would not have been inflamed (accenderem).  But 
because of the example of the group he was moved toward sin. Augustine notes 
“friendship can be a dangerous enemy, a seduction of the mind lying beyond the reach of 
investigation” (conf. 2.9.17).   
This danger of friendship, however, is overturned in the fellowship Augustine 
finds in book 8.  Through the physical presence of Simplicianus, Ponticianus, and 
especially Alypius in the garden, and through the presence of others in the stories shared, 
Augustine was surrounded by friendships that were enflaming him toward the love of 
God rather than love of self.  This alternative society was shaping Augustine’s desires 
toward good and away from evil.  The examples of the saints in book 8 were overcoming 
the examples set by Augustine’s fellow sinners in book 2.   
                                                
70 William A. Stephany, “Thematic Structure in Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian 
Studies 20 (1989): 129-142. 
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 The parallels between books 1 and 9 further strength this contrast between two 
societies, moving beyond the agonies of a particular will to the destinies of all people.  In 
book 1 Augustine speaks of his birth, his infancy, and his introduction into human society 
through the learning of language, an introduction that brought Augustine “more deeply 
into the stormy society of human life” (conf. 1.8.13).  The acquisition of language quickly 
outstrips its menial use in gaining the necessities of life and begins deforming his desires 
as Augustine commences his education.  It is here, in his education, that Augustine 
claims that he learned to love what is vile and despise what is good.  The “stormy society 
of human life” has now becomes a tumultuous ocean, to which Augustine cries:  
Woe to you, torrent of human custom! “Who can stand against you?” When will 
you run dry?  How long will your flowing current carry the sons of Eve into the 
great and fearful ocean which can be crossed, with difficulty, only by those who 
have embarked on the Wood of the cross? (conf. 1.16.25) 
 
This watery torrent symbolizing fallen human society is briefly interrupted by the story of 
a baptism deferred when, as a child, Augustine fell deathly ill (conf.  1.11.17-18).  At the 
offer of baptism Augustine is given a chance to bathe in the cleansing waters of the 
Church instead of drowning in the waters of human confusion.  This baptism, hinted at in 
book 1, is only final accomplished in book 9, marking the entry of Augustine into an 
alternative human society of those not tossed by the waves of desire but instead are those 
who thirst for God and are quenched by the fountain of life (conf. 13.17.20-21).  Book 1, 
then, speaks of a physical birth that is really an entry into social and spiritual death, and 
book 9 speaks of a sacramental death (and the physical deaths of multiple saints, most 
prominently Augustine’s mother) as the entry into spiritual life.71 
 
                                                
71 Stephany, “Thematic Structure in Augustine’s Confessions,” 132. 
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Subject and Society 
 
 Throughout books 1-9 of his Confessions Augustine has been showing us the 
contrasting influences of human society and its alternative.  Through these contrasts 
Augustine has lead us into an understanding of how the will becomes enslaved to sinful 
habit through its own free choice under the direction of external examples.  The subject is 
converted when it first begins to understand that the root of its division is not beyond 
itself but is the accumulation of its own past actions, actions given over to lesser loves.  
Although the bondage of the will is not imposed from beyond itself, the solution (or 
freedom) must come from beyond its own free choice and the sinful society that has 
shaped its exercise of free choice.  The will can will its own fall from freedom, but not its 
return to freedom.  It is for this reason that divine providence must orchestrate a return of 
the will through the provision of alternative objects of delight and examples of the proper 
response to such objects.  This process occurs not through a divine intervention from 
beyond history and humanity, but through a suitable calling that properly exposes the 
subject to examples which delight and enflame. 
The establishment and nature of such a society of examples, or city as Augustine 
will call it, will be the focus of the next chapter.  But for now I would like to briefly note 
the similarities of the above to Hegel’s understanding of the unity of the subject and 
society discussed in chapter 3.  Both Hegel and Augustine give priority to a non-material 
figure guiding the chance ordering of events in the formation of the subject, divine 
providence for Augustine and Geist for Hegel.  Both view this guiding figure as working 
through a society configured around institutions and practices out of which the subject is 
formed.  And both see freedom as more than the negative freedom of choice between 
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alternatives (liberum arbitrium for Augustine and willkür for Hegel).  Rather freedom is 
being positively ordered toward the good.   
But as noted in chapter 3, when it comes to the questions of establishing or 
transitioning into a more free society Hegel was not able to hold together subject and 
society within his framework of self-transcending immanence.  On the one hand, some 
Hegelians emphasize the institutional role of society to such a degree that it is impossible 
to promote the formation of a radical subjectivity capable of criticizing injustice and 
initiating change. This is the position of those like Robert Pippin who focus on normative 
social practices.  On the other hand, other Hegelians promote a radical subjectivity in 
such contrast to all social formations that while critical of one social formation it makes 
little sense to speak of a new, more just or free social formation because this would 
exactly limit and circumscribe the subject again.  This is the position of those like Slavoj 
Žižek who focus on radical subjective acts.  Does Augustine do any better in both 
integrating subject and society while also holding open the means for a subjectivity 
capable of both criticism and change?72 
It must be remembered that the main difference between the two is that Augustine 
explicitly presents his moral psychology in the Confessions as a transition between two 
societies, from the deformation of his will by sinful habit to the reformation of will by 
grace within an alternative society.  It is this change that is central, not the unity between 
subject and society.  While Augustine’s moral and social theory is guided by the 
                                                
72 Of course, asking if Augustine thinks the subject itself is ‘capable’ of criticism and 
change seems exactly to miss the Augustinian point about conversion, i.e. that the subject 
is exactly incapable of initiating such change.  I only frame it this way to highlight the 
contrast with Hegel and then, in the next section, show that it is God and not the subject 
which constitutes this capacity. 
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necessity of change through a slow process of breaking open the stable subject, Hegel’s 
faith in modernity does not have and does not need such a change.  These differences are 
based in a more fundamental difference between Augustine and Hegel concerning the 
nature of creation itself, to which we turn in the next section.  Augustine is fundamentally 
committed to the difference between Creator and creation, a difference that Hegel was at 
pains to abolish.  The difference between affirming or denying a distinction between 
Creator and creation is exactly the difference between a self-transcending immanence 
(Hegel) and a self-immanenting transcendence (Augustine).  It is because Augustine 
affirms that subject and society are created by a self-immanenting transcendence that he 
can hold the two together (subject and society) as a means for change rather than a 
perpetuation of the status quo (the previous sinful subject and society).  What 
Augustine’s self-immanenting transcendence might mean will now be examined by 
looking at the explicitly Christological aspects of conversion as they are linked to 
creation. 
 
3. Conversion of Creation: Christ as Intervention 
 
In outlining Augustine’s commitment to think God as self-immanenting 
transcendence we finally arrive where many begin, Augustine’s great confession of the 
restless soul journeying toward God: “You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, 
because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you” 
(conf. 1.1.1).73  That humanity is restless apart from God, somehow far from the One to 
                                                
73 Tu excites ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti no ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum 
donec requiescat in te. 
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whom all things are near (conf. 1.18.28), certainly speaks to the odyssey of the soul 
narrated in books 1-9.  Certainly these themes are justly emphasized and explored.   
Equally for Augustine, however, especially when we pass beyond book 10, is that 
humanity is made by God, “a little piece of your creation (creaturae tuae)” (conf. 1.1.1).  
The issue of creation is an essential key for understanding the unity of the work.  As Jon 
Mackenzie notes regarding the overall structure of the work,  
The first section [books 1-10] can be read as an attempt to conceive the human 
subject without recourse to the form of the subject imparted at creation, an 
attempt which will finally fail.  By comparison, the second portion [books11-13] 
of the Confessions could be interpreted as a re-reading of the first section in light 
of the understanding of the impartation of form to the subject through creation.74 
 
This impartation of form to the subject, as Mackenzie notes, is not something peculiar to 
humanity but is a characteristic of all creation.  For Augustine, creation is a two-step 
process in which formless matter is first created and then latter given form.75  This is 
Augustine’s synthesis of a Neoplatonic ontology and the claim in Genesis 1:2 that the 
earth was formless and void.76  All created things begin in and move toward this 
formlessness, “toward the chaos where there is no control, and to a far off dissimilarity 
(longinquam dissimilitudinem)” to God (conf. 13.2.2).  Concerning the sheer contingency 
of creation in relation to the God who does not need such a creation, Augustine asks, 
                                                
74 Mackenzie, “Subjectivity as a Methodology in Augustine’s Confessions,” 209 (italics 
in original).  This emphasis is inline with attempts to read Christ as the unity of other 
major works of Augustine.  See Lewis Ayres, “The Christological Context of Augustine’s 
De trinitate XIII: Toward Relocating Books VIII-XV,” Augustinian Studies 29/1 (1998): 
111-139. 
75 See Emilie Zum Brunn, St. Augustine: Being and Nothingness, trans by Ruth Namad 
(New York: Paragon House, 1988), 74-77; For the Plotinian background for Augusitne’s 
use see Aimé Solignac, Les Confessions. Biliothèque Augustinienne 14 (Paris: Desclée 
de Brouwer, 1962), 613-17. 
76 Augustine spends much of book 12 discussing the creation and nature of this formless 
matter, esp. 12.2.2-13.16 
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“What merit had these things before you even to receive a formless existence when, but 
for you, they would not exist at all?” (conf. 13.2.2).  But just as the formless creation 
depended on the Word of God for its creation, so too it is by that Word that they receive 
their form (conf. 13.2.2).  Or closer to the point, created things are “converted” 
(converteretur) from formless to formed by the Word who made them (conf. 13.2.3).  
Augustine wants us to understand that the “‘converting’ that is at the heart of the original 
creative act is now mirrored and brought to fulfillment in the redemptive act,” unifying 
the orders of creation and redemption.77  Therefore, when Augustine claims that God had 
converted him (conf. 8.12.30) he was not speaking of some anomalous event within the 
history of the cosmos.  Rather, he is speaking of how he is now again properly aligned 
with the cosmos, converted to his proper form and directed toward his proper end.  
Augustine’s autobiographical conversion served as an illustration, or typology, of the 
conversion of the cosmos.  This theme, announced in book 1 as the problem confronting 
humanity, is proclaimed to be the process of all creation.  All things must be converted to 
God.78 
 
Absorbing all Immanence? 
 
                                                
77 Lewis Ayres, "Into the Poem of the Universe,” 278.  See also Carol Harrison, 
Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 109-114. 
78 On the Trinitarian processes of creaturely conversion, see Scott A. Dunham, The 
Trinity and Creation in Augustine: An Ecological Analysis (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2008), 
72-80. 
  
 
230 
 The question to be asked, however, given this “metaphysics of conversion”79 is 
whether a reliance on a Neoplatonic ontology conflates creation and the fall as the 
prerequisite for the following conversion?  If the first stage of creation is formless matter 
that seems necessarily to be falling away from God, and if humanity is caught in such a 
downward fall, is not this fall synonymous with creation?  As Emilie Brunn comments, 
“Augustine insists on the close, if not fatal, connection that ties the first stage of spiritual 
creation…to the fact of the fall.”80  O’Connell worries this connection inevitably 
compromises the integrity of humanity, leading to the eventual absorption of human 
particularity when God becomes ‘all in all’ after the completion of redemption.81 
And if this is true, then the contrast between Hegel and Augustine argued for 
throughout is revealed as an utter failure.  If Augustine is overly dependent on 
Neoplatonism such that he conflates creation and fall then he is guilty of perpetuating a 
theology repulsive to bodily reality, tending toward an other-worldly escapism, all 
terminating in the re-absorption of humanity in God.  Augustine would not, then, present 
a clear alternative to the Hegelian problematic that explicitly conflates creation and the 
fall as the ‘sinfulness of existence’.  He would merely be offering its reverse.  Instead of a 
self-transcending immanence that excludes any true transcendence we would now have a 
self-immanenting transcendence that eventually re-absorbs all immanence back into 
itself. 
Does, then, Augustine conflate creation and fall?  Does he end up basically 
reducing humanity to a moment of divinity?  We will answer the former questions next, 
                                                
79 Brunn borrows this phrase from Gilson, but uses it more expansively (St. Augustine: 
Being and Nothingness, 86, n.60). 
80 Brunn, St. Augustine: Being and Nothingness, 75. 
81 O’Connell, St. Augustine's Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul, 178-185. 
  
 
231 
waiting to answer the second after discussing the mediation of Christ between God and 
humanity. 
 
Dissimilarity and Dissipation 
 
 Certainly Augustine draws a close connection between ontology and morality, 
closer than many interpreters recognize when they read Augustine as a precursor to the 
modern subject, claiming that he has replaced ontology with psychology.  But within this 
deep connection between ontology and psychology Augustine carefully distinguishes 
between the ontological and moral orders.  Augustine notes that the first moment of 
creation institutes beings that dwell in a “far off dissimilarity” (longinquam 
dissimilitudinem) from God (conf. 13.2.2).  This naturally suggests a comparison to the 
far country (longinqua regione) to which the Prodigal Son travelled (conf. 1.18.25).  And 
because of this parallel it is tempting to read Augustine’s entrance into a “the region of 
dissimilarity” (regione dissimilitudinis) and his fall from the vision of God in book 7 as 
corroborating the link between sinfulness and material existence.  The “region of 
dissimilarity” of book 7 and the “far off dissimilarity” of book 13, when read through the 
far country of humanity’s wandering, all seem to add up to a conflation between creation 
and fall.   
This however blurs the lines between the ontological region of dissimilarity 
(dissimilitudinis) from God (in which all created entities share) and the prodigal 
dissipation (dissiparet) of God’s gifts (in which only humanity shares).  As we noted in 
the first section, the war waged between Augustine’s two will “laid waste” (dissiparet) 
his soul (conf. 8.5.10; 8.10.22).  And it is exactly this moral situation to which Augustine 
  
 
232 
refers when speaking of the Prodigal Son, that in the far country (longinqua regione) “he 
could waste (dissiparet) the substance that [God] had given him” (conf. 1.18.28), a 
situation Augustine directly applies to himself in conf 4.16.30.82  Creaturely dissimilarity 
from God does not necessarily entail a prodigal dissipation.  Augustine is careful not to 
conflate these two regions of dissimilarity and dissipation, even if it is the Word who 
remedies both through a process of conversion.  The ontological creation of the world 
does not necessitate its moral fall.83 
 
Downward Participation and Mediation 
 
 How is humanity, then, to be re-formed once it has fallen away from its first 
conversion, entering not only an ontological dissimilarity but also a prodigal dissipation?  
In explaining this re-formation Augustine outlines his difference from the Platonists who 
glimpse the homeland but do not know the way to it.84  Platonists and Christians could 
agree on the ontological doctrine that creation participates in God.  But what Augustine 
began to realize is that for humanity to be re-formed it was necessary that God participate 
in the human plight.  God’s entrance within humanity would entail a ‘downward 
                                                
82 Sed profectus sum abs te in longinquam regionem, ut eam dissiparem in meretrices 
cupiditates. 
83 For expression of the difference between creation and fall in the early works up to 
Confessions see Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 91-95, 104-106.  For a 
thorough discussion of O’Connell and his conflation of creation and fall in early and late 
Augustine see Ronnie Rombs, Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul: Beyond 
O’Connell and His Critics (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press). 
84 Cavidini, “The Darkest Enigma,” 127. See Conf. 7.20.26; trin. 4.15.20.  
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participation’ through which humanity would be re-formed.  And this ‘downward 
participation’ marks Augustine’s distance from Neoplatonism.85 
 Within the much-commented intellectual conversion to Platonism recounted in 
book 7 is an oft-overlooked conversion of Platonism for an explicitly Christian purpose.  
Within the Confessions the term participatio occurs only three times, each in book 7, 
although the idea is prevalent throughout (especially in book 11-13).  In book 7 
Augustine recounts what the “books of the Platonists” taught him concerning the Word of 
God, although he does so by quoting Scripture (specifically John 1), rather than referring 
to the Platonists directly.  Augustine, however, notes that he did not find the humility of 
the Incarnation in those books.  The Platonic books could only affirm an upward 
participation of created realities in God.  The first and third use of participatio confirms 
this, each referencing the Word, the Son of God.  Augustine readily admits to the eternal 
and immutable nature of the Son in which all temporal and mutable natures participate.  
This is his meaning of his first use in conf. 7.9.14 where he says that all are wise “by 
participation (participatione) in wisdom abiding in them.”  Wise humans are wise 
because they participate in Wisdom itself, the Son.  As David Meconi comments,  
This participation is always ‘upward,’ in the sense that it is always the lower, less 
perfect existent’s taking part in the superior and more perfect reality.  Hence 
central to the platonic understanding of participation is the fact that the underived, 
immutable Form is always partaken of and participated in, never vise versa.86 
 
                                                
85 This ‘downward participation’ is noted by O’Donnell concerning conf. 7.18.24 
(Augustine: Confessions, Latin Text with English Commentary, 2:463), and commented 
on extensively by David Vincent Meconi in “The Incarnation and the Role of 
Participation in St. Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian Studies 29/2 (1998): 61-75.  I 
rely on Meconi here. 
86 Meconi, “The Incarnation and the Role of Participation,” 67. 
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The third use of participation affirms this philosophical doctrine, but now as a proof for 
the superiority of Christ above all other humans.  Augustine comments that while he was 
still grappling with how to understand the Incarnation he nevertheless counted Christ as 
superior to all others “because of the great excellence of his human character and the 
more perfect participation (participantione) in wisdom” (conf. 7.19.25).  Christ, the 
human, is thought to be the perfect exemplification of one participating in uncreated 
Wisdom, showing again the upward movement of participation.  Just like the rest of 
creation, Christ the contingent and mutable human, upwardly participates in Wisdom, and 
it is to this perfection that Augustine is drawn.   
 But it is the second use of participatio that transforms the entire Platonic 
ontology.  Between the immutable Word in which all participate (conf. 7.9.14) and the 
superiority of Christ in his participating in Wisdom (conf. 7.19.25) stands the Word that 
“by his sharing (participatione) in our ‘coat of skin’” comes to down to humanity in 
order to raise humanity up (conf. 7.18.24).  The Word, who is superior, comes down to 
that which is inferior and builds for himself a dwelling even though everything already 
dwells him.  The ‘coat of skin’, alluding to the garments God make for Adam and Eve, is 
the mortality in which humanity finds itself when expelled from the Garden.  It is through 
this Word that takes on human flesh that humanity is raised up and healed. As Meconi 
notes, “through the humbled flesh of the Word God’s downward participation in 
imperfection is now thought possible” such that “Plato is thus supplemented.”87  Book 7, 
therefore, certainly recounts Augustine’s conversion to Platonism.  But it also subtly 
                                                
87 Meconi, “The Incarnation and the Role of Participation,” 70. 
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indicates the conversion of Platonist participation through the downward movement of 
the Incarnation. 
 The possibility of downward participation opens space for Christ to be the 
mediator between God and humanity in book 10.  It should be remember that in book 8, 
just as Augustine was realizing the depths of his bondage to sin, he cried out with the 
words of Romans 7:24-25, “Wretched man that I was who would deliver me from this 
body of death other than your grace through Jesus Christ our Lord?” (conf. 8.5.12).  
Likewise, in book 10, after having examined his conscience according to the three sins of 
1 John 2:16, he calls out again to God, “Who could be found to reconcile me to you?” 
(conf. 10.42.67).  The answer is the Son of God, the mediator between God and 
humanity.  Because Augustine (and humanity in general) does not have the power to 
convert himself back to God, a mediator was necessary who has “something in common 
with God and something in common with humanity” (conf. 10.42.67).  This “mediator 
between God and men” is the “man Christ Jesus” (conf. 10.43.68), who participates 
downwardly with humanity so that humanity might again participate upwardly in God.  
Through the mediation of the Incarnation, the Word who was already in the form of God 
takes on the form of a servant so that humanity might be re-formed toward God.  In this 
way, that which was fallen from its original creation (a creation made through the Word 
as God) is converted back to God (through the Word as human).  The formless subject is, 
therefore, converted back to its original form through this downward participation of God 
in humanity, creating the possibility of a mediator between God and humanity. 
 
Willing the Divine (and Human) Will 
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Here we must return to the objection raised above concerning whether or not 
Augustine ends up absorbing all humanity particularity within God.  It could be asked, 
Even if God’s work is not strictly interventionist but a work of providence in history, and 
even if the subject is introduced into an alternative human society within history, is not 
the ultimate price of this re-formation, this ‘freedom’, the replacement of human will 
with divine will?  This kind of objection concerns whether freedom for Augustine is the 
preservation or loss of one’s own humanity.  And if this is a loss of human will within 
God’s, then Augustine is not a resource for thinking a truly radical political subjectivity 
because human subjectivity is ultimately overcome by God’s sovereignty.  And these 
fears seem to be confirmed, when, after his conversion Augustine declares to Christ, 
“This was the sum of it: not to will what I willed and to will what you willed.” (conf. 
9.1.1).88   
But this willing the will of Christ is not an alien intervention precisely because 
Christ is the mediator between God and humanity.  We must first remember the 
downward participation in which the Word takes on the human ‘coat of skin’.  This 
reference to taking on human mutability and morality is intimately connected to 
Augustine’s conversion.  In reading Romans he hears that he should no longer make 
provision for the sinful flesh, but should put on Christ (conf. 8.12.29).  Given the 
decisiveness of God’s own ‘putting on’ of human flesh in Christ, and the evident 
stumbling block that this was for Augustine initially, it would be incorrect to think that 
putting on Christ would mean for Augustine a denial of or escape from the human 
                                                
88 Et hoc erat totum, nolle quod volebam et velle quod volebas.  Translation by John K. 
Ryan.  O’Donnell notes the prayer from which the phrase is taken is the only time in the 
Confessions that Augustine addresses Christ directly (Augustine: Confessions, Latin Text 
with English Commentary, 3:74). 
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condition, a fleeing from material flesh to some immaterial life.  Why would the 
humanity of Christ be of such significance if it were then used as the means to escape the 
human condition itself?  Instead, putting on Christ must refer to the humanity of Christ, 
the Word’s own ‘coat of skin’ unblemished by sin, through which Augustine learns how, 
in Wetzel’s words, “to live in the flesh as God would and did.”89  The redemption of 
Augustine’s own humanity is through the humanity of God, a downward participation 
that reconnects humanity to the flow of upward participation in God, a conversion to its 
true form. 
With this affirmation of humanity before us we can return to the above objection 
that divine will seems to overcome human will.  If willing God’s will comes only from 
the side of the fully divine then Augustine would be flirting with the loss of his human 
individuality within divine being.  Those protesting such a situation would be correct in 
criticizing the loss of human subjectivity within divine sovereignty.  But Augustine, in 
his conversion, learns to put on Christ in Christ’s humanity.  This humanity of Christ is 
not in opposition to Augustine’s humanity but the fulfillment of it.  Only in putting on 
Christ can Augustine’s humanity be reformed or converted to its true purpose.  And 
through this conversion true freedom of the will is regained.  On the other hand, if this 
willing of Christ’s will came solely from the human side of the Incarnation then 
Augustine would certainly be surrendering his will to an exterior source, substituting the 
will of one material being for the will of another material being.  But again, because of 
the Incarnation, Christ’s humanity ought not be conceived in a strictly materialist fashion 
as a competition between two material beings.  Rather, the materiality of humanity is 
                                                
89 James Wetzel, “Will and Interiority in Augustine,” 159. 
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affirmed even while its sinful willing is denied.  The conflict of will (between human 
beings) or the loss of will (within divine being) only makes sense within a strictly 
materialist ontology or a strictly immaterialist Platonic ontology.90  But within the 
downward participation of the Word, of which all things upwardly participate, Augustine 
finds his will freed.  This free will remains a human will even while regaining its 
freedom. The divine Word, therefore, converts humanity back to its true form by entering 
into the fallen form of humanity and its history. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The previous section focused on the subject and its re-formation through 
conversion and Christ’s role in this recreation.  Admittedly, this constituted a more 
theoretical discussion leaving to the side questions of society and the subject’s place 
within it.  More will be said in the next chapter regarding the mediation of the Son and 
the type of society he institutes.  But for now it will be useful to gather together the 
threads concerning the Incarnation and God’s self-immanenting transcendence.    
 The downward participation of God in the Incarnation lends credence to 
designating Augustine’s articulation of God as self-immanenting transcendence in 
contrast to Hegel’s self-transcending immanence.  All throughout Augustine emphasizes 
the impossibility of (self-) transcending the milieu of fallen humanity, presently bound by 
its past choices, forged as sinful habits.  Attempts to think the subject according to its 
own immanence, its own psychological resources, fails.  Even the lofty heights of 
                                                
90 The difference between a material and immaterial ontology (or paradigm) is suggested 
within the last section (“Will Incarnate”) of Wetzel’s “Will and Interiority in Augustine,” 
156-160. 
  
 
239 
Platonism only glimpse the homeland for which humanity longs, ultimately failing to 
understand the way there.  For Augustine, Platonism marks the very limits of human self-
transcendence, and therefore fully expresses the failure of such self-transcendence to 
overcome the limitations of sinful habit and sinful humanity.  Only when God 
condescends to the human situation does a way open for change.   
It is exactly this possibility for creating change that separates Augustine from 
Hegel.  Hegel could only acknowledge change in history but no longer thought it 
necessary for true change to occur in modern society.  Hegel’s self-transcending 
immanence was meant to be the self-surpassing of human limitations through conflating 
creation and fall, such that existence is ‘sinful’ in its ontological alienation from itself, all 
without reference to any actual transcendence.  Because there is no distinction between 
creation and fall (i.e. there was no change for the worse) Hegel is unable to think change 
(for the better) once he has articulated his own philosophical system.  But Augustine, in 
holding apart creation and fall, conceptualizes both the change to worse (bondage of the 
will) and its consequent change for the better (true freedom).  While the former (the fall) 
was an act of sinful self-immanenting through free choice, the latter (redemption) is not 
an act of self-transcending through an alternative free choice.  Rather, the self-
immanenting act of humanity is only reversed through the self-immanenting act of God 
in the Incarnation.  Only because of God’s self-immanenting transcendence it is possible 
for humanity to transcend its own sinful limitations, opening the possibility for an 
alternative kind of human society. 
The exact contours of this alternative society, and that to which it is a contrast, 
still need to be examined.  The workings of this society were alluded to above while 
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discussing alternative exemplum through which Augustine’s conversion came.  These 
examples helped integrate the subjective and social within the process of conversion.  But 
as will be shown in the next chapter, it is really Christ who founds and established this 
alternative society, and therefore it is Christ who is the true example of freedom.  And yet 
Christ is not merely an example of freedom and justice, but is also the one who gives to 
humanity the ability to follow this example.  The next chapter, then, will examine more 
closely how God’ self-immanenting transcendence establishes an alternative society 
through the mediation of Christ. 
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CHAPTER 6: SOCIETY AND FREEDOM: CITY OF GOD 
 
The just live by faith, which works by love: by that love with which a man loves God as 
God ought to be loved, and his neighbor as himself.1 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter five focused on the conversion of the subject as a transition from one 
society to another society, held together through the self-immanenting transcendence of 
the Incarnation.  The Incarnation of the Word provided the means through which God re-
forms humanity toward freedom.  Beyond the bondage of the will within fallen human 
society, the converted will is a uniting of graced subject and society through the 
mediation of Christ, who is both God and human.  This chapter will broaden the 
discussion of human society only briefly touch upon in the previous chapter. For this we 
will focus on Augustine City of God.   
On a superficial level the argument of City of God can be laid out rather quickly.  
The antithetical relationship between the heavenly and the earthly cities stem from either 
an orderly love directed toward God or a disordered love directed toward self.  And yet, 
within this present age (saeculum), these two cities are entangled such that one cannot 
clearly distinguish the two until the final judgment.  Within this entanglement each city 
makes use of temporal goods creating a shared common peace.  This common peace, 
within this present age, secures a semi-autonomous realm for political deliberation 
regarding the common good among those who hold different comprehensive doctrines.  
The Rawlsian idiom ending the previous sentence signals the purpose and direction of 
                                                
1 ciu. 19.23.   
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such an interpretation.  This type of interpretation is meant to make Augustine palatable 
for contemporary political theory, allowing it to interact with modern concepts. 
Although the above description is useful and concise, this chapter argues that such 
a view offers an incomplete understanding of Augustine’s political thought.  But more 
importantly, this type of reading mutes the more pertinent aspects of Augustine’s political 
theology relating to political criticism and change.  By moving beyond individual 
subjectivity and its conversion examined in the previous chapter, this chapter will look at 
Augustine’s understanding of human society as a whole.  The overall goal of this chapter 
is to deepen the previous account of God’s self-immanenting transcendence, but now 
focusing on society rather than subjectivity.  This attention on society will focus on the 
mediating activity of Christ, now centered on the factors of justice and love rather than 
issues of the freedom of the will.  As we will see, justice and love can only come through 
the mediation of Christ who both founds and exemplifies a truly just and loving society.  
Through this mediation a critical distance is created out of which a constructive social 
change is possible.  This chapter, then, shows the significance of God’s self-immanenting 
transcendence in producing an alternative society capable of both social criticism and 
constructive change, a criticism and change working toward justice and love.  Through 
this chapter Augustine’s understanding of God’s self-immanenting transcendence will be 
shown to offer better resources for understanding social critique and change than Hegel’s 
self-transcending immanence. 
 
Reading City of God through book 19 
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 As with previous Augustinian themes (as with Hegel earlier), we must clear the 
ground a bit concerning dominant interpretations.  To this end I will fill out the above 
sketch with reference to R. A. Markus’s understanding of the saeculum and Oliver 
O’Donovan’s emphasis on love as the linchpin of Augustine’s political thought.   
 Markus sees Augustine’s mature political thought as striking a balance between a 
Eusebian celebration and a Hippolytan judgment of Rome.  For Eusebius, a Christian 
Emperor sitting in Rome represents the unification of what was held separate during the 
life of Christ and the rule of Augustus.  With Constantine comes a “single harmonious 
order, one Empire devoted to the worship of the one true God.”2  But to this messianic 
rendering of Constantine is a Hippolytan alternative of judgment and condemnation, 
fueled by past persecutions.  Hippolytus poured out apocalyptic pronouncements against 
Rome in the tradition of the writers of Daniel and Revelation, denouncing it as a “satanic 
imitation of the kingdom of Christ.”3  Augustine, however, was wary of either total 
acceptance or total rejection of these traditions.  For Augustine, according to Markus, 
“the Empire is not to be seen in terms either of the messianic image of the Eusebian 
tradition or of the apocalyptic image of the Antichrist of the Hippolytan 
tradition…[Rome] is theologically neutral.”4  For Markus, Augustine suspends Rome 
between the earthly and heavenly cities, radically indeterminate in this present age (the 
saeculum).5   
                                                
2 R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 50. 
3 Markus, Saeculum, 49. 
4 Markus, Saeculum, 55. 
5 Markus, Saeculum, 58. 
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This is, of course, not to collapse the distinction between the earthly and heavenly 
cities.  They are radially dichotomous in terms of justice and love.  But the polarity of 
‘formal’ definition is always mixed within the ‘empirical’ situation of temporal existence.  
As Augustine says, “In this world (saeculo), the two cities are indeed entangled and 
mingled with one another; and they will remain so until the last judgment shall separate 
them” (ciu. 1.35).6  This temporal mixture ultimately renders invisible both the earthly 
and heavenly cities until the final judgment separates them, rending indeterminate any 
current identification of either the earthly city with Rome and the heavenly city with the 
church.7   
This dual invisibility allows for an overlapping use of temporal goods even if 
each ultimately orders them differently (i.e. only the heavenly city properly orders the 
love of temporal things toward the eternal).8  For Augustine, the earthly city has 
wrongfully restricted its concern only to “temporal peace,” the sphere of material needs 
and their satisfaction through orderly social interactions.  The heavenly city, on the other 
hand, properly uses temporal goods as ordered toward the eternal.  Regardless of their 
differences, as Markus notes, “the earthly peace is of common concern to all, whether 
citizens of the heavenly or the earthly cities; it is valued and ‘loved’ by both.”  Markus 
continues, 
Augustine’s ‘positivistic’ definition of the res publica appears to have been very 
carefully devised to make room for this overlap.  The people constituting a res 
publica are agreed in valuing certain things; they need not be agreed in valuing 
them on identical scales of value, still less do they need to be agreed on the 
objects upon which they set supreme value.9 
                                                
6 See also ciu. 11.1 
7 Markus, Saeculum, 60-62. 
8 See ciu. 15.4, 19.17, 19.26. 
9 Markus, Saeculum, 69. 
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The bulk of Markus’ argument centers on book 19 of City of God and its replacement of 
justice by love as the definition of a commonwealth, an argument introduced but not 
extensively pursued in book 2.  He argues that this redefinition of a res public according 
to love allows for different ultimate allegiances to engage each other within a restricted 
sphere of temporal goods and its earthly peace.  This restricted sphere allows for the 
autonomy of an inherently pluralistic state in which different motivating structures can 
form coincident decisions.10  For Markus, these conceptualization all flows from 
Augustine’s “understanding of the saeculum, not as a no-man’s land between the two 
cities, but as their temporal life in their interwoven, perplexed, and only eschatologically 
separable realities.”11 This, in nuce, is Markus’ reading of Augustine. 
Oliver O’Donovan criticizes Markus for his agnosticism concerning historical 
identifications of the either the earthly city (with Babylon and Rome) and the heavenly 
city (Israel and the church), he questions Markus’ supposed neutrality of actual historical 
communities, and complains of Markus’ over-hasty assimilation of Augustine to modern 
liberalism.12  Nonetheless, O’Donovan also sees book 19 as the center of Augustine’s 
political theology, with 19.24 constituting a critical turning point in Augustine’s 
                                                
10 Markus, Saeculum, 69-70. 
11 Markus, Saeculum, 71. 
12 See Oliver O’Donovan, “The Political Thought of City of God 19,” in Oliver 
O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan (eds), Bonds of Imperfection: Christian 
Politics, Past and Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 48-72, substantially 
revised from  “Augustine’s City of God XIX and Western Political Thought,” Dionysius, 
11 (1987): 98-110 (reprinted in Dorothy F. Donnelly, The City of God: A Collection of 
Critical Essays [New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1995], 135-150).  
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thought.13  In O’Donovan’s mind, Augustine’s redefinition of a res publica around love 
rather than justice allows for the possibility of understanding earthly peace without 
Augustine compromising his principle that a res publica is only just when God is given 
his due through right worship.14  While offering a corrective to Markus, O’Donovan 
likewise perpetuates the practice of centering Augustine’s political thought on book 19 
and its concerns with temporal peace and love.  Both Markus and O’Donovan continue 
the modern interpretation of Augustine that emphasizes eschatological ends over a 
supposed natural order.15 
And certainly, in agreement with Markus and O’Donovan, it is right to make love 
central to Augustine’s political thought.  Certainly Augustine uses love as an essential 
definition of the two cities: “Two cities, then, have been created by two loves: that is, the 
earthly by love of self extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly city by love 
of God extending to contempt of self” (ciu. 14.28).  And earlier, “In the one city, love of 
God has been given pride of place, and, in the other, love of self” (ciu. 14.13).  Echoing 
his claim from Confessions (conf. 13.9.10), love is central to human existence because as 
“the body is carried by its weight” so too “the soul is carried by its love” (ciu. 11.28), 
directing the will appropriately or perversely.  This emphasis on love allows Augustine to 
place evil within the will rather than the objects perversely used by the will such that, for 
                                                
13 Gregory W. Lee draws attention to this overlapping emphasis between Markus and 
O’Donovan in his “Republics and Their Loves: Rereading City of God 19,” Modern 
Theology 27/4 (2011): 553-558. 
14 O’Donovan, “The Political Thought of City of God 19,” 55. 
15 By emphasizing eschatological ends rather than natural order Markus and O’Donovan, 
exemplifying typical modern interpretations, overturn medieval interpretations that 
emphasize natural order on the way to establishing Augustine as a natural law theorist.  
Concerning these modern and traditional schools of Augustinian interpretation, see 
Miikka Ruokanen, Theology of Social Life in Augustine’s City of God (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 9-18.  
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example, avarice is the effect of a disordered will rather than caused by a golden object 
itself, which remains good though loved poorly (ciu. 12.8).  A properly ordered love, 
therefore, is ordered according to the order of being found in all created things (ciu. 
15.22).  With these distinctions in mind Augustine can claim that the earthly city loves 
lower things (the self and the goods secured by an earthly peace) while the heavenly city 
loves the higher goods (God and eternal security) (ciu. 15.4).  Augustine grafts the 
absolute dichotomy of loves between the two cities onto a common order of being and its 
hierarchy of goods and concludes that the heavenly city uses earthly and temporal goods 
as pilgrims on a journey while the earthly city uses temporal good as if they were 
permanent residents (ciu. 19.17).16 
These texts can be gathered and directed in such a way as to explain Augustine’s 
replacement of love for justice in his definition of a res publica, with the added result of 
justifying the centrality of an overlapping concern for earthly peace (temporal goods) 
amid wildly divergent loves (love of self and love of God).  This emphasis softens the 
dichotomy between the two loves by finding a realm of overlapping interests within an 
earthly peace.  Marcus and O’Donovan play up the trajectory of such a reading, and as 
we have seen, Eric Gregory follows by emphasizing the political virtue of properly 
ordered love of God and love of neighbor.  
                                                
16 It is for this reason that Augustine’s uti/frui distinction becomes so important.  See 
Oliver O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruitio in Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana I.” Journal 
of Theological Studies 33/2 (1982): 361-97; Willian Riordan O’Connor, “The Uti/Frui 
Distinction in Augustine’s Ethics.” Augustinian Studies 14 (1983): 45-62; Raymond 
Canning, The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine (Leuven: 
Augustinian Historical Institute, 1993), 79-115; Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of 
Love: An Augustinian Ethics of Democratic Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008), 335-343. 
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But these types of readings have begun to be contested as self-serving and 
selective. If offering a redefinition of a res publica were the center of Augustine’s 
political thought, why introduce the concept in book 2 (the definition of a res publica) 
only to wait until book 19 to resolve it?  And if there is a good reason for the delay, what 
is missed in jumping from book 2 to 19 with hardly a comment on what lay between 
(besides touching on the texts mentioned above)?  And why, when Augustine is so 
persistent in his critique of the earthly city, is this, one of the only concessions made 
between the earthly and heavenly city (a shared earthly peace), developed into the center 
of Augustine’s political thought?17  These questions raise the possibility that something is 
amiss in the above approaches.  In order to correct these partial readings of City of God it 
is necessary not only to search Augustine’s texts for themes and topics interesting and 
accessible to modern political theorists, but also to follow the threads of Augustine’s own 
argument. 
With the goal in mind of following Augustine’s own argument this chapter will 
open with book 1 of City of God and its depiction of Rome and its lust for domination 
(libido dominandi).  This lust for domination expresses the essence of the earthly city and 
is therefore the baseline against which the heavenly city is a contrast.   With this 
emphasis on the lust for domination in mind we will then turn to Augustine’s discussion 
of justice in book 2.  Following this will be the linking of justice and love in book 10 and 
                                                
17 Representative of these criticisms are Gregory W. Lee, “Republics and Their Loves”; 
Robert Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), “Eloquent Lies, Just Wars and the Politics of 
Persuasion: Reading Augustine's City of God in a 'Postmodern' World.” Augustinian 
Studies 25 (1994): 77-138; Johannes van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into 
Augustine’s City of God and the Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities (Leiden: Brill, 
1991); Rowan Williams, “Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God,” Milltown 
Studies 19/20 (1987): 55-72. 
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17, and it mediation through Christ, the just founder of the heavenly city.  Only then will 
we turn to book 19 and examine how it weaves together justice and love.  Throughout I 
will show that Augustine has an overwhelming concern with justice, such that any 
supposed forsaking of justice for love misunderstands Augustine’s intention, rendering 
his political theology incomplete. 
Standing on its own this chapter will attempt to correct incomplete interpretations 
of Augustine’s political theology by holding together justice and love as 1) the means of 
critiquing the lust for domination of the earthly city and 2) as that which directs the 
change offered by the heavenly city through its earthly pilgrimage.  Within part two of 
this study the interpretation offered here will deepen the previous chapter’s account of 
God’s self-immanenting transcendence, but now adding the factor of justice and love to 
the previous transformation of will.  The mediation between God and humanity in the 
Son will be shown to be the key through which Augustine articulates an alternative 
society capable of criticism (against the lust for domination) and change (around true 
justice and love).  This alternative society is the correlate of the previous chapter’s 
emphasis on subjectivity, both of which are connected to the mediation of Christ.  Within 
the general evaluation between Augustine and Hegel, this chapter reveals the superiority 
of Augustine’s understanding of God’s self-immanenting transcendence in supplying a 
framework for social criticism and change when compared to Hegel’s understanding of 
humanity’s self-transcending immanence. 
 
1. The Earthly City and the Lust for Domination 
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 In the preface to book 1 Augustine lays out the essential themes of City of God, 
even if he did not know at the time how long the work would grow.18  Augustine first 
introduces the glorious city of God, referring to both its pilgrim (peregrinator) status and 
as it will be in its eternal home.  Augustine seeks to “defend her against those who favour 
their own gods above her Founder.”  Augustine then introduces his first antithesis 
through the pairing of pride and humility.  He says that the King and Founder of the city 
of God has proclaimed a divine law that “God resisteth the proud but giveth grace unto 
the humble.”  This is contrasted with the words of Virgil in reference to Rome, that the 
proud love to hear themselves praised with the motto: “To spare the [conquered] and 
subdue the proud.”19  While God gives grace to the humble (humilibus), Rome is praised 
for sparing the conquered (subiectis).  And while God resists the proud (superbi), Rome 
takes it upon itself to subdue the proud.  In these subtle contrasts Augustine is showing 
how human pride is always a perverse imitation of God (ciu. 19.12), supplanting the 
grace given to the humble by God for a mere sparring of the conquered by Rome, and 
                                                
18 City of God is a polemic works structured in two major parts in which Augustine 
defends the city of God against those who claim the sack of Rome happened because the 
people had forsaken the traditional gods (Johannes van Oort, in Jerusalem and Babylon, 
164-198, argues also for the dogmatic and catechetical aspects of the City of God).  The 
first part consists of 10 books disputing the claims of the earthly city against the heavenly 
city.  The second part consists of 12 books explaining the origins, progress, and ends of 
the two cities (CD 1.35; 10.32, 11.1; 18.1).  The first part separates into two section: 
books 1-5 dispute the claim that the gods be worshipped for benefit in the present life, 
and books 6-10 dispute that the gods be worshipped for the benefit of the life to come 
(CD 1.36; 5.26; 6.1). The second part includes two sections containing 4 books each 
concerning the origins (books 11-14), progress (books 15-18), and end (books 19-22) of 
the two cities (11.1; 15.1; 18.1).  See Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God: A Readers 
Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 67-73; Johannes van Oort, Jerusalem 
and Babylon, 75-77; John O’Meara, Charter of Christendom: The Significance of the 
City of God (New York: Macmillan, 1961), 31-34; Jean Claude Guy, Unité et structure 
logique de la ‘Cité de dieu’ de saint Augustin (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1961). 
19 All words in brackets within Dyson’s translation are my own, usually with the purpose 
of drawing out an emphasis or contrast that his word choice overlooks. 
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Rome sees itself as doing God’s work in subduing the proud.20  Only after the initial 
pairing of pride and humility does Augustine finally complete his most famous antithesis 
by raising the figure of the earthly city.  The defining attribute of this city is that “when it 
seeks [domination]” over others it “is itself [dominated] by the lust for [domination] (ipsa 
ei dominandi libido dominatur).”21  As we will see, this libido dominandi is the principle 
means by which Augustine critiques Roman virtue, showing that its civic virtues always 
served a will to dominate others.  But, as he states here and throughout, one is always 
dominated by this lust for domination, always leading away from freedom and justice 
toward slavery and domination. 
 
Temporal Goods, Virtue, and Death 
 
 In book 1, instead of tracing any of these themes directly Augustine first notes 
that critics of the heavenly city should praise rather than blame God because only in the 
Christian churches did these critics find safety from the attaching hordes.  Through a 
quick survey of Greek and Roman history Augustine finds that never before have the 
vanquished been spared in the halls of their own temples, but in Rome the pagans found 
shelter in the churches (ciu. 1.1-7).  Augustine further steals the wind from the critics’ 
sails when he reminds them of what every true philosopher knows, that loss of temporal 
goods is no true loss for the virtuous (ciu. 1.8-14).  By this Augustine places these critics 
on the horns of a dilemma.  Either these critics are virtuous and therefore ought not to 
fear death.  Or they are not virtuous because they worship false gods, but were saved by 
                                                
20 O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God, 75. 
21 Throughout I will be exchanging Dyson’s “lust for mastery” for “lust for domination” 
in translating libido dominandi and its cognates, indicated by brackets. 
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the true God anyway. Augustine wants to force them to choice between the failure of 
their own virtue or the failure of their gods. 
Augustine deepens this dilemma in 1.15 by raising before their eyes the noble 
example (nobilissimum exemplum) of Marcus Regulus.  Regulus, captured by the 
Carthaginians, is sent back to Rome in hope of exchanging prisoners.  Regulus is bound 
by oath to return to Carthage if he fails in releasing the captive Carthaginians from Rome.  
Regulus, however, advises the Senate not to release the prisoners, and, because of his 
oath, returns to Carthage to face a miserable death.  Augustine praises Regulus for his 
virtue (both in advising Rome on the wisest course of action and in keeping his oath), but 
draws a dual conclusion from this example.  On the one hand, if Regulus thought worship 
of the gods brought temporal benefit then he was sorely mistaken. The gods neither 
protected him from defeat or death.  On the other hand, if Regulus thought worship of the 
gods brought benefit only in the next life, then Regulus would not find any fault in the 
gods for his death.  In either case the critics bewailing the present woes of Rome have no 
argument to make. If Regulus, such a revered hero of Rome could come to such a death, 
then these critics ought not complain if Rome itself dies.  And if Regulus can die with his 
virtue while worshipping the gods, then the same ought to be true for Rome itself. 
These opening chapters, then, raise the issues of worshipping the gods for either 
temporal or eternal benefit, themes that will dominate the first part of City of God, books 
1-5 and 6-10 respectively. But Augustine has also introduced the issue of virtue and the 
place of exemplum in moral discourse.  Deepening these themes Augustine next turns to 
the issue of volitional death as a mark of Roman virtue, exemplified by Lucretia and 
Cato. 
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Lucretia and Cato as Exempla 
 
 Augustine initially takes up the issue of honorable suicide because during the sack 
of Rome women—especially certain Christian virgins—were sexually violated.  Critics 
mocked that God was not able to save those most dedicate to him, and added that these 
women were not even virtuous enough to kill themselves in order to prove their honor, as 
the great Lucretia had.22  Augustine first argues that chastity is maintained even if the 
body is violated by the lust of another.  Therefore a woman “has done nothing for which 
she ought to punish herself with voluntary death” (ciu. 1.18) because she is innocent of 
any crime.  Indeed, if one of these women were to commit suicide she would be guilty of 
killing an innocent person (ciu. 1.17).  Augustine, seeking to put to rest the concerns of 
Christian women who felt for the sake of honor they should kill themselves, sets justice 
as the criteria by which he will discuss Lucretia’s death. 
 In 1.19 Augustine turns to Lucretia, “that noble woman of Rome,” and seeks to 
draw out the inconsistencies of Roman conceptions of virtue.  By the time of Augustine 
the rape and suicide of Lucretia was an ancient tale told by Livy as an example of Rome 
virtue.  Because the story was so well known to his readers, Augustine glosses the details.  
After being raped by king Tarquin, Lucretia reveals to her husband and father what 
happened to her.   Then, “sick with the shame of what had been done to her, and unable 
to bear it, she slew herself.”  Why did she kill herself? Augustine asks.  It was not 
because of personal guilt or sadness.  Rather she killed herself as a public witness in light 
                                                
22 For a discussion of Roman views on chastity and suicide, and how they had crept into 
Christian thought and practice, see Dennis Trout, “Re-Textualizing Lucretia: Cultural 
Subversion in the City of God,” Journal of Early Christian Studies, 2/1 (1994): 53-70. 
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of her public shame.  In Rome, suicide is a means of public honor and glory, or rather, it 
is a practice of civic virtue.  For example, old men, rather than becoming a burden on 
society, would choose to die by closing their mouths to food as a way of maintaining 
their virtue.23  Suicide was also a public act used to prove a point.24  This occurs in the 
case of Lucretia.  Augustine asks the question that Lucretia knew everyone would ask, 
“Should she be judged an adulteress or a chaste woman?”  Lucretia killed herself in order 
to prove beyond all doubt her innocence and chastity, and therefore maintain her virtue.  
These were the traditional terms by which Lucretia’s suicide was understood.  But 
Augustine shifts the question from the issue of adultery and chastity, to that of guilt and 
punishment.  Why, if innocent, is Lucretia punished with death?  “If it was not through 
any impurity on her part that she was taken against her will, then it was no justice by 
which, being innocent, she was punished.”  Augustine raises the issue of justice in light 
of the violence suffered.  If Lucretia had suffered violence, how is it an act of justice that 
she would now be punished when she is innocent? If she punishes the innocent (herself) 
unjustly then she is a murderer.  But if she is not unjustly punished then she must have 
been an adulteress.  The situation reduces to a simple dilemma: 
If she is acquitted of murder, she is convicted of adultery; and if she is acquitted 
of adultery, then she is convicted of murder.  It is not possible to find a way out of 
this dilemma.  One can only ask: If she was an adulteress, why is she praised? If 
she was pure, why was she slain.  
 
Augustine, moving from a classical understanding of Lucretia death based in issues of 
chastity and honor, redefines the issue according to justice. In setting up this dilemma 
                                                
23 See Brian Harding, Augustine and Roman Virtue (New York: Continuum, 2008), 93-
95. 
24 Harding, Augustine and Roman Virtue, 94. 
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Augustine seeks to show the inconsistencies of Roman virtue in which the pursuit of 
honor is at odds with the practice of justice. 
 Augustine, however, does not end by noting inconsistencies.  He instead seeks to 
move below the symptoms to the underlying disease.  Below the issues of adultery or 
chastity, of guilt or innocence, Augustine suggests that Lucretia’s true motivation was not 
based in the strength of purity but the weakness of shame, a weakness springing from the 
love of praise. 
Being a Roman lady excessively eager for praise, she feared that if she remained 
alive, she would be thought to have enjoyed suffering the violence that she had 
suffered when she lived.  Hence, she judged that she must use self-punishment to 
exhibit the state of her mind to the eyes of men to whom she could not show her 
conscience.  She blushed, indeed, to think that, if she were to bear patiently the 
infamy that another had inflicted upon her, she would be believed to have been an 
accomplice to it. (ciu. 1.19) 
 
Rather than seek approval from the eyes of God who sees the purity of conscience and 
chastity (as Christian women are commended to do), Lucretia loved the praise of others 
and force them to see the contents of her mind through the corpse of her body.  Augustine 
claims this is a weakness based in shame rather than a principled commitment to purity, a 
weakness that cannot bear the foolish opinions of others but would rather dominate their 
praise (ciu. 1.22).   
 For Augustine this weakness of shame growing from the love of praise is rooted 
in a more sinister soil.  In book 5 he examines this more closely.  There Augustine claims 
that Rome expanded because they loved praise and glory and died for it, deeming it best 
to either die in glorious battle or live in freedom.  He explains that 
they suppressed all other desires in their boundless desire for this one thing.  In 
short, because they deemed it ignoble for their fatherland to serve and glorious for 
it to rule and command (dominari), the first object of all their desire was freedom 
(liberam), and the second mastery (dominam). (ciu. 5.12) 
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Rome thought it inglorious to serve and desired freedom instead.  Overcoming its more 
base desires because of its thirst for praise and glory, Rome became a great empire.  But 
Augustine contends that this desire for glory and freedom merely masked Rome’s deepest 
desire.  For “once they had achieved freedom (libertas), however, so great a desire for 
glory then arose that liberty (libertas) seemed to them too little by itself, unless they also 
sought domination (dominatio) over others” (ciu. 5.12). Roman moralists like Livy claim 
that this desire for glory overcomes a lust for mastery and represents the moral progress 
of the Romans.  But Augustine shows that desire for glory only masks the dark soil of 
domination.25  As Brian Harding says, the difference between the love of glory and the 
lust for domination “is not one of goals, but of methods and appearances.”26  According 
to the lights of the earthly city, love of praise and glory produce a certain level of virtue, 
keeping in check outright wickedness.  But for Augustine both are vices rooted in and 
expressing the will to dominate inaugurated by Romulus’ murder of Remus (ciu. 3.6).  
For Augustine, a truly virtuous person would not need love of praise to curb a lust for 
domination.  Indeed, a virtuous person despises the glory of others and instead rests in the 
judgment of God (ciu. 5.14, 19).   
 With this critique in mind we can return to the example of Lucretia, of which the 
Romans held as a matron of virtue and Augustine handed over as a mistress of vice.  
Rather than exhibiting the virtue of chastity and honor, by explaining her suicide as an act 
of weakness compelled by love of praise, Augustine is insinuating that rather than be a 
                                                
25 For a detailed survey on the perceived moral development from libido dominandi to 
love of glory, and Augustine’s critique of such a development, see Harding, Augustine 
and Roman Virtue, 35-102. 
26 Harding, Augustine and Roman Virtue, 89. 
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slave to the opinions of others Lucretia desired to master their opinions by dominating 
her own body.  As Harding suggests, “This desire turns the blade against Lucretia, her 
libido dominandi dominates her causing her for the sake of honour to slay herself.”27  By 
exchanging interpretive frameworks, Augustine has transformed Lucretia from an 
example of Roman virtue into an example of what Augustine had noted in the preface of 
book 1, that those given over to the lust for domination are in turn dominated by it. 
 To similar effect, in 1.23, Augustine raises the death of Cato as an example not of 
the virtue of conscience but the vice of domination.  Cato kills himself at Utica after 
Caesar effectively ends the Republic.  Cato’s suicide is held up as a valiant example of 
individual liberty and patriotic commitment to the Republic against Caesar’ domination.  
But Augustine finds in Cato another example of the contradictions of Roman virtue 
masking its libido dominandi.  Augustine wonders why, if death is preferable to life 
under Caesar’s rule, Cato would not also compel his son to die with him.  Would not a 
father’s sword have redeemed his son from such a disgrace?  Instead of being rooted in 
the love of liberty or the glory of Rome, Augustine suggests that “although Cato greatly 
loved his son, who he hoped and wished would be spared by Caesar, still more greatly 
did he hate…to give Caesar the glory of pardoning himself.”  As with all of Rome before 
him, Cato hated the idea of serving another rather than ruling, and could not live under 
the mercy of Caesar.  Again concurring with Harding, Cato 
dominates himself because he can no longer dominate anything else; in this 
suicide the repressed brutality of Romulus again returns to the surface pushing 
aside its mask of glory…[Cato] makes himself into a Roman hero like Romulus 
by treating his body as Remus.”28 
 
                                                
27 Harding, Augustine and Roman Virtue, 96. 
28 Harding, Augustine and Roman Virtue, 101. 
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Cato, in his pride, is dominated by the lust for domination, leading toward death rather 
than life.   
 In typical rhetorical fashion, Augustine has mined ancient exempla for a 
contemporary purpose. Augustine has twisted these examples to make a polemical point 
against his critics and their own perceived virtue.  As Augustine noted in the preface, it is 
the nature of the earthly city to attempt to subdue the proud and in the process end by 
being dominated by this very lust for domination.  Lucretia and Cato perfectly exemplify 
the perverse virtue of Rome causing it to celebrate those people whose pride compels 
them to subdue themselves.  The suicides of Lucretia and Cato reveal the self-subjection 
of the proud, motivated by a love of praise and glory, of which Augustine reveals to be 
merely a mask for a libido dominandi.  It is for these reasons that Augustine claims that 
Rome has developed the libido dominandi in its purest form (ciu. 1.30), cleverly veiled as 
a desire for glory.29  Lucretia and Cato, therefore, are not examples mobilizing a 
commitment to virtue, offering resources for positive change from a less virtuous to a 
more virtuous society.  Rather they capitulate to and therefore continue the oppressive 
Roman practice of dominating the subjected.  
 
Depths Of Domination 
 
 This purest form of domination, praise of glory ending in self-destruction, is the 
result of sin and its bondage.  God “did not intend that His rational creature, made in His 
own image, should have lordship (dominari) over any but the irrational creatures: not 
                                                
29 Here Augustine effectively anticipates and reverses Nietzsche’s critique of Christian 
humility as a mask for power by claiming that pagan virtue is a mask for unrestricted 
domination. 
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man over man, but man over the beasts…The first cause of servitude, therefore, is sin” 
(ciu. 19.15).  Seeking dominion over others, for Augustine, is the result and punishment 
of sin.  And in the process of seeking to rule over others each is ruled by sin.  For this 
reason Augustine argues that the harshest form of domination is not experiences from the 
hands of others but comes from the lust for domination itself (libido ipsa dominandi) 
(ciu. 19.15).  By this Augustine repeats the preface to book 1, that when the earthly city 
seeks to dominate over others it is itself dominated by this lust. 
This lust for domination seeks not only the servitude of fellow humans but also 
the gods as well.  This is Cain’s sin, the founder of the first earthly city and the first 
example (primo exemplo) or archetype of Rome (ciu. 15.5).  Cain sought not to serve 
God in his sacrifice but that through his sacrifice God would serve him.  For “this is the 
way of the earthly city: to worship a god or gods so that, with their aid, that city may 
reign in victory and earthly peace, not by the counsel of charity, but with lust for 
[domination] (dominandi cupiditate)” (ciu. 15.7).  Here we should note that Augustine 
connects “earthly peace” with “lust for domination” in a manner that should give pause to 
over hasty celebrations of earthly peace and its common use by the earthly and heavenly 
cities.  After the irenic statements in 15.4 concerning the earthly city and it loving lesser 
goods comes these darker consequences in 15.5 and 15.7.  Earthly peace is still 
compelled by domination, a domination not exhausted by the cessation of war (for it must 
be remembered that Cain and Abel were not at war when Cain murdered his brother). 
Indeed, even peace is not enough for the libido dominandi because it cannot bare 
sharing the glory of such a peace.  It is for this reason that Romulus killed Remus, 
because as co-founders of Rome the glory of the accomplishment was shared between 
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them.  But  “in order that one of them should wield entire mastery (totam dominationem), 
his colleague was removed” (ciu. 15.5).  As Augustine notes, unlike goodness that can be 
shared without diminishment, glory is always lessened when divided among equals.  It is 
for this reason the earthly city is always divided against itself.  While goodness is non-
competitive, glory always divides in seeking total dominion.  In these ways, therefore, the 
libido dominandi seeks dominion over humanity and the gods and it will suffer no rivals. 
Lucretia and Cato are examples of such domination in turning against themselves in order 
to master others.  Rather than being virtuous examples meant to spur on just deeds they 
are examples of vice perpetuating injustice.  Throughout book 1, then, Augustine weaves 
a polemic against a Roman pride that end in the death of the innocent. 
 
2. Justice and Res Publica 
 
 Now, at first glance it might seem that the above analysis of book one only 
strengthens those approaches that would place love at the center of Augustine’s political 
theology.  The libido dominandi of the earthly city is merely the negative correlate of the 
properly ordered love of the heavenly city.  And certainly this is true.  But to move from 
libido dominandi to properly ordered love moves too quickly and ignores the issues of 
virtue and justice that Augustine weaves into his critique of Rome.  In book 1 Augustine 
does not directly connect love of self with the formation of the libido dominandi, but 
rather connects it with the false virtues exemplified by Lucretia and Cato.  Here 
Augustine is practicing a theological critique located in concerns of justice rather than 
that of love.  When moving from the first to the second book of City of God we see this 
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concerned for justice explicitly raised.  And seeing this will help reveal the intimate link 
between justice and love that Augustine forges throughout City of God. 
 
The Justice of Gods and Romans 
 
 It is interesting to note that while Augustine’s stated purpose for book 2 is to 
show that Rome suffered many calamities under their gods before Christ was born (2.3).  
He begins by pointing out that the gods never provided Rome with just laws for upright 
living (2.4, 2.6, 2.16).  Rather than giving Rome laws directed toward justice the gods are 
instead examples of indecency and perversion.  Their public rites are more obscene than 
what anyone would permit to be done in private.  And the Romans tacitly knew it was 
better not to emulate their gods because they passed laws forbidding performers of such 
indecent rites from holding public office, and they forbid that the slanderous remarks 
directed toward the gods should ever be made of fellow countrymen.  In these ways they 
showed more concern for themselves than their gods, an inconsistency Augustine is 
careful to exploit (ciu. 2.8-16). 
 But, Augustine wonders, “perhaps the divine beings saw no need to appoint laws 
for the Roman people because, as Sallust says, ‘justice and goodness prevailed among 
them as much by nature as by law’” (ciu. 2.17).  Against such a boastful claim, Augustine 
mercilessly recites all the ‘just and good’ deeds of the Romans, beginning with the rape 
of the Sabine women and the slaughter of their fathers and ending with the exile of the 
celebrated Roman general Marcus Camillus, disparaged and disgraced because of the 
envy of others.  Between these Augustine gives faint praise to the Romans who, although 
making Romulus a god, at least passed laws forbidding the emulation of his deeds.  
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Augustine shows that Rome had fallen from the heights of such “justice and goodness” 
well before the time of Christ (ciu. 2.18-20).  If Rome has become corrupt, Augustine 
shows that it had become so before Christianity began to have influence within the 
empire.  Throughout these chapters Augustine shows that the Roman gods neither 
promoted nor exemplified justice, and the Romans themselves neither loved nor practiced 
justice. Only after Augustine had dismissed the justice of the gods and the nature of the 
people does he then turn to Cicero’s much discussed definition of a res publica. 
 
A Res Publica of Justice 
 
 If justice is not secured through the gods by example or decree, or by the natural 
propensity of the Romans, then perhaps it is constructed through common agreement. In 
2.21 Augustine shifts from historical description to philosophical definition, drawing on 
Cicero.  Augustine cites the lines of Scipio through whom Cicero declares that like the 
harmony established by musicians, common agreement within a city must be established 
by justice, allowing for the ‘property of the people’, or commonwealth, to be secured.  If 
the common property of the people is violated by unjust rule (either by king, council, or 
all the people itself), then the res publica is not merely flawed, but ceases to exist.  
Within Cicero’s dialogue it is shown that this definition of a res publica is superior to 
others because it applies to all modes of governance: monarchy, republic, and democracy.   
 From here commentators often skip to Augustine’s claim that not only had Rome 
ceased to be a commonwealth because it had strayed from justice, but that it had never 
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been a commonwealth because it never practiced true justice.30  But before we ask about 
the nature of this ‘true justice’ mentioned at the end of 2.21 we must examine more 
closely the long quote added from book 5 of De republica in which Cicero laments the 
present state of Rome.  More than just using Cicero to indict Rome’s moral degradation 
in general, Augustine utilizes Cicero in accusing the ‘great men’ who were supposed to 
uphold the traditions and mores of Rome. “And what shall I say of our men?” declares 
Cicero,  
For morals have perished from the want of great men; and we must not only be 
held accountable for so great an evil; we must indeed, plead our cause as though 
charged with a capital offense.  For it is because of our vices, and not through any 
mischance, that we now retain only the name of the commonwealth that we long 
ago lost in fact.31 
 
As Robert Dodaro has argued, this passage and the previous passage from Cicero 
comparing the harmony of musicians to the common agreement of a res publica refer to 
the function of the statesmen in promoting justice within the commonwealth.32  Cicero 
laments not the failure of justice in general, but the specific failure of just statesmen to 
promote justice within the res publica.  It is against this failure that Augustine claims that 
true justice only exists in the commonwealth founded and ruled by Christ (ciu. 2.21).  In 
book 2, then, neither the gods, nor the innate justice and goodness of the Romans, nor the 
justice of the statesmen have secured Rome in its virtue or justice. Rome could not secure 
this justice because true justice only comes through Christ as the founder of the just 
society.  This appeal to Christ is not one step on the way toward abandoning justice for a 
broader conception of love as the definition of a res publica found in book 19.  Rather 
                                                
30 Representative are Ruokanen, Theology of Social Life in Augustine’s City of God, 122-
24, and O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God, 81-4.  
31 Quoted from Cicero’s De rep. 5.1 by Augustine. 
32 Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society,10-26. 
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Augustine is slowly laying the foundation for understanding the essential differences 
between the heavenly and the earthly cities based in justice.  
 
3. Justice, Love, and Sacrifice 
 
 Throughout the previous two sections we have first traced how Rome is 
dominated by the libido dominandi, using the desire for praise and glory to mask its more 
base desire to rule over others.  Then we examined the question of justice and the Roman 
res publica, seeing how Augustine claimed that only true justice resides in the city of 
God founded and ruled by Christ.  The persistence of the libido dominandi and its 
consequent injustice is caused both by the worship of false gods and the sinfulness of 
humanity, exemplified by Rome but applicable to all societies.33  And while we examined 
how Augustine uses Cicero’s definition of a res publica according to justice, we have not 
defined justice as Augustine sees it. 
 To understand the centrality of justice, and by way of introducing the related 
themes of love and sacrifice, let us refer to a statement in 19.23.  Here Augustine says, 
Justice is found where the one supreme God rules an obedient City according to 
His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him…In that City, both the individual 
just man and the community and people of the just live by faith, which works by 
love: by that love with which a man loves God as God ought to be loved, and his 
neighbor as himself.  
 
It is essential to understand this constellation of concepts here in 19.23 before moving on 
to the more famous 19.24 and its “objects of love” definition of a res publica.  The proper 
questions to be asked are not, What is justice and what is this ordered love?  Rather the 
                                                
33 See van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon, 129-131. 
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proper questions is, How does justice comes about and how is love properly ordered?34  
To do this we must inquire into the close connection between justice, love, and sacrifice.  
We will first do this by examining love and sacrifice in book 10, followed by observing 
how Christ is both “just and justifying” in book 17.  Both will deepen the previous 
chapter’s account of God’s self-immanenting transcendence as a means toward 
conversion, but now adding the factor of justice and love to the previous transformation 
of will, all mediated through Christ. 
  
From Justice to Love 
 
 Augustine subscribes to the classical notion that justice is giving each his due 
(ciu. 19.4).35  Connected to God this means to worship and serve God alone, for  
justice is that virtue which gives to each his due.  What kind of justice is it, then, 
that takes a man away from the true God and subjects him to impure demons?  Is 
this giving to each his due?...What justice can we suppose there to be in a man 
who does not serve God?” (ciu. 19.21) 
 
But what does it mean to serve God and thereby give God God’s due?  Book 10 gives us 
an answer to this question in reference to worship, but in a way we might not expect.   
 Worship is how we give to God what is God’s due through service (latreia) (ciu. 
10.1), a service “expressed through certain sacraments or performed within our own 
selves” (ciu. 10.3).36  But in performing this service we learn to cling to God who is our 
highest good, a clinging accomplished through love expressed as the fulfillment of the 
                                                
34 The neglect of these ‘how’ questions result in Gregory neglecting Augustine’s 
soteriology and ecclesiology. 
35 See also De lib. arb. 1.13. 
36 Earlier in the preface to book 6 Augustine speaks of the latreia due only to God as a 
way of setting up the discussion of books 6-10 regarding the benefit of worshipping the 
gods in view of the life to come.   
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dual love commands: love God and love your neighbor.  This practice of love “is worship 
of God” for “this is true religion; this is right piety; this is the service which is due to God 
alone” (ciu. 10.3).  Through the service of love for God and others, Augustine transforms 
the classical notions of justice by linking it to love, a transformation informed by Roman 
13:8 in which we are commanded to fulfill the debt of love to each other.37 
 Augustine, however, does not leave the connection between love and worship 
unexplored, instead asking more specifically about the service due to God.  Augustine 
centers on the practice of offering sacrifices because “it is certain, and no man would 
venture to deny it, that sacrifice is due only to God,” a practice Augustine sees 
established by Cain and Abel (ciu. 10.4).  But it is around the concept of sacrifice that 
Augustine’s doctrine of God begins to transform the categories of religious devotion.  For 
“who would be so foolish as to suppose that the things offered to God in sacrifice are 
necessary to Him for some purposes of His own?” asks Augustine (ciu. 10.5). Instead of 
being for God, sacrifices are required for our own benefit.  God desires not our sacrifice 
per se, but that in and through them we might draw near to God.   For “we are to 
understand these things simply as symbols of what we are to do now for the purpose of 
drawing near to God and helping our neighbor to do the same” (ciu. 10.5).  Illustrating 
from the psalms and prophets, Augustine concludes that the true, invisible sacrifice God 
requires is a contrite heart leading to acts of mercy.  Because mercy borne from contrition 
is the true sacrifice owed to God Augustine concludes that “all commandments, therefore, 
which we read concerning the many kinds of sacrifice offered in the ministry of the 
                                                
37 See also trin. 8. 
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tabernacle or the temple, are to be interpreted symbolically, as referring to love of God 
and neighbour.” 
Moving from here to Romans 12:1-6, Augustine discusses Paul’s exhortation that 
everyone offer themselves as living sacrifices in true humility.  But how is such a true 
sacrifice possible for those dominated by self-love, unable to will the good will of God?  
In an elegant passage bringing together several themes Augustine relates our sacrifice to 
the true sacrifice of Christ: 
Since, therefore, true sacrifices are works of mercy shown to ourselves and to our 
neighbours, and done with reference to God; and since works of mercy have no 
object other than to set us free from misery and thereby make us blessed; and 
since this cannot be done other than through that good of which it is said, ‘It is 
good for me to be very near to God’: it surely follows that the whole of the 
redeemed City—that is, the congregation and fellowship of the saints—is offered 
to God as a universal sacrifice for us through the great High Priest Who, in His 
Passion, offered even Himself for us in the form of a servant, so that we might be 
the body of so great a Head.  For it was this form that He offered, and in it that He 
was offered, because it is according to it that He is our Mediator. (ciu. 10.6) 
  
Central to this passage is the fact that Christ is the mediator because of his being in the 
form of a servant (recalling Philippians 2:6-11).  In his human weakness, participating in 
our “coat of skin” (conf. 7.18.24), Christ is our mediator.  Augustine elaborates in 10.20, 
saying,  
The man Jesus Christ, became the Mediator between God and man by taking the 
form of a servant.  In the form of God, He receives sacrifice together with the 
Father, with Whom He is one God.  In the form of a servant, however, He chose 
to be a sacrifice Himself…Thus, He is both priest who offers and the sacrifice 
which is offered. 
 
Here Augustine appeals to the dual nature of Christ, that in the form of God he receives 
sacrifices while in the form of a servant, of humanity, he offers sacrifice to God.  In his 
humanity, in the proper humility expected of humanity but lost in the pride of the fall, 
Christ offers the only true sacrifice due to God.    
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Augustine is giving content to what he only alluded to in book 10 of his 
Confessions.  It is not just that God took on the form of humanity that humanity might be 
re-formed, but Christ took on the form of a servant in order to render to God what is due 
to God in true sacrifice.  As he says in 10.6, in the Passion of Christ this true sacrifice is 
offered and through this offering the redeemed city is also offered to God.  The sacrifice 
that the faithful make to God is in reality the sacrifice that Christ made to God on behalf 
of humanity.  The redeemed city participates in this sacrifice through the continual 
celebration of the Eucharist “by which she demonstrates that she herself is offered in the 
offering that she makes to God” (ciu. 10.6).  Because it is Christ who offers the true 
sacrifice to God Christians know that their ability for such an act (which is really the act 
of love) does not come from themselves but from God.  As Dodaro indicates, in 
celebrating the Eucharist Christians “should recognize that the source of their virtue is 
found not in themselves, but in Christ.  By adopting this perspective, they too assume the 
‘form of a servant’, and in imitation of Christ, do not grasp at equality with God.”38  The 
Incarnation, then, is not merely an expression of the unity of God and humanity making 
possible the unity of love of God and love of neighbor, a position Gregory stakes out.  
Rather the Incarnation effects the mediation of Christ through who comes the ability to 
properly love at all.   
In taking up this form, Christ gives to God what is God’s due through love for 
God and neighbor.  This is possible because the “Son of God, remaining immutable in 
himself, put on humanity and bestowed upon mankind the spirit of His love through the 
mediation of a Man” (ciu. 10.29).  This bestowing of the spirit of love through the 
                                                
38 Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society, 104. 
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incarnation, perfectly expressed in his sacrifice, is that grace by which one can love God 
and love neighbor as one’s self.  Ultimately this is a Trinitarian process of love in which 
humanity is caught up, reordering our loves of self toward love of God and neighbor.39 
But we need to note how in the mediation of Christ we again see God’s self-
immanenting transcendence.  God in Christ enters the human situation to do for humanity 
what it could not do for itself.  Through the Incarnation, here specifically in death, Christ 
fulfills the dual love commands thereby rendering to God what is due to God.  God in 
Christ does this because humanity on its own could not give God God’s due because of 
the bondage of its own will to its libido dominandi.  Of this self-immanenting 
transcendence Augustine says that God  
established and founded this faith, that man might find a way to man’s God 
through God made man.  For this is ‘the Mediator between God and man: the man 
Christ Jesus’.  For it is as man that He is the Mediator and the Way. (ciu. 11.2)40 
 
Christ, as mediator between God and humanity because he is both God and human, offers 
on behalf of humanity the perfect sacrifice due to God.  According to this sacrifice justice 
and love come to humanity and are returned to God, a justice and love not possible for 
                                                
39 Certainly, at this point, much more could be said about love, both concerning the 
relation of self-love, neighbor-love, and God-love, and also regarding the Trinitarian 
nature of the love of God and love as God. This, however, would greatly expand the 
scope this inquiry that seeks to focus on the nature of the political subject in Augustine.  
The argument here assumes the work of Raymond Canning and Oliver O’Donovan, and 
in qualified fashion that of Eric Gregory.  On the Trinitarian nature of love see Canning, 
The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour, 301-314, and Lewis Ayres, “Augustine, 
Christology, and God as Love: An Introduction to the Homilies of 1 John,” in Nothing 
Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God ed. by Kevin Vanhoozer 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 67-93. 
40 Augustine continues: “If there is a way between one who strives and that towards 
which he strives, there is hope of his reaching his goal; but if there is no way, or if he is 
ignorant of it, how does it help him to know what the goal is?  The only way that is 
wholly defended against all error is when one and the same person is at once God and 
man: God our goal, man our way” (ciu. 11.2). 
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humanity according to its own will or effort. Augustine, however, has more to say 
concerning the salvific effects of Christ’s life and death.  And for this we will turn to 17.4 
and its account concerning Christ’s mediation of justice. 
 
The Just and Justifier 
 
 The connection between love and sacrifice united in Christ is strengthened when 
we return to the theme of justice.  Why is Christ’s sacrifice effective for humanity?  
Christ’s death is effective because Christ is the only truly just person who also justifies, 
overcoming the ignorance and weakness of sin. 
 Augustine argues for the mediation of justice through Jesus by considering 
Hannah’s song in 17.4.  This song is not merely “the words of a little woman giving 
thanks for the birth of her son,” but is rather “the Christian religion itself, the City of God 
itself, whose King and Founder is Christ.”  Referring to the city of God and Christ as its 
founder and king (conditor et rex) echoes the expression from 2.21 that true justice is 
only found in the city whose founder and rule (conditor rectorque) is Christ.41  It must be 
remembered that in 2.21 the issue was not justice in general, but the example of justice 
given by the statesmen.  Continuing in 17.4 Augustine says, “Through her, indeed, there 
speaks, by the spirit of prophecy, the grace of God itself, from which the proud are 
estranged so that they fall, and by which the humble are filled so that they rise.”  This 
falling of the proud and rising of the humble echoes the essential dichotomy between the 
two cities introduced in the preface to book 1.  Fundamentally, the adversaries of the city 
of God, here named as Babylon, “presume upon their own strength and glory in 
                                                
41 Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society, 108. 
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themselves and not in the Lord…In their pride, they believe that they can please God by 
their own strength, and that they do not need the help of God.”  They are “‘ignorant of 
God’s righteousness’ (Dei iustitiam) (that is, of that which God, Who alone is just and 
justifies us (iustus atque iustificans), gives to men).”42  Against pagan and Pelagian 
accounts of virtue in which moral strength is found within ourselves, Augustine claims 
that true virtue leading to true justice only comes from Christ who is just and also 
justifies.  Christ, the just one, is the true exemplum of justice lacking in a world 
dominated by examples of pride and injustice (especially those masked as virtue like 
Lucretia and Cato).  Christ acts as the true example of justice because when he took on 
human nature he remained righteous, not becoming sinful (sed iusta, non peccatrix erat), 
so that by this Christ might show “that it is sin which is evil, and not the substance or 
nature of flesh” (ciu. 10.24). 
In addition to being an example of justice, Christ also justifies the sinner in his 
death such that the weakness and penalty of sin is overcome (ciu. 20.6).  Justifying the 
sinner liberates the will from bondage caused by sin, overcoming not only ignorance but 
also moral weakness (the weakness seen in Lucretia bound to her libido dominandi). In 
Christ’s death humanity is able to see that death—as the penalty for sin, a penalty paid by 
Christ—should not be avoided nor sought out sinfully.  The penalty of sin is paid and the 
weakness of will caused by bondage to sin is broken in Christ’s death.  By breaking the 
bondage of sin Christ is able to establish a truly just community: he enables its citizens to 
act justly, free from the fear of death and the bonds of sinful habit.  Dodaro states this 
                                                
42 Parentheses are in Dylon’s translation.  Here Augustine is citing Roman 10:3, although 
the phrase “just and justifies” echoes Romans 3:26, that God alone is both the just and 
justifier of those who believe in Christ. 
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concisely: “As a truly just man, Christ offers the only perfect example of justice that can 
cure ignorance, while as the God-man he offers the grace by which the soul is enabled to 
understand and imitate his example.”43 Augustine frames Christ as the true statesmen 
who establishes and promotes justice by means of providing an adequate example (as 
just) and by providing the ability for following such an example (as justifier).  
 Whereas in book 10 Augustine spoke of Christ’s mediation through his sacrifice, 
connecting worship and love, here in book 17 we see that “Christ alone mediates justice 
because he alone is truly just, while he also justifies human beings, thereby uniting them 
with himself to form the only just society.”44  The creation of this just society is the goal 
of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, who mediates the true sacrifice to God as the 
just and justifying one.  In offering himself as a sacrifice Christ gives to God what is 
God’s due, the true act of justice.  Only in acting justly toward God can one secure a just 
society, for if one acts unjustly toward God then all else will fall into injustice and 
disorder.  It is for this reason that the true worship of God, secured only in the city of 
God, is the basis for justice (ciu. 19.24).  This justice, it should be remembered, is 
reversible with love for God and others, such that giving God justice through Christ is the 
only means by which love is secured for others. 
 Justice as giving to each person their due; worship as sacrificing to God what is 
due to God; love as the truth of which sacrifices are the symbol: these are all wrapped 
together and made possible by the priestly mediation of Christ who is the perfect 
statesmen as both just and justifier.  It is only within this configuration of concepts that 
                                                
43 Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society, 78.  See also 109.  In aditions to this, see trin. 4.4-
6, 4.15-19 elaboration on this theme of the unjust death of the just Christ overcoming 
humanity’s just punishment of death. 
44 Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society, 108. 
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we can understand Augustine’s summary statement in 19.23, noted at the opening of this 
section: 
Justice is found where the one supreme God rules an obedient City according to 
His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him…In that City, both the individual 
just man and the community and people of the just live by faith, which works by 
love: by that love with which a man loves God as God ought to be loved, and his 
neighbour as himself.45 
 
In the city of God, the just person and the just community live by faith expressing itself 
as love for God and neighbor.  This love is a fulfillment of justice in giving God God’s 
due, a giving that humanity is unable to give except as given through Christ, the mediator 
between God and humanity.  Christ, then, is the mediator of both love and justice in that 
true justice is love and true love is just.  This mediation springs from God’s self-
immanenting transcendence in the Incarnation in which the immutable partakes of the 
mutable, the immortal the mortal, so as to exemplify and offer love and justice to 
humanity (ciu. 9.17).  This mediation of justice and love overcomes the libido dominandi 
enslaving humanity, coming from beyond in humility to reverse the immanence of self-
loving pride. 
 
4. Love and the World 
 
 Having now outlined Augustine’s political theology according to the destructive 
libido dominandi in general, and Rome’s perfection of masking it with glory, and by 
                                                
45 Of course we have yet to say anything of how “God rules” the obedient city, noting the 
part excluded from the quote above: “…where, in consequence, the soul rules the body in 
all men who belong to that City and obey God, and the reason faithfully rules the vices in 
lawful order.”  This rule of God over the city (just as the soul rules the body and as 
reason rules the emotions) follows from Augustine’s hierarchy of being as a benevolent 
rule.  I will not explicitly deal with this issue of God’s rule here as its implicit answer lies 
within the discussion of love below and the non-competitive nature of God’s will and 
ours explored in the previous chapter. 
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understanding Augustine’s continuing commitment to justice as love for God and 
neighbor mediated through the Incarnation, we must answer an objection, or rather, the 
fundamental objection, raised against adopting this exposition of God’s self-immanenting 
transcendence. 
This objection asks, does not such a strong linking of justice and love to the 
worship of God exactly promote the problem of otherworldly detachment for which 
Hegel offers an alternative? Does not anchoring justice and love in God precisely divert 
adherents from the needs and concerns of justice and love in this world while passively 
travelling beyond?  If justice is not so easily separated from love, if Augustine’s 
replacement of a love for justice as a definition of a res public in 19.24 is as much ironic 
concession as positive proposal,46 then is not earthly peace lost as a possible platform on 
which to build a Christian concern for the world?  Without such a foundation is not 
Augustinian political theory apt to drift into otherworldly escapism?  And if so, then does 
not the critical apparatus constructed by contrasting the libido dominandi with true justice 
and love fail to change the world even if it can critique it?  It is these types of objections 
that prompt people like Markus and O’Donovan to read Augustine as replacing justice for 
love so as to ensure a minimal discourse around worldly peace.  And lastly, if these types 
of objections are true then at best Augustine fails to promote freedom here and now, and 
at the worst he positively inhibits freedom under the guise of a freedom to come in a 
                                                
46 Note especially that in 19.24 this definition places the supposed heights of Athens and 
Rome on equal footing with the tyrannical depths of Babylon. 
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world beyond.  As Hegel would ask, is not such other-determined freedom exactly not 
freedom?47 
The lineaments of a response to such objections should already be well within 
view. But answering such an objection will farther clarify the need for adopting the 
theological orientation of God’s self-immanenting transcendence as the basis not only for 
political criticism, but also constructive change.  To answer this objection we will look at 
the pilgrim distance and the pilgrim love of the city of God. 
 
Pilgrim Distance  
 
 To answer the otherworldly objection we must return to a concept that will at first 
seem only to exacerbate the problem.  This is the idea that the city of God is a pilgrim 
city, a city journeying through this world. This aspect of the city of God was announced 
in the preface to book 1: The city of God both dwells “by faith as a pilgrim” and “in the 
security of that eternal home which she now patiently awaits.”  This is the eschatological 
tension within the city of God in which a part of humanity sojourns toward the eternal 
security already experienced by the unfallen angels.48  Citizens of the city of God are 
those “awaiting a heavenly fatherland (supernam patriam) with true faith” and “know 
that they are pilgrims (peregrinos) even in their own habitations” (ciu. 1.15).49  This 
                                                
47 While part one of this study hoped to show that Hegel’s answer to the question of 
otherworldliness is deeply flawed, the question itself still stands as a reflection of our 
modern milieu.  This second part focusing on Augustine attempts exactly to give an 
alternative basis from which to ask and answer this question of freedom. 
48 Book 11 of the City of God speaks of the fallen and unfallen angels. 
49 For a full examination of all the uses and meanings of peregrinatio and its cognates in 
City of God, and its use in other works see van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon, 131-142. 
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world is not home for the citizens of the city of God.  They travel toward their true 
homeland beyond this mortal life.   
Turning back to Cain and Able, the archetypes of the struggle between the two 
cities, we can begin to see the political edge of such a distinction.  In 15.1 Augustine 
reminds us that the history of the two cities “extends throughout the whole of this time or 
age (saeculum)” of mortal living and dying.  It is within this time that “Cain founded a 
city, whereas Abel, a pilgrim (peregrinus), did not found one.”  The earthly city, “which 
is not a pilgrim (non peregrinantem) in this world, but which finds its rest in its own 
temporal peace and felicity (temporali pace ac felicitate)” (ciu. 15.17), makes its home in 
this world and puts its trusts in it rather than hoping in God (ciu. 15.21).  More 
specifically, the city of God learns, as a pilgrim on earth (peregrinator in terris), that  
it should not trust the freedom of its own will (libertate arbitrii), but should ‘hope 
to call upon the name of the Lord God.’ For the will which is present in man’s 
nature can fall away from good to do evil; and it does this through its own free 
choice (libero arbitrio)…It can also turn away from evil to do good; but it cannot 
do this without divine aid. (ciu. 15.21) 
 
This passage links the distinction between the earthly and heavenly cities to the previous 
discussion of the divided will that fell into bondage by its own free choice and is unable 
to liberate itself by the same free choice.  The earthly city, through its own free choice, is 
bound in the unfreedom of the libido dominandi.  These comments on the will return to 
the argument from the previous chapter. 
 But Augustine’s main concern here lies not with the ability of the will to enslave 
itself, but the nature of this enslavement and its effects on earthly societies.  Earlier we 
looked at book 15 concerning the depths of the libido dominandi.  In 15.5 Augustine 
reminds us that not only is Cain the founder of the first earthly city, but this city was 
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founded on a fratricide in the slaying of Abel.  This fratricide is repeated by Romulus in 
the slaying of Remus because the glory of Rome could not be shared.  This founding 
event (inaugurated by Cain and repeated by Romulus) exemplifies the libido dominandi 
seeking domination over others.  The founding of the earthly city and its competition of 
goods (the praise of others as a means toward self-love) destines the earthly city to be 
always “divided against itself,” while the citizens of the heavenly city “cannot strive 
among themselves” (ciu. 15.5) in seeking the good.  The earthly city is always divided 
against itself, even in times of peace, because the glory sought is always unsharable and 
therefore competitive.  The goodness that is loved among the citizens of the heavenly 
city, however, “is a possession which is enjoyed more fully in proportion to the concord 
that exists between partners united in charity” (ciu. 15.5).   
 That the heavenly city is based in non-competitive goodness and love should not, 
however, lead to a triumphant perfectionism.  Augustine stipulates later in 15.5 that while 
on their pilgrim way towards perfection, mortal citizens of the heavenly city have not yet 
attained this perfection of goodness and love.  This lack of attainment causes strife within 
each citizen and between citizens of the heavenly city (ciu. 15.5).  For this reason 
Augustine claims that righteousness or justice “is in this life such that it consists only in 
the remission of sin rather than the perfection of virtue,” such that pilgrims on the way to 
their homeland are always begging for forgiveness rather than demanding perfection (ciu. 
19.27).  This “contrite heart, humble in penitence” (ciu. 10.5) leads us precisely back to 
book 10 and its discussion of sacrifice, love, and justice.  The way of justice in this world 
always begins with a penitent heart for its lack of love, and always ends with love of God 
and love of neighbor.  In a sense, each makes up the two-step process of walking forward 
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on the pilgrim journey, first repenting and then loving.   But neither step is possible, the 
penance for self-love and the action of God- and neighbor-love, outside the mediation of 
Christ who founds the true city in justice and love. 
This love creates the distance necessary to criticize the libido dominandi 
dominating the earthly city.  It is exactly because of this pilgrim status that Augustine is 
able to deftly analyze the false virtues of the earthly city and unmask its libido 
dominandi.  And as we have seen, while this pilgrim distance from the earthly city 
springs from Augustine’s ontology (the natural order of being and desire), it is 
fundamentally practiced through his soteriology (the re-ordering of desire).50  This 
soteriology focuses on the mediation of justice and love in Christ as the self-immanenting 
transcendence of God.  The otherworldly God creates the possibility of critique within 
this world through the mediation of Christ.  This is a critique offered against the 
dominating practices of the earthly city. 
In offering this critical distance Augustine gives us something that Hegel could 
not provide.  As we saw in chapter 3 above, Hegel’s self-transcending immanence could 
not provide a critical distance from which to move from a worse to better society (or for 
Hegel, a more free society).  A lack of critical distance is caused by uniting subject and 
society in such a strong manner that fundamental change was no longer necessary within 
Hegel’s system.  This denial of change could not hold leading to the current 
                                                
50 Of course I am not trying to pit Augustine’s ontology against his soteriology.  As I 
showed in the last chapter, they are intimately connected as creation and re-creation.  But 
when considering Augustine’s political theology and the ordering of desire the emphasis 
must lay in the soteriological re-ordering of desire through the mediation of Christ.  This 
emphasis is lacking in Eric Gregory in his persistent emphasis on the ontological ordering 
between love of God and neighbor without adequately investigating the soteriological 
moments of mediation and change.  Here I am emphasizing the soteriological how rather 
than the ontological what. 
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interpretations between Pippin and Žižk.  Pippin represents the Hegelianism of communal 
practices and social normativity.  Because there is no space outside of this social 
normativity Pippin ends up foreclosing a subjectivity capable of true social change.  
Pippin does this for the same reasons as Hegel: namely, that modernity no longer needs a 
fundamental transformation, only continual piece-meal evolutions within a progressive 
social normativity.  Indeed, Pippin excludes the very possibility of an alternative society 
into which one might transform.   
Augustine, however, has made this transformation fundamental to his thought on 
the will in particular and society in general.  It is never the case that there is only one will 
or one society that is under consideration.  There are always two: either the fallen will 
and its bondage to sin or the graced will and its regained freedom; either the earthly city 
and its libido dominandi or the heavenly city and its love of God and neighbor.  A 
movement between two real alternatives is excluded by Hegel’s self-transcending 
immanence where there is no real transition or change beyond the circle of immanence 
where creation is coterminous with fall.  Augustine, in affirming the necessity of creation 
and the contingency of fall is able to hold the two in tension and, through God’s self-
immanenting transcendence, show how a transition between the two is possible.  This 
movement between two (two wills and two societies) is that through which a critical 
distance is opened. 
  
Pilgrim Love 
 
But this critical distance is hardly the only benefit of the pilgrim status of the 
heavenly city.  It certainly is not Augustine’s emphasis.  Rather, this pilgrim status 
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enables citizens of the heavenly city to live in charity with one another in a non-
competitive and therefore non-dominating manner.  We already noted this non-
competitiveness in book 15, but we can also see it in turning to book 19.  In 19.14 
Augustine gives an example of how a pilgrim citizen lives in charity rather than 
domination.  After discussing how irrational animals and rational souls desire peace, 
Augustine turns to the dual love commands to show in what way peace is achieved within 
human community.  Each individual, in loving God and ones neighbor as oneself, will 
then  
be at peace with all men as far as in him lies: there will be that peace among men 
which consists in well-ordered concord.  And the order of this concord is, first 
that a man should harm no one, and second, that he should do good to all, so far 
as he can. 
 
Here Augustine intertwines love and peace, and specifies that loving one’s neighbor 
means not harming anyone and doing them good as far as possible.51  Passages like this 
lend credence to interpreters like Gregory who emphasize the centrality of ordered love 
for Augustine’s political theology.  I affirm with Gregory that “the self that is ordered 
toward God is released to love rather than grasp or posses the neighbor” because  
‘for Augustine, it is not as if God and the neighbor are in competition for the 
subject’s affections.’  Rather, Augustinian love aims to release the creative 
generosity and receptivity that allows for genuine community.52 
 
And I can certainly agree with how Gregory outlines this Augustinian love of neighbor as 
a compassion fused with prudence, an equality expressed non-identically, all with an eye 
                                                
51 Augustine describes the details of this “ordered concord” on different ontological and 
social levels at the beginning of 19.13: the order between body and soul, cognition and 
action, God and humanity, and within humanity (as an ordered household and an ordered 
city. 
52 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 329.  Gregory is quoting Raymond Canning, 
The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour, 12-13. 
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to doing no harm.53  The non-competitive aspect of love of God and love of neighbor 
makes all this possible and desirable.  Only within the earthly city are God, neighbor, and 
oneself in competition leading to division and domination. 
 By following Augustine farther in 19.14, however, we can see in which way 
Gregory’s interpretation needs completing.  After explaining how peace is accomplished 
through the dual love commands Augustine offers an example introducing the concepts 
of justice and mercy, the pilgrim city, and the libido dominandi.  Augustine begins 
saying, “In the household of the just man, however, who ‘lives by faith’ and now is still a 
pilgrim on his way to that Heavenly City, even those who command are the servants of 
those whom they seem to command.”  Note that Augustine is speaking of the just man 
who is a pilgrim.  We know that a just person is one who has received the mediation of 
justice and love through Christ, now living as a pilgrim in this life.  And as one 
participating in the justice and love of Christ, this just person now commands as a 
servant, taking on the form of Christ’s humble service.  Continuing in 19.14 Augustine 
offers a contrast: “For it is not out of any desire for mastery (dominandi) that they 
command; rather they do so from a dutiful concern for others; not out of pride in ruling, 
but because they love mercy.”  Here, in dual contrasts, Augustine alludes to the 
fundamental difference between the earthly and heavenly cities.  Those within the earthly 
city command from a libido dominandi.  But pilgrims of the heavenly city lead from an 
express concern for others.  The earthly city takes pride in ruling while the heavenly city 
practices mercy.  As we have seen in book 10, this practice of mercy through loving 
others functions as the true sacrifice and is therefore a practice of justice. This practice is 
                                                
53 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 292-98. 
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only possible through the mediation of justice and love in Christ.  Only in Christ is the 
dominating pride of the earthly city overcome allowing for the founding of true 
community in justice and love.  Only in the founding sacrifice of Christ, an act of love 
and mercy for others rather than an act of domination over others, is a truly just and 
loving community formed.54   
 The pilgrim status of the city of God, founded by Christ, does not deny or flee 
from this world on its passage to the next.   Rather, its pilgrim status allows for a critical 
distance through which to judge the earthly city’s libido dominandi.  But in addition to 
this critical distance a constructive change is made possible through the mediation of 
Christ.  As a people entering the non-competitive practice of love, the pilgrim city re-
orders the structures of human society, from the household to the city and beyond.   
The possibilities of critique and the practices of change flow from the pilgrim 
status of the city of God.  In fundamental agreement with Gregory, but attempting to push 
him farther, this analysis argues that the charge of otherworldliness causing a disregard 
for worldly politics should be turned on its head.  Profound resources are found within a 
pilgrim people for a worldly political praxis able both to protest the dominant social 
                                                
54 It might be objected that since I have been arguing for the convertibility of justice and 
love through worship, does not my criticism of those like Gregory (and also of 
O’Donovan) fall short in that while emphasizing love they were also, necessarily, 
speaking of justice.  If this is true, then am I not merely faulting them on matters of 
emphasis rather than of substance?  But the truth is that they are the ones denying the 
convertibility of justice and love by driving a wedge between them in speaking explicitly 
of the change from justice to love in Augustine’s definition of the commonwealth in 
19.24 (for O’Donovan), or by failing to speak of justice and worship in relation to love 
(for Gregory).  They have done this to secure a more neutral region through which to 
discuss Augustine’s political theology, but have done so at the cost of the intricate 
coherence of his thought, specifically soteriology and ecclesiology.  
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structures as well as the ability to practice concrete change.55  But in disagreement with 
Gregory, these resources for critique and change cannot be gathered through a sustained 
reflection on Augustine’s ontology of ordered love but only through his soteriology of 
properly re -ordered love.  This soteriology emphasizes an alternative society founded 
and formed by Christ, of which Gregory all but ignores. 
In offering this pilgrim love Augustine again gives us something that Hegel could 
not provide.  In Žižek’s hands Hegel is not bound to the perpetuation of social 
normativity (i.e. Pippin’s interpretation).  Rather, Žižek’s Hegel places subjectivity 
beyond such social normativity as a persistent ‘tarrying with the negative.’  For Žižek, the 
subject is nothing but the perpetual failure to become a subject.  This perpetual failure 
creates a critical distance from which one can condemn dominating social practices. 
Žižek, however, has no positive account about the re-formation of human subjectivity 
toward love leading his radical political subjectivity into a deadlocked space of criticism 
without any orientation toward the good, love, or freedom (except the freedom of 
subjective negativity).  This deadlock comes from making the subject absolute, even in 
its persistent failure. Žižek can only articulate the ‘subject’ beyond the status quo but 
cannot articulate a ‘converted subject’ seeking the positive good of love of neighbor as 
love for God.   
The Žižekian form of Hegel’s self-transcending immanence focuses on the more-
than-merely-immanent structure of the subject, but because this is only a ‘self-
transcending’ he can never offer a theoretical or practical subject capable of constructive 
social change.  Žižek cannot because his fundamental contrast is between radical 
                                                
55 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 319-20. 
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subjectivity and social normativity rather than the Augustinian contrast between two 
societies and there respective subjectivities. Because Žižek opposes subject and society 
he can never affirm a positive construal of subject and society ordered around love, even 
a pilgrim love marked by confession and mercy.  Augustine, however, does not 
fundamentally oppose subject and society.  Rather, as we have shown in Confessions and 
City of God, subject and society are mutually reinforcing within the earthly and heavenly 
cities, even while being open to a transcendence beyond both. 
The most important difference between Žižek and Augustine concerns how one 
transitions between the two societies.  For Žižek, within a paradigm of self-transcending 
immanence, it is the subject’s own heroic effort by which she separates herself from the 
dominant social normativity even though this never really leads to an alternative social 
construction.  This heroic effort is experienced as a dying to oneself, a dying to the 
process of knowing oneself through society’s norms.  This is Žižek’s ‘subjective 
destitution’ explored at the end of chapter one.  Augustine, on the other hand, shows that 
this self-transcendence never escapes the bonds of sin.  Rather, God’s self-immanenting 
transcendence is that by which humanity transcends its own captivity to its libido 
dominandi.  God’s self-immanenting transcendence breaks the social normativity of sin’s 
libido dominandi and all is various guises, allowing for the reformation of the will toward 
love of God and love of neighbor.  For Augustine, the radical break from dominating 
social structures does not come from humanity by itself, but only through the mediator 
between God and humanity, who is both divine and human, who founds an alternative 
society of freedom and justice.  Only through the mediation of the Son is a transition, a 
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conversion, possible.  The pilgrim status of the city of God centers on this very 
mediation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Reordering Love 
 
 Certainly more could be said about the political significance and practice of such 
a pilgrim distance and pilgrim love.  We must, however, tend to the goals of this chapter 
to show the centrality of not only love, but also of justice in Augustine’s political 
thought.  This was exhibited by seeing the reversibility of justice and love for Augustine, 
as well as their unity through sacrifice.  It was further shown that the true practice of 
justice, love, and sacrifice is not possible for humanity because it is dominated by its 
libido dominandi.  Only in Christ’s sacrifice, the mediator between God and humanity, 
can justice and love be properly ordered and implemented within humanity society.  This 
truly just human society, of which Christ is the founder, is really a pilgrim city sojourning 
through this land on its way to its own native country.  This interlocking complex of 
ideas allows Augustine both the critical distance by which to condemn the libido 
dominandi of the earthy city even while promoting an alternative practice of love issuing 
in changed social practices.   
Throughout it has been emphasized that Augustine’s political thought must center 
on the soteriological issues of how love is properly ordered and true justice practiced.  
This approach has been contrasted with those focusing on the ontological what of an 
ordered love that balances love of self with love of God and love of neighbor, based in an 
ordered hierarchy of goods allowing for the possibility of an overlapping earthly peace.   
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The approach taken here has been to show that Augustine is just as, if not more, 
concerned with how love is re-ordered through the mediating work of Christ.  It is 
through this work that Christ, as the true statesman, acts to promote justice by giving an 
adequate example and by creating the conditions by which others can follow this 
example.  As both the example (truth) and the means (way) Christ both unites subject and 
society and promotes the transition from one society to its alternative.  The mediation of 
Christ, by uniting both subject and society and by promoting the change between 
societies, offers a possibility of change closed off by Hegel and his various interpreters.   
 
Self-Immanenting Transcendence 
 
The mediation of Christ as God’s self-immanenting transcendence offers this 
possibility for change by integrating transcendence and immanence rather than excluding 
transcendence as inimical to the human freedom.  In the Incarnation, God the immutable 
becomes mutable; the eternal enters time.  The One raised up above all takes on the 
humility of a servant in order to raise up a humanity debased through pride.  In the 
Incarnation Christ mediates true justice and love to a humanity otherwise incapable of 
justice and love.  The self-immanenting transcendence of God allows for the breaking of 
the mere immanence of self-love issuing forth as a libido dominandi.   
If it has not been clear to this point, the self-immanenting transcendence of God 
means that God remains transcendent.  This is axiomatic for Augustine.  The persistence 
of this transcendence, however, is no threat to humanity for it is exactly in being 
transcendent that God in Christ can do for humanity what humanity could not do for 
itself.  In considering the Confessions we noted how the Incarnation allowed for the 
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congruence between God’s will and Augustine’s will such that true freedom is to will 
God’s will as the human will of the Son.  This is possible because the Incarnation affirms 
the goodness of a material (embodied) will while converting it from the will subject to 
carnal habit.  In City of God the persistence of transcendence interrupts the libido 
dominandi of sin governing human society, allowing for an alternative society of non-
competitive love and justice.  Only in this community does true freedom flourish as it 
opens to a transcendence beyond itself.  If this transcendence did not remain transcendent 
to humanity (and to creation itself) then Augustine’s position would collapse into the 
Hegelian problematic offering no resources for true change. 
Christ accomplishes the founding of an alternative society because he transcends 
the human condition of sin (but not the human condition of embodied existence), 
allowing him to act as true humanity ought to act, freely giving to God what is due to 
God and therefore also able to freely love one’s neighbor.  If God were merely 
transcendent then humanity would be able grasp God’s nature and the nature of justice.  
Humanity, however, would not be able to practice this justice because of sin.  The goal 
would be known but the way would be blocked (this is the problem of Platonism for 
Augustine).  But if God were only immanent (which would make God not God but 
merely a god), then humanity could never truly break free of bondage to sin because sin 
is exactly to will its own irrational immanence (Confessions), mistaking the masks of its 
own libido dominandi for virtue (City of God).  Holding these two positions in tension 
requires affirming God’s self-immanenting transcendence rather than merely God’s 
transcendence or God’s immanence. 
  
 
288 
 The self-immanenting transcendence of God through the Incarnation creates a 
critical distance from dominating social practices and promotes constructive change 
within and beyond these practices.  This is possible because the Incarnation 
simultaneously supplies a subjectivity free (or better, becoming free) of sinful habit along 
with coordinated social practices that promote and sustain such a subjectivity.  Hegel’s 
self-transcending immanence only posits a duality between social practices and subject 
positions (this is the opposition between Pippin and Žižek).  As was shown in chapter 
three, this supposed duality is united by emphasizing one to the exclusion of the other, a 
situation that ultimately forecloses the possibility of true change.  Hegel’s self-
transcending immanence always collapses the two (subject and society) into one (either 
normative society or radical subjectivity).  Augustine’s understanding of God’s self-
immanenting transcendence holds together three terms: two societies and the transition 
between them. This third term, or process of conversion, is linked to God’s own 
transcendence.  The two societies and the transition between them are sustained through 
God’s transcendence.  The transcendence of God disallows the conflation between 
creation and fall while God’s self-immanenting provides for the conversion from sinful 
society to its alternative.  Hegel, in conflating creation and fall, ultimately destroys the 
possibility of true change from fallen will and dominating society. For Hegel, self-
transcendence is always still immanence and therefore disallows for true change from one 
society to another.  It is for these reasons that those concerned with true social change 
should adopt a more Augustinian than Hegelian orientation regarding transcendence and 
immanence. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is not God’s fault if we do not feel at home in our creatureliness  
and in this creaturely world.1 
 
Summary 
 
 This study began by asking about the fundamental relationships between 
transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity.  These relationships were filtered through the 
issue of producing and sustaining a radical political subjectivity capable of both criticism 
and change.  Hegel and Augustine were examined according to the possibilities of each in 
supplying such a radical political subjectivity.  The issue between them concerned whether 
transcendence is inimical or essential to freedom.  Chapter 1 introduced us to two 
competing interpretations of Hegel in the forms of Robert Pippin and Slavoj Žižek. Each 
connected Hegel to a post-Kantian framework in opposition to the more metaphysical 
interpretations of Hegel.  And each regarded modern freedom as the sole premise of 
Hegel’s system.  But their non-metaphysical reading produced divergent results. We saw 
Pippin representing a ‘normative Hegel’ focused on evolutionary social practices, and 
Žižek represented a ‘radical Hegel’ focused on revolutionary subjective acts.  But it was 
found that each displayed problems in supplying a radical subjectivity capable of criticism 
and change.  Pippin’s ‘normative Hegel’ only suggested incremental changes as immanent 
criticism, but could not account for those would stand against the status quo in its entirety.  
Žižek’s ‘radical Hegel’ is articulated exactly to explode the status quo, but only in the form 
of permanent critique, never allowing for the existence of new social formation.  Each of 
                                                
1 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III/3, trans. G. W. Bromiley and R. J. Ehrlich (London: 
T&T Clark, 1960) 48. 
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these interpretations began showing the aporias of Hegel’s self-transcending immanence, 
unable to fully integrate the subject and society in a process of social transformation. 
 Chapter 2 dove headlong into Hegel’s philosophy by showing that Hegel’s system 
is both properly described as the self-transcending immanence of thought, and that his 
philosophy failed to prove itself in a non-circular manner.  We first examined the opening 
movements of Hegel’s Logic, from the being-nothing to the finite-infinite dialects, showing 
how the movements to becoming and the true infinite, respectively, were both based in a 
pervious exclusion of ‘nothing’ as the non-thought of thought, which was then later re-
included as negation. It was shown that this encounter with nothing as non-thought was the 
last attempt of Kantian Verstand in proving its independence from Vernunft.  But this 
failure of thought before nothing revealed the necessary presupposition from which the 
Logic begins, the presupposition of the pure knowing of Vernunfts beyond all divisions 
between subject and object, form and content.  It was the Phenomenology’s job to prepare 
thought for such a presupposition, undoing the divide between subject and object to which 
Verstand ceaselessly clings.  The second section of chapter 2 took three soundings from the 
Phenomenology to see in what manner it engaged the divide between subject and object.  
These three soundings focused on the encounter of consciousness with the ‘beyond’ as its 
extreme other, finding that each followed the logic of nothing and the infinite encountered 
in the Logic, preemptively configuring the beyond as the non-thought of thought.  This 
circular relationship between the Logic and the Phenomenology means that Hegel may 
have given a persuasive interpretation of subjectivity and its operations without reference 
to transcendence, but he has not necessarily proven this argument against other equally 
plausible interpretations that include transcendence.  This failure to truly discount 
  
 
291 
transcendence (because Hegel never really encounters a transcendence that is not already 
pre-configured by the self-transcending immanence of thought) means that choosing 
between Hegel’s systems and one like Augustine’s must be made only grounds other than 
the purely logical. 
 Moving from the purely logical to the practical led us to consider Hegel’s political 
philosophy as it is outlined in his Philosophy of Right.  In chapter 3 we saw Hegel offering 
an interpretation of modern freedom that attempted to unify subject and society as the 
cultivated system of rational habituation.  The subjective will as drives and desires needed 
to be rationally self-determining through an objective system of cultivated habits, allowing 
for the seamless unity of subject and society within the institutions of modern ethical life 
(family, civil society, and state).  This chapter ended by claiming that Hegel supposed 
synthesis between subject and society, based in the unity of substance and subject, fell 
apart between of its own internal tensions.  It was argued that Hegel could either be read as 
too idealistically removed from political realities that he could not offer concrete directive 
for forming a more free society, or he was too closely identified with existing socio-
political realities that he did not feel a substantial change necessary.  This conclusion 
means that one must either agree with Hegel that modern institutions are basically good, 
only requiring minimal changes (Pippin), or one must revise Hegel by emphasizing 
subjectivity to the detriment of society (Žižek).  But these options either lead to social 
conformity without change or a subjectivity that can never truly be part of a society.  In 
either case, the resources for a radical political subjectivity capable of criticism and change 
are lacking within the Hegelian framework, putting into question the plausibility of the 
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Hegelian project as one through which a more free society might be established, a desire 
emanating from modernity itself. 
 The failure of the Hegelian system of self-transcending immanence prompted a turn 
toward Augustine.  Chapter 4 introduced Augustine’s political theology through the 
interpretations of John Milbank and Eric Gregory.  Both examine Augustine through the 
backdrop of modern liberalism, the former as standing against and the latter as standing 
with it.  Both focused on Augustine’s ontological vision.  Milbank read Augustine’s 
ontology of peace against the ontologies of violence offered by postmodern Nietzscheans, 
seeking to offer an apology for theology amid secular reason.  Gregory focused on 
Augustine’s ontology of properly ordered love as a means toward offering the political 
virtue of love to civic liberalism.  In this way each affirms Augustine’s essential orientation 
toward God’s transcendence.  But it was noted that both focuses so heavily on the 
ontological aspects of Augustine that they minimize the transformative processes in which 
subjects are re-formed away from evil and toward the good. 
 Correcting this imbalance was the goal of chapters 5 and 6.  Chapter 5 focused on 
the bondage and freedom of the will.  Through a reading of Augustine’s Confessions it was 
shown how Augustine understood the process by which the will became bound to sinful 
habit and the manner in which is was reformed again.  The self-transcending immanence of 
human will could not free Augustine from the bondage to habitual sin.   Augustine’s 
analysis of sinful habit offered a contrast to Hegel’s account of rationalized habit, showing 
the pernicious problems of understanding subject and society only from within their own 
immanence.  The process of Augustine’s conversion was exhibited as the transition from 
one society and its (sinful) subjective formation into another society and its (graced) 
  
 
293 
subjective formation, all united through the mediation of the Incarnate Word through whom 
comes creation and re-creation. The mediation offered through the Incarnation, as a 
significant augmentation of Platonic participation, began to outline Augustine’s 
understanding of God’s self-immanenting transcendence.  This self-immanenting 
transcendence united subject and society because it also united ontological creation and 
soteriological re-creation. 
 Chapter 6 investigated the consequences of these transitions between societies on a 
more general level.  By looking at Augustine’s City of God we noted that, in opposition to 
Hegel’s account that could only note change after the fact, Augustine’s affirmation of the 
goodness of creation coupled with the perversion of sinful desire gives Augustine the 
critical tools by which to talk about two different societies within humanity, the earthly city 
and the city of God.  The first is oriented around the immanence of self-love while the 
second is oriented toward the transcendence of God- and neighbor-love.  This critical 
position, however, is only available to Augustine because of the mediation of justice and 
love though Christ who established the just and loving city of God.  Christ not only 
ontologically unites God- and neighbor-love because he is both human and divine, but he 
actively exemplifies this love and justice, and creates the possibility of following this 
example.  As the one who exemplified and enables love and justice, Christ is the founder of 
a loving and just society.  In these ways God’s self-immanenting transcendence moves 
human society beyond its own self-immanenting abdication of freedom in its bondage to 
sin.   
Rather than posit a duality between subject and society as Hegel does, Augustine 
posits a duality of societies and focuses on the transition (conversion) between the two. 
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This transition between two societies, effected through God’s self-immanenting 
transcendence, means that Augustine’s understanding of the subject is that it only 
transcends its previous social formation and enters a new one because God is already 
transcendent to both.  The fundamental orientation for Augustine calls for “transcending 
subjects” as the point of view from which unity between subject and society can be 
accomplished and through which change can be prompted.  In other words, the subject as 
the primary category of thought (even the subject expanded into intersubjective sociality as 
Geist) must be transcended.  Hegel, on the other hand, has been shown to emphasize 
“transcending subjects” as the basis of his thought, i.e. that subjects are self-transcending in 
nature.  In the specific arena of producing a radical political subjectivity, this fundamental 
orientation of Hegel has been shown to be lacking. 
 
Situating Results: Terrain 
 
 If this account between Hegel and Augustine is correct, then we can give a more 
precise answer to the question posed in the Introduction between Romand Coles and 
Stanley Hauerwas.  There we noted an essential difference between Coles and Hauerwas in 
regard to transcendence.  While both are devoted to the establishment of justice and 
freedom, Coles sees a positive commitment to transcendence as inimical to radical 
democratic practice, and Hauerwas sees such a commitment as indispensible for such a 
project.  The question asked by Hauerwas was, “What do radical democrats do if they do 
not confess sin?”2  After our passage through Hegel we can begin to see an answer to this 
question.  Indeed, Hegel provides Coles an answer because Hegel does have an account of 
                                                
2 Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 326. 
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confessing sin and asking for forgiveness.  As we saw in the Phenomenology, Hegel sees 
the practice of the mutual confession and forgiveness as the apex and resolution of an 
extended process of mutual recognition.  In this mutual confession and forgiveness 
humanity accomplishes its goal of mutual recognition as self-certainty, a self-certainty 
existing above natural life but without recourse to a supernatural beyond. 
 But what, exactly, is being confessed and forgiven for Hegel.  It is the ‘sin of 
existence’, the ‘sin of finitude’.  Confessing one’s own limited and one-sided perspective, 
confessing that each individual cannot truly know anything, not least itself, by itself, is to 
confess one’s finitude.  Finite being, as we saw logically in the Logic and experientially in 
the Phenomenology, is always contradictory and incomplete.  Only by passing into the true 
infinite can consciousness enter the truth of itself and others.  On the socio-political level, 
only by entering the infinite process of mutual confession and forgiveness of the sins of 
existence can human society be reconciled.  This is Hegel’s answer to the question of 
confessing one’s sin.  But we saw that this confession of the sins of existence, separated 
into the perspectives represented by Pippin and Žižek (who do not speak of confession or 
forgiveness), forego any true transformation. 
 Augustine, on the other hand, does not confess the sin of existence, but the sins of a 
disordered desire seeking domination over others.  This confession does not fault the 
finitude of existence even while does not denying the finitude of existence.  Rather this 
confession is based on properly ordering of desire beyond the self toward God and others, 
and the self-immanenting transcendence of God who actively re-orders this desire.  While 
Hegel began with the unity of sin and finitude and ends with the inability to unify subject 
and society nor conceptualize change, Augustine begins with the separation of sin and 
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finitude (creation for Augustine) and ends with the unity of subject and society and the 
ability to conceptualize the transition between societies (sinful and graced).  These 
represent the fundamental differences in orientation between those who affirm God’s self-
immanenting transcendence and those who affirms humanity’s self-transcending 
immanence. 
 It could be objected of course that to position this discussion around the 
determination of ‘sin’ already prejudices the study toward theology and transcendence.  
Indeed, the criteria used throughout concerning criticism and change could be thought to 
unfairly lead toward the Augustinian orientation of self-immanenting transcendence. It 
must be remembered, however, that it is Hegel who poses freedom as the fundamental 
project for his philosophy, attempting to secure the self-determining freedom of thought 
and action.  In examining Pippin and Žižek we saw that each attempted to continue this 
modern project through their interpretations of Hegel.  For Pippin this meant focusing on 
the normative social practices of a society as it develops its own expression of freedom.  
For Žižek this meant focusing on the revolutionary subjective act of freedom against the 
constraints of society. The former notes the place of incremental criticism as a continual 
fine-tuning of social freedom, but rejects wholesale change of the system.  The latter 
promotes wholesale change through ‘subjective destitution’ from the dominant and 
dominating social structures, but rejects a reconsolidation into a new social formation.  It is 
Pippin and Žižek, therefore, who set the criteria of social criticism and substantive change 
by which we have judged both Hegel and Augustine.  Essentially this study has drawn its 
criteria from the proponents of Hegel and showed that Hegel cannot fulfill his own 
promises within his system of self-transcending immanence.  In regard to these criteria, 
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Augustine was examined and found more successful in offering a subjectivity capable of 
criticism and change, also uniting subject and society in a more integral manner. 
  
Moving Forward: Trajectories 
 
 It could be argued there are more options than Hegel’s in understanding a political 
subjectivity oriented around immanence rather than transcendence.  This is certainly true. 
This study cannot be too quickly extended beyond the scope of those who explicitly affirm 
Hegel as a philosophical or theological resource.  To show that other philosophies or 
theologies of immanence are similarly faulty it would first have to be shown that these 
other philosophies and theologies unknowingly repeat essential Hegelian perspectives and 
arguments.  This study has not attempted to do this and, therefore, future study could take 
this analysis of Hegel and see if he represents a more general pattern or template within 
contemporary philosophies or theologies concerned with politics and social change.  If 
significant similarities were found between Hegel’s conception of human self-transcending 
immanence and others, then these criticisms could be applied.  
 Of course, philosophies and theologies of immanence need not begin with human 
subjectivity at all.  Here we return to issues set aside in the Introduction.  We initially 
discussed transcendence and immanence by conflating into two the three categories of 
transcendence offer by William Desmond.  He spoke of the transcendence (T1) of external 
objects in the world, the transcendence (T2) of self-transcending subjectivity, and the 
transcendence (T3) beyond, but in relation to, both nature/being (T1) and subjectivity 
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(T2).3  We conflated T1 and T2 as immanence and regarded T3 as transcendence.  We later 
saw that Hegel further conflated T3 within T2 as self-transcending immanence.  Those 
desiring to explore a philosophy or theology of immanence, however, could easily ground 
this in a philosophy or theology of nature that does not directly address T2 or T3 for its 
basis. If plausibly accomplished, this philosophy or theology would escape the Hegelian 
aporias explored in this study.   
 This question of nature returns us to the two issues bracketed in the Introduction.  
While Hegel effectively reduces matter to the processes of self-transcending immanence, 
Augustine relies heavily on his ontology for understanding the process of subjective 
conversion.  This study, for the most part, avoided exploring Augustine’s ontology except 
as it related to subjectivity.  Future study would need to press into this region, possibily as a 
way of assessing proposals offering a philosophy or theology of immanence based in 
nature. Augustine also utilizes a developed sense of time, history, and memory, all of 
which were also bracketed from this study except as they helped elucidate issues pertaining 
to subjectivity.  Future study could also explore these themes with an eye toward outlining 
their significance for God’s self-immanenting transcendence, either in relation to Hegel’s 
own philosophy of history (unexplored here) or other philosophies or theologies of 
immanence.  These two studies (regarding matter and time) could just as easily follow the 
same pattern here, pressing into the ambiguities of “transcending matter” and “transcending 
events.”  To these investigations I hope to turn soon.  
                                                
3 William Desmond, Hegel’s God: Counterfeit Double? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 
2-7. 
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